Naci Saldi

Naci Saldi, Tamer Başar, Maxim Raginsky

In this paper, we consider discrete-time dynamic games of the mean-field type with a finite number $N$ of agents subject to an infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criterion. The state space of each agent is a locally compact Polish space. At each time, the agents are coupled through the empirical distribution of their states, which affects both the agents' individual costs and their state transition probabilities. We introduce a new solution concept of the Markov-Nash equilibrium, under which a policy is player-by-player optimal in the class of all Markov policies. Under mild assumptions, we demonstrate the existence of a mean-field equilibrium in the infinite-population limit $N \to \infty$, and then show that the policy obtained from the mean-field equilibrium is approximately Markov-Nash when the number of agents $N$ is sufficiently large.

Naci Saldi, Tamer Basar, Maxim Raginsky

Establishing the existence of Nash equilibria for partially observed stochastic dynamic games is known to be quite challenging, with the difficulties stemming from the noisy nature of the measurements available to individual players (agents) and the decentralized nature of this information. When the number of players is sufficiently large and the interactions among agents is of the mean-field type, one way to overcome this challenge is to investigate the infinite-population limit of the problem, which leads to a mean-field game. In this paper, we consider discrete-time partially observed mean-field games with infinite-horizon discounted cost criteria. Using the technique of converting the original partially observed stochastic control problem to a fully observed one on the belief space and the dynamic programming principle, we establish the existence of Nash equilibria for these game models under very mild technical conditions. Then, we show that the mean-field equilibrium policy, when adopted by each agent, forms an approximate Nash equilibrium for games with sufficiently many agents.

Naci Saldi, Serdar Yüksel, Tamás Linder

In this paper, we consider finite model approximations of a large class of static and dynamic team problems where these models are constructed through uniform quantization of the observation and action spaces of the agents. The strategies obtained from these finite models are shown to approximate the optimal cost with arbitrary precision under mild technical assumptions. In particular, quantized team policies are asymptotically optimal. This result is then applied to Witsenhausen's celebrated counterexample and the Gaussian relay channel problem. For the Witsenhausen's counterexample, our approximation approach provides, to our knowledge, the first rigorously established result that one can construct an $\varepsilon$-optimal strategy for any $\varepsilon > 0$ through a solution of a simpler problem.

Naci Saldi, Serdar Yüksel, Tamás Linder

We consider finite model approximations of discrete-time partially observed Markov decision processes (POMDPs) under the discounted cost criterion. After converting the original partially observed stochastic control problem to a fully observed one on the belief space, the finite models are obtained through the uniform quantization of the state and action spaces of the belief space Markov decision process (MDP). Under mild assumptions on the components of the original model, it is established that the policies obtained from these finite models are nearly optimal for the belief space MDP, and so, for the original partially observed problem. The assumptions essentially require that the belief space MDP satisfies a mild weak continuity condition. We provide examples and introduce explicit approximation procedures for the quantization of the set of probability measures on the state space of POMDP (i.e., belief space).

Uğur Aydın, Naci Saldi

In this paper, we investigate the robustness of stationary mean-field equilibria in the presence of model uncertainties, specifically focusing on infinite-horizon discounted cost functions. To achieve this, we initially establish convergence conditions for value iteration-based algorithms in mean-field games. Subsequently, utilizing these results, we demonstrate that the mean-field equilibrium obtained through this value iteration algorithm remains robust even in the face of system dynamics misspecifications. We then apply these robustness findings to the finite model approximation problem in mean-field games, showing that if the state space quantization is fine enough, the mean-field equilibrium for the finite model closely approximates the nominal one.

Naci Saldi, Can Deha Karıksız, Maxim Raginsky et al.

In this paper, we consider non-signaling approximation of finite stochastic teams. We first introduce a hierarchy of team decision rules that can be classified in an increasing order as randomized policies, quantum-correlated policies, and non-signaling policies. Then, we establish an approximation of team-optimal policies for sequential teams via extendible non-signaling policies. We prove that the distance between extendible non-signaling policies and decentralized policies is small if the extension is sufficiently large. Using this result, we establish a linear programming (LP) approximation of sequential teams. Finally, we state an open problem regarding computation of optimal value of quantum-correlated policies.

Berkay Anahtarci, Can Deha Kariksiz, Naci Saldi

This paper explores the use of Maximum Causal Entropy Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) within the context of discrete-time stationary Mean-Field Games (MFGs) characterized by finite state spaces and an infinite-horizon, discounted-reward setting. Although the resulting optimization problem is non-convex with respect to policies, we reformulate it as a convex optimization problem in terms of state-action occupation measures by leveraging the linear programming framework of Markov Decision Processes. Based on this convex reformulation, we introduce a gradient descent algorithm with a guaranteed convergence rate to efficiently compute the optimal solution. Moreover, we develop a new method that conceptualizes the MFG problem as a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (GNEP), enabling effective computation of the mean-field equilibrium for forward reinforcement learning (RL) problems and marking an advancement in MFG solution techniques. We further illustrate the practical applicability of our GNEP approach by employing this algorithm to generate data for numerical MFG examples.

Berkay Anahtarci, Can Deha Kariksiz, Naci Saldi

We consider the maximum causal entropy inverse reinforcement learning problem for infinite-horizon stationary mean-field games, in which we model the unknown reward function within a reproducing kernel Hilbert space. This allows the inference of rich and potentially nonlinear reward structures directly from expert demonstrations, in contrast to most existing inverse reinforcement learning approaches for mean-field games that typically restrict the reward function to a linear combination of a fixed finite set of basis functions. We also focus on the infinite-horizon cost structure, whereas prior studies primarily rely on finite-horizon formulations. We introduce a Lagrangian relaxation to this maximum causal entropy inverse reinforcement learning problem that enables us to reformulate it as an unconstrained log-likelihood maximization problem, and obtain a solution \lk{via} a gradient ascent algorithm. To illustrate the theoretical consistency of the algorithm, we establish the smoothness of the log-likelihood objective by proving the Fréchet differentiability of the related soft Bellman operators with respect to the parameters in the reproducing kernel Hilbert space. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method on a mean-field traffic routing game, where it accurately recovers expert behavior.

Naci Saldi, Serdar Yuksel

We introduce a novel topology, called Kernel Mean Embedding Topology, for stochastic kernels, in a weak and strong form. This topology, defined on the spaces of Bochner integrable functions from a signal space to a space of probability measures endowed with a Hilbert space structure, allows for a versatile formulation. This construction allows one to obtain both a strong and weak formulation. (i) For its weak formulation, we highlight the utility on relaxed policy spaces, and investigate connections with the Young narrow topology and Borkar (or \( w^* \))-topology, and establish equivalence properties. We report that, while both the \( w^* \)-topology and kernel mean embedding topology are relatively compact, they are not closed. Conversely, while the Young narrow topology is closed, it lacks relative compactness. (ii) We show that the strong form provides an appropriate formulation for placing topologies on spaces of models characterized by stochastic kernels with explicit robustness and learning theoretic implications on optimal stochastic control under discounted or average cost criteria. (iii) We thus show that this topology possesses several properties making it ideal to study optimality and approximations (under the weak formulation) and robustness (under the strong formulation) for many applications.

Ali Devran Kara, Naci Saldi, Serdar Yüksel

Reinforcement learning algorithms often require finiteness of state and action spaces in Markov decision processes (MDPs) (also called controlled Markov chains) and various efforts have been made in the literature towards the applicability of such algorithms for continuous state and action spaces. In this paper, we show that under very mild regularity conditions (in particular, involving only weak continuity of the transition kernel of an MDP), Q-learning for standard Borel MDPs via quantization of states and actions (called Quantized Q-Learning) converges to a limit, and furthermore this limit satisfies an optimality equation which leads to near optimality with either explicit performance bounds or which are guaranteed to be asymptotically optimal. Our approach builds on (i) viewing quantization as a measurement kernel and thus a quantized MDP as a partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP), (ii) utilizing near optimality and convergence results of Q-learning for POMDPs, and (iii) finally, near-optimality of finite state model approximations for MDPs with weakly continuous kernels which we show to correspond to the fixed point of the constructed POMDP. Thus, our paper presents a very general convergence and approximation result for the applicability of Q-learning for continuous MDPs.

Berkay Anahtarci, Can Deha Kariksiz, Naci Saldi

In this paper, we introduce a regularized mean-field game and study learning of this game under an infinite-horizon discounted reward function. Regularization is introduced by adding a strongly concave regularization function to the one-stage reward function in the classical mean-field game model. We establish a value iteration based learning algorithm to this regularized mean-field game using fitted Q-learning. The regularization term in general makes reinforcement learning algorithm more robust to the system components. Moreover, it enables us to establish error analysis of the learning algorithm without imposing restrictive convexity assumptions on the system components, which are needed in the absence of a regularization term.

Berkay Anahtarcı, Can Deha Karıksız, Naci Saldi

We consider learning approximate Nash equilibria for discrete-time mean-field games with nonlinear stochastic state dynamics subject to both average and discounted costs. To this end, we introduce a mean-field equilibrium (MFE) operator, whose fixed point is a mean-field equilibrium (i.e. equilibrium in the infinite population limit). We first prove that this operator is a contraction, and propose a learning algorithm to compute an approximate mean-field equilibrium by approximating the MFE operator with a random one. Moreover, using the contraction property of the MFE operator, we establish the error analysis of the proposed learning algorithm. We then show that the learned mean-field equilibrium constitutes an approximate Nash equilibrium for finite-agent games.

Naci Saldi, Tamer Basar, Maxim Raginsky

In this paper, we study a class of discrete-time mean-field games under the infinite-horizon risk-sensitive discounted-cost optimality criterion. Risk-sensitivity is introduced for each agent (player) via an exponential utility function. In this game model, each agent is coupled with the rest of the population through the empirical distribution of the states, which affects both the agent's individual cost and its state dynamics. Under mild assumptions, we establish the existence of a mean-field equilibrium in the infinite-population limit as the number of agents ($N$) goes to infinity, and then show that the policy obtained from the mean-field equilibrium constitutes an approximate Nash equilibrium when $N$ is sufficiently large.

Naci Saldi, Serdar Yüksel, Tamás Linder

Calculating optimal policies is known to be computationally difficult for Markov decision processes (MDPs) with Borel state and action spaces. This paper studies finite-state approximations of discrete time Markov decision processes with Borel state and action spaces, for both discounted and average costs criteria. The stationary policies thus obtained are shown to approximate the optimal stationary policy with arbitrary precision under quite general conditions for discounted cost and more restrictive conditions for average cost. For compact-state MDPs, we obtain explicit rate of convergence bounds quantifying how the approximation improves as the size of the approximating finite state space increases. Using information theoretic arguments, the order optimality of the obtained convergence rates is established for a large class of problems. We also show that, as a pre-processing step the action space can also be finitely approximated with sufficiently large number points; thereby, well known algorithms, such as value or policy iteration, Q-learning, etc., can be used to calculate near optimal policies.