Helen Margetts

Vincent J. Straub, Deborah Morgan, Jonathan Bright et al.

Recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI), especially in generative language modelling, hold the promise of transforming government. Given the advanced capabilities of new AI systems, it is critical that these are embedded using standard operational procedures, clear epistemic criteria, and behave in alignment with the normative expectations of society. Scholars in multiple domains have subsequently begun to conceptualize the different forms that AI applications may take, highlighting both their potential benefits and pitfalls. However, the literature remains fragmented, with researchers in social science disciplines like public administration and political science, and the fast-moving fields of AI, ML, and robotics, all developing concepts in relative isolation. Although there are calls to formalize the emerging study of AI in government, a balanced account that captures the full depth of theoretical perspectives needed to understand the consequences of embedding AI into a public sector context is lacking. Here, we unify efforts across social and technical disciplines by first conducting an integrative literature review to identify and cluster 69 key terms that frequently co-occur in the multidisciplinary study of AI. We then build on the results of this bibliometric analysis to propose three new multifaceted concepts for understanding and analysing AI-based systems for government (AI-GOV) in a more unified way: (1) operational fitness, (2) epistemic alignment, and (3) normative divergence. Finally, we put these concepts to work by using them as dimensions in a conceptual typology of AI-GOV and connecting each with emerging AI technical measurement standards to encourage operationalization, foster cross-disciplinary dialogue, and stimulate debate among those aiming to rethink government with AI.

Yoshua Bengio, Sören Mindermann, Daniel Privitera et al. · eth-zurich, mit

The first International AI Safety Report comprehensively synthesizes the current evidence on the capabilities, risks, and safety of advanced AI systems. The report was mandated by the nations attending the AI Safety Summit in Bletchley, UK. Thirty nations, the UN, the OECD, and the EU each nominated a representative to the report's Expert Advisory Panel. A total of 100 AI experts contributed, representing diverse perspectives and disciplines. Led by the report's Chair, these independent experts collectively had full discretion over the report's content.

Yoshua Bengio, Sören Mindermann, Daniel Privitera et al. · eth-zurich

This is the interim publication of the first International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI. The report synthesises the scientific understanding of general-purpose AI -- AI that can perform a wide variety of tasks -- with a focus on understanding and managing its risks. A diverse group of 75 AI experts contributed to this report, including an international Expert Advisory Panel nominated by 30 countries, the EU, and the UN. Led by the Chair, these independent experts collectively had full discretion over the report's content. The final report is available at arXiv:2501.17805

Kobi Hackenburg, Ben M. Tappin, Luke Hewitt et al.

There are widespread fears that conversational AI could soon exert unprecedented influence over human beliefs. Here, in three large-scale experiments (N=76,977), we deployed 19 LLMs-including some post-trained explicitly for persuasion-to evaluate their persuasiveness on 707 political issues. We then checked the factual accuracy of 466,769 resulting LLM claims. Contrary to popular concerns, we show that the persuasive power of current and near-future AI is likely to stem more from post-training and prompting methods-which boosted persuasiveness by as much as 51% and 27% respectively-than from personalization or increasing model scale. We further show that these methods increased persuasion by exploiting LLMs' unique ability to rapidly access and strategically deploy information and that, strikingly, where they increased AI persuasiveness they also systematically decreased factual accuracy.

Vincent J. Straub, Youmna Hashem, Jonathan Bright et al.

There is currently considerable excitement within government about the potential of artificial intelligence to improve public service productivity through the automation of complex but repetitive bureaucratic tasks, freeing up the time of skilled staff. Here, we explore the size of this opportunity, by mapping out the scale of citizen-facing bureaucratic decision-making procedures within UK central government, and measuring their potential for AI-driven automation. We estimate that UK central government conducts approximately one billion citizen-facing transactions per year in the provision of around 400 services, of which approximately 143 million are complex repetitive transactions. We estimate that 84% of these complex transactions are highly automatable, representing a huge potential opportunity: saving even an average of just one minute per complex transaction would save the equivalent of approximately 1,200 person-years of work every year. We also develop a model to estimate the volume of transactions a government service undertakes, providing a way for government to avoid conducting time consuming transaction volume measurements. Finally, we find that there is high turnover in the types of services government provide, meaning that automation efforts should focus on general procedures rather than services themselves which are likely to evolve over time. Overall, our work presents a novel perspective on the structure and functioning of modern government, and how it might evolve in the age of artificial intelligence.

Kobi Hackenburg, Ben M. Tappin, Paul Röttger et al.

Large language models can now generate political messages as persuasive as those written by humans, raising concerns about how far this persuasiveness may continue to increase with model size. Here, we generate 720 persuasive messages on 10 U.S. political issues from 24 language models spanning several orders of magnitude in size. We then deploy these messages in a large-scale randomized survey experiment (N = 25,982) to estimate the persuasive capability of each model. Our findings are twofold. First, we find evidence of a log scaling law: model persuasiveness is characterized by sharply diminishing returns, such that current frontier models are barely more persuasive than models smaller in size by an order of magnitude or more. Second, mere task completion (coherence, staying on topic) appears to account for larger models' persuasive advantage. These findings suggest that further scaling model size will not much increase the persuasiveness of static LLM-generated messages.

Laila Sprejer, Helen Margetts, Kleber Oliveira et al.

Radical right influencers routinely use social media to spread highly divisive, disruptive and anti-democratic messages. Assessing and countering the challenge that such content poses is crucial for ensuring that online spaces remain open, safe and accessible. Previous work has paid little attention to understanding factors associated with radical right content that goes viral. We investigate this issue with a new dataset ROT which provides insight into the content, engagement and followership of a set of 35 radical right influencers. It includes over 50,000 original entries and over 40 million retweets, quotes, replies and mentions. We use a multilevel model to measure engagement with tweets, which are nested in each influencer. We show that it is crucial to account for the influencer-level structure, and find evidence of the importance of both influencer- and content-level factors, including the number of followers each influencer has, the type of content (original posts, quotes and replies), the length and toxicity of content, and whether influencers request retweets. We make ROT available for other researchers to use.

Paul Röttger, Bertram Vidgen, Dong Nguyen et al.

Detecting online hate is a difficult task that even state-of-the-art models struggle with. Typically, hate speech detection models are evaluated by measuring their performance on held-out test data using metrics such as accuracy and F1 score. However, this approach makes it difficult to identify specific model weak points. It also risks overestimating generalisable model performance due to increasingly well-evidenced systematic gaps and biases in hate speech datasets. To enable more targeted diagnostic insights, we introduce HateCheck, a suite of functional tests for hate speech detection models. We specify 29 model functionalities motivated by a review of previous research and a series of interviews with civil society stakeholders. We craft test cases for each functionality and validate their quality through a structured annotation process. To illustrate HateCheck's utility, we test near-state-of-the-art transformer models as well as two popular commercial models, revealing critical model weaknesses.

Bertie Vidgen, Austin Botelho, David Broniatowski et al.

The outbreak of COVID-19 has transformed societies across the world as governments tackle the health, economic and social costs of the pandemic. It has also raised concerns about the spread of hateful language and prejudice online, especially hostility directed against East Asia. In this paper we report on the creation of a classifier that detects and categorizes social media posts from Twitter into four classes: Hostility against East Asia, Criticism of East Asia, Meta-discussions of East Asian prejudice and a neutral class. The classifier achieves an F1 score of 0.83 across all four classes. We provide our final model (coded in Python), as well as a new 20,000 tweet training dataset used to make the classifier, two analyses of hashtags associated with East Asian prejudice and the annotation codebook. The classifier can be implemented by other researchers, assisting with both online content moderation processes and further research into the dynamics, prevalence and impact of East Asian prejudice online during this global pandemic.

Taha Yasseri, Scott A. Hale, Helen Margetts

Contemporary collective action, much of which involves social media and other Internet-based platforms, leaves a digital imprint which may be harvested to better understand the dynamics of mobilization. Petition signing is an example of collective action which has gained in popularity with rising use of social media and provides such data for the whole population of petition signatories for a given platform. This paper tracks the growth curves of all 20,000 petitions to the UK government petitions website (http://epetitions.direct.gov.uk) and 1,800 petitions to the US White House site (https://petitions.whitehouse.gov), analyzing the rate of growth and outreach mechanism. Previous research has suggested the importance of the first day to the ultimate success of a petition, but has not examined early growth within that day, made possible here through hourly resolution in the data. The analysis shows that the vast majority of petitions do not achieve any measure of success; over 99 percent fail to get the 10,000 signatures required for an official response and only 0.1 percent attain the 100,000 required for a parliamentary debate (0.7 percent in the US). We analyze the data through a multiplicative process model framework to explain the heterogeneous growth of signatures at the population level. We define and measure an average outreach factor for petitions and show that it decays very fast (reducing to 0.1 pervent after 10 hours in the UK and 30 hours in the US). After a day or two, a petition's fate is virtually set. The findings challenge conventional analyses of collective action from economics and political science, where the production function has been assumed to follow an S-shaped curve.