Nir Chemaya

Robert McLaughlin, Nir Chemaya, Dingyue Liu et al.

This paper introduces a trade ordering rule that aims to reduce intra-block price volatility in Automated Market Maker (AMM) powered decentralized exchanges. The ordering rule introduced here, Clever Look-ahead Volatility Reduction (CLVR), operates under the (common) framework in decentralized finance that allows some entities to observe trade requests before they are settled, assemble them into "blocks", and order them as they like. On AMM exchanges, asset prices are continuously and transparently updated as a result of each trade and therefore, transaction order has high financial value. CLVR aims to order transactions for traders' benefit. Our primary focus is intra-block price stability (minimizing volatility), which has two main benefits for traders: it reduces transaction failure rate and allows traders to receive closer prices to the reference price at which they submit their transactions accordingly. We show that CLVR constructs an ordering which approximately minimizes price volatility with a small computation cost and can be trivially verified externally.

Nir Chemaya, Daniel Martin

The emergent abilities of Large Language Models (LLMs), which power tools like ChatGPT and Bard, have produced both excitement and worry about how AI will impact academic writing. In response to rising concerns about AI use, authors of academic publications may decide to voluntarily disclose any AI tools they use to revise their manuscripts, and journals and conferences could begin mandating disclosure and/or turn to using detection services, as many teachers have done with student writing in class settings. Given these looming possibilities, we investigate whether academics view it as necessary to report AI use in manuscript preparation and how detectors react to the use of AI in academic writing.

Aviv Yaish, Nir Chemaya, Dahlia Malkhi et al.

Inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient are used to inform and motivate policymaking, and are increasingly applied to digital platforms. We analyze how measures fare in pseudonymous settings that are common in the digital age. One key challenge of such environments is the ability of actors to create fake identities under fictitious false names, also known as ``Sybils.'' While some actors may do so to preserve their privacy, we show that this can hamper inequality measurements: it is impossible for measures satisfying the literature's canonical set of desired properties to assess the inequality of an economy that may harbor Sybils. We characterize the class of all Sybil-proof measures, and prove that they must satisfy relaxed version of the aforementioned properties. Furthermore, we show that the structure imposed restricts the ability to assess inequality at a fine-grained level. We then apply our results to prove that popular measures are not Sybil-proof, with the famous Gini coefficient being but one example out of many. Finally, we examine dynamics leading to the creation of Sybils in digital and traditional settings.