Maxim Chupilkin

Maxim Chupilkin

How can researchers identify beliefs that large language models (LLMs) hide? As LLMs become more sophisticated and the prevalence of alignment faking increases, combined with their growing integration into high-stakes decision-making, responding to this challenge has become critical. This paper proposes that a list experiment, a simple method widely used in the social sciences, can be applied to study the hidden beliefs of LLMs. List experiments were originally developed to circumvent social desirability bias in human respondents, which closely parallels alignment faking in LLMs. The paper implements a list experiment on models developed by Anthropic, Google, and OpenAI and finds hidden approval of mass surveillance across all models, as well as some approval of torture, discrimination, and first nuclear strike. Importantly, a placebo treatment produces a null result, validating the method. The paper then compares list experiments with direct questioning and discusses the utility of the approach.

Maxim Chupilkin

This paper asks whether large language models (LLMs) can be used to study the strategic foundations of conflict and cooperation. I introduce LLMs as experimental subjects in a repeated security dilemma and evaluate whether they reproduce canonical mechanisms from international relations theory. The baseline game is extended along three theoretically central dimensions: multipolarity, finite time horizons, and the availability of communication. Across multiple models, the results exhibit systematic and consistent patterns: multipolarity increases the likelihood of conflict, finite horizons induce universal unraveling consistent with backward-induction logic, and communication reduces conflict by enabling signaling and reciprocity. Beyond observed behavior, the design provides access to agents' private reasoning and public messages, allowing choices to be linked to underlying strategic logics such as preemption, cooperation under uncertainty, and trust-building. The contribution is primarily methodological. LLM-based experiments offer a scalable, transparent, and replicable approach to probing theoretical mechanisms.

Maxim Chupilkin

Which factors determine AI propensity for military intervention? While the use of AI in war games and military planning is growing exponentially, the simple analysis of key drivers embedded in the models has not yet been done. This paper does a simple conjoint experiment proposing a model to decide on military intervention in 640 vignettes where each was run for 100 times allowing to explore AI decision on military intervention systematically. The analysis finds that largest predictors of AI decision to intervene are high domestic support and high probability of success. Costs such as international condemnation, military deaths, civilian deaths, and negative economic effect are statistically significant, but their effect is around half of domestic support and probability of victory. Closing window of opportunity only reaches statistical significance in interaction with other factors. The results are remarkably consistent across scenarios and across different models (OpenAI GPT, Anthropic Claude, Google Gemini) suggesting a pattern in AI decision-making.

Maxim Chupilkin

How does AI think about economic policy? While the use of large language models (LLMs) in economics is growing exponentially, their assumptions on economic issues remain a black box. This paper uses a conjoint experiment to tease out the main factors influencing LLMs' evaluation of economic policy. It finds that LLMs are most sensitive to unemployment, inequality, financial stability, and environmental harm and less sensitive to traditional macroeconomic concerns such as economic growth, inflation, and government debt. The results are remarkably consistent across scenarios and across models.