Cong Liao

Tingkai Zhang, Chaoyu Chen, Cong Liao et al.

Text-to-SQL conversion is a critical innovation, simplifying the transition from complex SQL to intuitive natural language queries, especially significant given SQL's prevalence in the job market across various roles. The rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) like GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 has greatly advanced this field, offering improved natural language understanding and the ability to generate nuanced SQL statements. However, the potential of open-source LLMs in Text-to-SQL applications remains underexplored, with many frameworks failing to leverage their full capabilities, particularly in handling complex database queries and incorporating feedback for iterative refinement. Addressing these limitations, this paper introduces SQLfuse, a robust system integrating open-source LLMs with a suite of tools to enhance Text-to-SQL translation's accuracy and usability. SQLfuse features four modules: schema mining, schema linking, SQL generation, and a SQL critic module, to not only generate but also continuously enhance SQL query quality. Demonstrated by its leading performance on the Spider Leaderboard and deployment by Ant Group, SQLfuse showcases the practical merits of open-source LLMs in diverse business contexts.

Cong Liao, Haoti Zhong, Anna Squicciarini et al.

Deep learning models have consistently outperformed traditional machine learning models in various classification tasks, including image classification. As such, they have become increasingly prevalent in many real world applications including those where security is of great concern. Such popularity, however, may attract attackers to exploit the vulnerabilities of the deployed deep learning models and launch attacks against security-sensitive applications. In this paper, we focus on a specific type of data poisoning attack, which we refer to as a {\em backdoor injection attack}. The main goal of the adversary performing such attack is to generate and inject a backdoor into a deep learning model that can be triggered to recognize certain embedded patterns with a target label of the attacker's choice. Additionally, a backdoor injection attack should occur in a stealthy manner, without undermining the efficacy of the victim model. Specifically, we propose two approaches for generating a backdoor that is hardly perceptible yet effective in poisoning the model. We consider two attack settings, with backdoor injection carried out either before model training or during model updating. We carry out extensive experimental evaluations under various assumptions on the adversary model, and demonstrate that such attacks can be effective and achieve a high attack success rate (above $90\%$) at a small cost of model accuracy loss (below $1\%$) with a small injection rate (around $1\%$), even under the weakest assumption wherein the adversary has no knowledge either of the original training data or the classifier model.