Muhammad Ali Siddiqi

Muhammad Ali Siddiqi, David Vrijenhoek, Lennart P. L. Landsmeer et al.

Electrophysiological recordings of neural activity in a mouse's brain are very popular among neuroscientists for understanding brain function. One particular area of interest is acquiring recordings from the Purkinje cells in the cerebellum in order to understand brain injuries and the loss of motor functions. However, current setups for such experiments do not allow the mouse to move freely and, thus, do not capture its natural behaviour since they have a wired connection between the animal's head stage and an acquisition device. In this work, we propose a lightweight neuronal-spike detection and classification architecture that leverages on the unique characteristics of the Purkinje cells to discard unneeded information from the sparse neural data in real time. This allows the (condensed) data to be easily stored on a removable storage device on the head stage, alleviating the need for wires. Synthesis results reveal a >95% overall classification accuracy while still resulting in a small-form-factor design, which allows for the free movement of mice during experiments. Moreover, the power-efficient nature of the design and the usage of STT-RAM (Spin Transfer Torque Magnetic Random Access Memory) as the removable storage allows the head stage to easily operate on a tiny battery for up to approximately 4 days.

Muhammad Ali Siddiqi, Georg Hahn, Said Hamdioui et al.

A Medical Body Area Network (MBAN) is an ensemble of collaborating, potentially heterogeneous, medical devices located inside, on the surface of or around the human body with the objective of tackling one or multiple medical conditions of the MBAN host. These devices -- which are a special category of Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs) -- collect, process and transfer medical data outside of the network, while in some cases they also administer medical treatment autonomously. Since communication is so pivotal to their operation, the newfangled IEEE 802.15.6 standard is aimed at the communication aspects of WBANs. It places a set of physical and communication constraints while it also includes association/disassociation protocols and security services that WBAN applications need to comply with. However, the security specifications put forward by the standard can be easily shown to be insufficient when considering realistic MBAN use cases and need further enhancements. The present work addresses these shortcomings by, first, providing a structured analysis of the IEEE 802.15.6 security features and, afterwards, proposing comprehensive and tangible recommendations on improving the standard's security.

Muhammad Ali Siddiqi, Christian Doerr, Christos Strydis

Over the past decade, focus on the security and privacy aspects of implantable medical devices (IMDs) has intensified, driven by the multitude of cybersecurity vulnerabilities found in various existing devices. However, due to their strict computational, energy and physical constraints, conventional security protocols are not directly applicable to IMDs. Custom-tailored schemes have been proposed instead which, however, fail to cover the full spectrum of security features that modern IMDs and their ecosystems so critically require. In this paper we propose IMDfence, a security protocol for IMD ecosystems that provides a comprehensive yet practical security portfolio, which includes availability, non-repudiation, access control, entity authentication, remote monitoring and system scalability. The protocol also allows emergency access that results in the graceful degradation of offered services without compromising security and patient safety. The performance of the security protocol as well as its feasibility and impact on modern IMDs are extensively analyzed and evaluated. We find that IMDfence achieves the above security requirements at a mere less than 7% increase in total IMD energy consumption, and less than 14 ms and 9 kB increase in system delay and memory footprint, respectively.

Muhammad Ali Siddiqi, Christos Strydis

Modern Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) feature wireless connectivity, which makes them vulnerable to security attacks. Particular to IMDs is the battery Denial-of-Service attack whereby attackers aim to fully deplete the battery by occupying the IMD with continuous authentication requests. Zero-Power Defense (ZPD) based on energy harvesting is known to be an excellent protection against these attacks. This paper establishes essential design specifications for employing ZPD techniques in IMDs, offers a critical review of ZPD techniques found in literature and, subsequently, gives crucial recommendations for developing comprehensive ZPD solutions.

Muhammad Ali Siddiqi, Christos Strydis

Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) such as pacemakers and neurostimulators are highly constrained in terms of energy. In addition, the wireless-communication facilities of these devices also impose security requirements considering their life-critical nature. However, security solutions that provide considerable coverage are generally considered to be too taxing on an IMD battery. Consequently, there has been a tendency to adopt ultra-lightweight security primitives for IMDs in literature. In this work, we demonstrate that the recent advances in embedded computing in fact enable the IMDs to use more mainstream security primitives, which do not need to compromise significantly on security for fear of impacting IMD autonomy.