Kobi Hackenburg

Christopher Summerfield, Lisa Argyle, Michiel Bakker et al. · stanford

Advanced AI systems capable of generating humanlike text and multimodal content are now widely available. In this paper, we discuss the impacts that generative artificial intelligence may have on democratic processes. We consider the consequences of AI for citizens' ability to make informed choices about political representatives and issues (epistemic impacts). We ask how AI might be used to destabilise or support democratic mechanisms like elections (material impacts). Finally, we discuss whether AI will strengthen or weaken democratic principles (foundational impacts). It is widely acknowledged that new AI systems could pose significant challenges for democracy. However, it has also been argued that generative AI offers new opportunities to educate and learn from citizens, strengthen public discourse, help people find common ground, and to reimagine how democracies might work better.

Paul Röttger, Kobi Hackenburg, Hannah Rose Kirk et al.

Hundreds of millions of people use artificial intelligence (AI) for writing assistance. Here, we evaluated how AI writing assistance distorts writer personas - their perceived beliefs, personality, and identity. In three large-scale experiments, writers (N=2,939) wrote political opinion paragraphs with and without AI assistance. Separate groups of readers (N=11,091) blindly evaluated these paragraphs across 29 socially salient dimensions of reader perception, spanning political opinion, writing quality, writer personality, emotions, and demographics. AI writing assistance produced persona distortions across all dimensions: with AI, writers seemed more opinionated, competent, and positive, and their perceived demographic profile shifted towards more privileged groups. Writers objected to many of the observed distortions, yet continued to prefer AI-assisted text even when made aware of them. We successfully mitigated objectionable persona distortions at the model level by training reward models on our experimental data (10,008 paragraphs, 2,903,596 ratings) to steer AI outputs towards faithful representation of writer stance. However, this came at a cost to user acceptance, suggesting an entanglement between desirable and undesirable properties of AI writing assistance that may be difficult to resolve. Together, our findings demonstrate that persona distortions from AI writing assistance are pervasive and persistent even under realistic conditions of human oversight, which carries implications for public discourse, trust, and democratic deliberation that scale with AI adoption.

Lennart Luettgau, Hannah Rose Kirk, Kobi Hackenburg et al.

Conversational AI systems are increasingly being used in place of traditional search engines to help users complete information-seeking tasks. This has raised concerns in the political domain, where biased or hallucinated outputs could misinform voters or distort public opinion. However, in spite of these concerns, the extent to which conversational AI is used for political information-seeking, as well the potential impact of this use on users' political knowledge, remains uncertain. Here, we address these questions: First, in a representative national survey of the UK public (N = 2,499), we find that in the week before the 2024 election as many as 32% of chatbot users - and 13% of eligible UK voters - have used conversational AI to seek political information relevant to their electoral choice. Second, in a series of randomised controlled trials (N = 2,858 total) we find that across issues, models, and prompting strategies, task-directed conversations with AI to research specific political topics increase political knowledge (increase belief in true information and decrease belief in misinformation) to the same extent as self-directed Google search. Taken together, our results suggest that people in the UK are increasingly turning to conversational AI for information about politics. These findings substantially extend prior work by demonstrating that conversational AI's effects on political knowledge generalise across multiple topics, political perspectives, and model families, suggesting that the shift toward AI-assisted political information-seeking may not lead to increased public belief in political misinformation.

Angus R. Williams, Liam Burke-Moore, Ryan Sze-Yin Chan et al.

Advances in large language models have raised concerns about their potential use in generating compelling election disinformation at scale. This study presents a two-part investigation into the capabilities of LLMs to automate stages of an election disinformation operation. First, we introduce DisElect, a novel evaluation dataset designed to measure LLM compliance with instructions to generate content for an election disinformation operation in localised UK context, containing 2,200 malicious prompts and 50 benign prompts. Using DisElect, we test 13 LLMs and find that most models broadly comply with these requests; we also find that the few models which refuse malicious prompts also refuse benign election-related prompts, and are more likely to refuse to generate content from a right-wing perspective. Secondly, we conduct a series of experiments (N=2,340) to assess the "humanness" of LLMs: the extent to which disinformation operation content generated by an LLM is able to pass as human-written. Our experiments suggest that almost all LLMs tested released since 2022 produce election disinformation operation content indiscernible by human evaluators over 50% of the time. Notably, we observe that multiple models achieve above-human levels of humanness. Taken together, these findings suggest that current LLMs can be used to generate high-quality content for election disinformation operations, even in hyperlocalised scenarios, at far lower costs than traditional methods, and offer researchers and policymakers an empirical benchmark for the measurement and evaluation of these capabilities in current and future models.

Kobi Hackenburg, Luke Hewitt, Caroline Wagner et al.

There is substantial concern about the ability of advanced artificial intelligence to influence people's behaviour. A rapidly growing body of research has found that AI can produce large persuasive effects on people's attitudes, but whether AI can persuade people to take consequential real-world actions has remained unclear. In two large preregistered experiments N=17,950 responses from 14,779 people), we used conversational AI models to persuade participants on a range of attitudinal and behavioural outcomes, including signing real petitions and donating money to charity. We found sizable AI persuasion effects on these behavioural outcomes (e.g. +19.7 percentage points on petition signing). However, we observed no evidence of a correlation between AI persuasion effects on attitudes and behaviour. Moreover, we replicated prior findings that information provision drove effects on attitudes, but found no such evidence for our behavioural outcomes. In a test of eight behavioural persuasion strategies, all outperformed the most effective attitudinal persuasion strategy, but differences among the eight were small. Taken together, these results suggest that previous findings relying on attitudinal outcomes may generalize poorly to behaviour, and therefore risk substantially mischaracterizing the real-world behavioural impact of AI persuasion.

Kobi Hackenburg, Ben M. Tappin, Luke Hewitt et al.

There are widespread fears that conversational AI could soon exert unprecedented influence over human beliefs. Here, in three large-scale experiments (N=76,977), we deployed 19 LLMs-including some post-trained explicitly for persuasion-to evaluate their persuasiveness on 707 political issues. We then checked the factual accuracy of 466,769 resulting LLM claims. Contrary to popular concerns, we show that the persuasive power of current and near-future AI is likely to stem more from post-training and prompting methods-which boosted persuasiveness by as much as 51% and 27% respectively-than from personalization or increasing model scale. We further show that these methods increased persuasion by exploiting LLMs' unique ability to rapidly access and strategically deploy information and that, strikingly, where they increased AI persuasiveness they also systematically decreased factual accuracy.

Paul Röttger, Musashi Hinck, Valentin Hofmann et al. · allen-ai

Large language models (LLMs) are helping millions of users write texts about diverse issues, and in doing so expose users to different ideas and perspectives. This creates concerns about issue bias, where an LLM tends to present just one perspective on a given issue, which in turn may influence how users think about this issue. So far, it has not been possible to measure which issue biases LLMs manifest in real user interactions, making it difficult to address the risks from biased LLMs. Therefore, we create IssueBench: a set of 2.49m realistic English-language prompts to measure issue bias in LLM writing assistance, which we construct based on 3.9k templates (e.g. "write a blog about") and 212 political issues (e.g. "AI regulation") from real user interactions. Using IssueBench, we show that issue biases are common and persistent in 10 state-of-the-art LLMs. We also show that biases are very similar across models, and that all models align more with US Democrat than Republican voter opinion on a subset of issues. IssueBench can easily be adapted to include other issues, templates, or tasks. By enabling robust and realistic measurement, we hope that IssueBench can bring a new quality of evidence to ongoing discussions about LLM biases and how to address them.

Christopher Summerfield, Lennart Luettgau, Magda Dubois et al.

We examine recent research that asks whether current AI systems may be developing a capacity for "scheming" (covertly and strategically pursuing misaligned goals). We compare current research practices in this field to those adopted in the 1970s to test whether non-human primates could master natural language. We argue that there are lessons to be learned from that historical research endeavour, which was characterised by an overattribution of human traits to other agents, an excessive reliance on anecdote and descriptive analysis, and a failure to articulate a strong theoretical framework for the research. We recommend that research into AI scheming actively seeks to avoid these pitfalls. We outline some concrete steps that can be taken for this research programme to advance in a productive and scientifically rigorous fashion.

Kobi Hackenburg, Ben M. Tappin, Paul Röttger et al.

Large language models can now generate political messages as persuasive as those written by humans, raising concerns about how far this persuasiveness may continue to increase with model size. Here, we generate 720 persuasive messages on 10 U.S. political issues from 24 language models spanning several orders of magnitude in size. We then deploy these messages in a large-scale randomized survey experiment (N = 25,982) to estimate the persuasive capability of each model. Our findings are twofold. First, we find evidence of a log scaling law: model persuasiveness is characterized by sharply diminishing returns, such that current frontier models are barely more persuasive than models smaller in size by an order of magnitude or more. Second, mere task completion (coherence, staying on topic) appears to account for larger models' persuasive advantage. These findings suggest that further scaling model size will not much increase the persuasiveness of static LLM-generated messages.