Dong Hao

Zeyu Zhang, Lu Li, Shuyan Wan et al.

The paper discusses signed graphs, which model friendly or antagonistic relationships using edges marked with positive or negative signs, focusing on the task of link sign prediction. While Signed Graph Neural Networks (SGNNs) have advanced, they face challenges like graph sparsity and unbalanced triangles. The authors propose using data augmentation (DA) techniques to address these issues, although many existing methods are not suitable for signed graphs due to a lack of side information. They highlight that the random DropEdge method, a rare DA approach applicable to signed graphs, does not enhance link sign prediction performance. In response, they introduce the Signed Graph Augmentation (SGA) framework, which includes a structure augmentation module to identify candidate edges and a strategy for selecting beneficial candidates, ultimately improving SGNN training. Experimental results show that SGA significantly boosts the performance of SGNN models, with a notable 32.3% improvement in F1-micro for SGCN on the Slashdot dataset.

Bin Li, Dong Hao, Dengji Zhao

This paper studies multi-unit auctions powered by intermediaries, where each intermediary owns a private set of unit-demand buyers and all intermediaries are networked with each other. Our goal is to incentivize the intermediaries to diffuse the auction information to individuals they can reach, including their private buyers and neighboring intermediaries, so that more potential buyers are able to participate in the auction. To this end, we build a diffusion-based auction framework which incorporates the strategic interaction of intermediaries. It is showed that the classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism within the framework can achieve the maximum social welfare, but it may decrease the seller's revenue or even lead to a deficit. To overcome the revenue issue, we propose a novel auction, called critical neighborhood auction, which not only maximizes the social welfare, but also improves the seller's revenue comparing to the VCG mechanism with/without intermediaries.

Zeyu Zhang, Shuyan Wan, Sijie Wang et al.

Signed Graph Neural Networks (SGNNs) are vital for analyzing complex patterns in real-world signed graphs containing positive and negative links. However, three key challenges hinder current SGNN-based signed graph representation learning: sparsity in signed graphs leaves latent structures undiscovered, unbalanced triangles pose representation difficulties for SGNN models, and real-world signed graph datasets often lack supplementary information like node labels and features. These constraints limit the potential of SGNN-based representation learning. We address these issues with data augmentation techniques. Despite many graph data augmentation methods existing for unsigned graphs, none are tailored for signed graphs. Our paper introduces the novel Signed Graph Augmentation framework (SGA), comprising three main components. First, we employ the SGNN model to encode the signed graph, extracting latent structural information for candidate augmentation structures. Second, we evaluate these candidate samples (edges) and select the most beneficial ones for modifying the original training set. Third, we propose a novel augmentation perspective that assigns varying training difficulty to training samples, enabling the design of a new training strategy. Extensive experiments on six real-world datasets (Bitcoin-alpha, Bitcoin-otc, Epinions, Slashdot, Wiki-elec, and Wiki-RfA) demonstrate that SGA significantly improves performance across multiple benchmarks. Our method outperforms baselines by up to 22.2% in AUC for SGCN on Wiki-RfA, 33.3% in F1-binary, 48.8% in F1-micro, and 36.3% in F1-macro for GAT on Bitcoin-alpha in link sign prediction.

Ratha Pech, Dong Hao, Yan-Li Lee et al.

Drug-target interaction (DTI) prediction plays a very important role in drug development and drug discovery. Biochemical experiments or \textit{in vitro} methods are very expensive, laborious and time-consuming. Therefore, \textit{in silico} approaches including docking simulation and machine learning have been proposed to solve this problem. In particular, machine learning approaches have attracted increasing attentions recently. However, in addition to the known drug-target interactions, most of the machine learning methods require extra characteristic information such as chemical structures, genome sequences, binding types and so on. Whenever such information is not available, they may perform poor. Very recently, the similarity-based link prediction methods were extended to bipartite networks, which can be applied to solve the DTI prediction problem by using topological information only. In this work, we propose a method based on low-rank matrix projection to solve the DTI prediction problem. On one hand, when there is no extra characteristic information of drugs or targets, the proposed method utilizes only the known interactions. On the other hand, the proposed method can also utilize the extra characteristic information when it is available and the performances will be remarkably improved. Moreover, the proposed method can predict the interactions associated with new drugs or targets of which we know nothing about their associated interactions, but only some characteristic information. We compare the proposed method with ten baseline methods, e.g., six similarity-based methods that utilize only the known interactions and four methods that utilize the extra characteristic information. The datasets and codes implementing the simulations are available at https://github.com/rathapech/DTI_LMP.

Han Yang, Dong Hao, Zhuohan Wang et al.

Automatically discovering formulaic alpha factors is a central problem in quantitative finance. Existing methods often ignore syntactic and semantic constraints, relying on exhaustive search over unstructured and unbounded spaces. We present AlphaCFG, a grammar-based framework for defining and discovering alpha factors that are syntactically valid, financially interpretable, and computationally efficient. AlphaCFG uses an alpha-oriented context-free grammar to define a tree-structured, size-controlled search space, and formulates alpha discovery as a tree-structured linguistic Markov decision process, which is then solved using a grammar-aware Monte Carlo Tree Search guided by syntax-sensitive value and policy networks. Experiments on Chinese and U.S. stock market datasets show that AlphaCFG outperforms state-of-the-art baselines in both search efficiency and trading profitability. Beyond trading strategies, AlphaCFG serves as a general framework for symbolic factor discovery and refinement across quantitative finance, including asset pricing and portfolio construction.

Lijun Wu, Dong Hao, Zhiyi Fan

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have achieved outstanding performance across a wide range of graph-related tasks. However, their "black-box" nature poses significant challenges to their explainability, and existing methods often fail to effectively capture the intricate interaction patterns among nodes within the network. In this work, we propose a novel explainability framework, GraphEXT, which leverages cooperative game theory and the concept of social externalities. GraphEXT partitions graph nodes into coalitions, decomposing the original graph into independent subgraphs. By integrating graph structure as an externality and incorporating the Shapley value under externalities, GraphEXT quantifies node importance through their marginal contributions to GNN predictions as the nodes transition between coalitions. Unlike traditional Shapley value-based methods that primarily focus on node attributes, our GraphEXT places greater emphasis on the interactions among nodes and the impact of structural changes on GNN predictions. Experimental studies on both synthetic and real-world datasets show that GraphEXT outperforms existing baseline methods in terms of fidelity across diverse GNN architectures , significantly enhancing the explainability of GNN models.

Yuhang Guo, Dong Hao, Bin Li et al.

Strategyproofness in network auctions requires that bidders not only report their valuations truthfully, but also do their best to invite neighbours from the social network. In contrast to canonical auctions, where the value-monotone allocation in Myerson's Lemma is a cornerstone, a general principle of allocation rules for strategyproof network auctions is still missing. We show that, due to the absence of such a principle, even extensions to multi-unit network auctions with single-unit demand present unexpected difficulties, and all pioneering researches fail to be strategyproof. For the first time in this field, we identify two categories of monotone allocation rules on networks: Invitation-Depressed Monotonicity (ID-MON) and Invitation-Promoted Monotonicity (IP-MON). They encompass all existing allocation rules of network auctions as specific instances. For any given ID-MON or IP-MON allocation rule, we characterize the existence and sufficient conditions for the strategyproof payment rules, and show that among all such payment rules, the revenue-maximizing one exists and is computationally feasible. With these results, the obstacle of combinatorial network auction with single-minded bidders is now resolved.

Yifan Huang, Dong Hao, Zhiyi Fan et al.

Reserve prices are widely used in practice. The problem of designing revenue-optimal auctions based on reserve price has drawn much attention in the auction design community. Although they have been extensively studied, most developments rely on the significant assumption that the target audience of the sale is directly reachable by the auctioneer, while a large portion of bidders in the economic network unaware of the sale are omitted. This work follows the diffusion auction design, which aims to extend the target audience of optimal auction theory to all entities in economic networks. We investigate the design of simple and provably near-optimal network auctions via reserve price. Using Bayesian approximation analysis, we provide a simple and explicit form of the reserve price function tailored to the most representative network auction. We aim to balance setting a sufficiently high reserve price to induce high revenue in a successful sale, and attracting more buyers from the network to increase the probability of a successful sale. This reserve price function preserves incentive compatibility for network auctions, allowing the seller to extract additional revenue beyond that achieved by the Myerson optimal auction. Specifically, if the seller has $ρ$ direct neighbours in a network of size $n$, this reserve price guarantees a $1-{1 \over ρ}$ approximation to the theoretical upper bound, i.e., the maximum possible revenue from any network of size $n$. This result holds for any size and any structure of the networked market.

Qi Shi, Dong Hao

In a crowdsourcing contest, a principal holding a task posts it to a crowd. People in the crowd then compete with each other to win the rewards. Although in real life, a crowd is usually networked and people influence each other via social ties, existing crowdsourcing contest theories do not aim to answer how interpersonal relationships influence people's incentives and behaviors and thereby affect the crowdsourcing performance. In this work, we novelly take people's social ties as a key factor in the modeling and designing of agents' incentives in crowdsourcing contests. We establish two contest mechanisms by which the principal can impel the agents to invite their neighbors to contribute to the task. The first mechanism has a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and it is very simple for agents to play and easy for the principal to predict the contest performance. The second mechanism has an asymmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and agents' behaviors in equilibrium show a vast diversity which is strongly related to their social relations. The Bayesian Nash equilibrium analysis of these new mechanisms reveals that, besides agents' intrinsic abilities, the social relations among them also play a central role in decision-making. Moreover, we design an effective algorithm to automatically compute the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the invitation crowdsourcing contest and further adapt it to a large graph dataset. Both theoretical and empirical results show that the new invitation crowdsourcing contests can substantially enlarge the number of participants, whereby the principal can obtain significantly better solutions without a large advertisement expenditure.

Yuhang Guo, Dong Hao

In recent years, a new branch of auction models called diffusion auction has extended the traditional auction into social network scenarios. The diffusion auction models the auction as a networked market whose nodes are potential customers and whose edges are the relations between these customers. The diffusion auction mechanism can incentivize buyers to not only submit a truthful bid, but also further invite their surrounding neighbors to participate into the auction. It can convene more participants than traditional auction mechanisms, which leads to better optimizations of different key aspects, such as social welfare, seller's revenue, amount of redistributed money and so on. The diffusion auctions have recently attracted a discrete interest in the algorithmic game theory and market design communities. This survey summarizes the current progress of diffusion auctions.

Bin Li, Dong Hao, Dengji Zhao et al.

Auction is the common paradigm for resource allocation which is a fundamental problem in human society. Existing research indicates that the two primary objectives, the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency, are generally conflicting in auction design. For the first time, we expand the domain of the classic auction to a social graph and formally identify a new class of auction mechanisms on graphs. All mechanisms in this class are incentive-compatible and also promote all buyers to diffuse the auction information to others, whereby both the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency are significantly improved comparing with the Vickrey auction. It is found that the recently proposed information diffusion mechanism is an extreme case with the lowest revenue in this new class. Our work could potentially inspire a new perspective for the efficient and optimal auction design and could be applied into the prevalent online social and economic networks.

Dengji Zhao, Bin Li, Junping Xu et al.

We consider a market where a seller sells multiple units of a commodity in a social network. Each node/buyer in the social network can only directly communicate with her neighbours, i.e. the seller can only sell the commodity to her neighbours if she could not find a way to inform other buyers. In this paper, we design a novel promotion mechanism that incentivizes all buyers, who are aware of the sale, to invite all their neighbours to join the sale, even though there is no guarantee that their efforts will be paid. While traditional sale promotions such as sponsored search auctions cannot guarantee a positive return for the advertiser (the seller), our mechanism guarantees that the seller's revenue is better than not using the advertising. More importantly, the seller does not need to pay if the advertising is not beneficial to her.

Bin Li, Dong Hao, Dengji Zhao et al.

In an economic market, sellers, infomediaries and customers constitute an economic network. Each seller has her own customer group and the seller's private customers are unobservable to other sellers. Therefore, a seller can only sell commodities among her own customers unless other sellers or infomediaries share her sale information to their customer groups. However, a seller is not incentivized to share others' sale information by default, which leads to inefficient resource allocation and limited revenue for the sale. To tackle this problem, we develop a novel mechanism called customer sharing mechanism (CSM) which incentivizes all sellers to share each other's sale information to their private customer groups. Furthermore, CSM also incentivizes all customers to truthfully participate in the sale. In the end, CSM not only allocates the commodities efficiently but also optimizes the seller's revenue.

Dong Hao, Kai Li, Tao Zhou

Repeated game has long been the touchstone model for agents' long-run relationships. Previous results suggest that it is particularly difficult for a repeated game player to exert an autocratic control on the payoffs since they are jointly determined by all participants. This work discovers that the scale of a player's capability to unilaterally influence the payoffs may have been much underestimated. Under the conventional iterated prisoner's dilemma, we develop a general framework for controlling the feasible region where the players' payoff pairs lie. A control strategy player is able to confine the payoff pairs in her objective region, as long as this region has feasible linear boundaries. With this framework, many well-known existing strategies can be categorized and various new strategies with nice properties can be further identified. We show that the control strategies perform well either in a tournament or against a human-like opponent.

Ratha Pech, Dong Hao, Liming Pan et al.

Inspired by practical importance of social networks, economic networks, biological networks and so on, studies on large and complex networks have attracted a surge of attentions in the recent years. Link prediction is a fundamental issue to understand the mechanisms by which new links are added to the networks. We introduce the method of robust principal component analysis (robust PCA) into link prediction, and estimate the missing entries of the adjacency matrix. On one hand, our algorithm is based on the sparsity and low rank property of the matrix, on the other hand, it also performs very well when the network is dense. This is because a relatively dense real network is also sparse in comparison to the complete graph. According to extensive experiments on real networks from disparate fields, when the target network is connected and sufficiently dense, whatever it is weighted or unweighted, our method is demonstrated to be very effective and with prediction accuracy being considerably improved comparing with many state-of-the-art algorithms.