Taylor Olson

Taylor Olson, Roberto Salas-Damian, Kenneth D. Forbus

To safely interact with humans, AI agents must both know our norms and consider them during planning. However, such norm-guided planning has been less explored, only within communities of artificial agents, and has ignored the dynamic nature of norms. This paper instead presents an approach to guiding planning with dynamically changing norms in a human-AI setting. We contribute a defeasible calculus for resolving normative conflicts and an approach to using such dynamically changing norms as guard rails on plans. We theoretically demonstrate our approach with formal proofs and empirically with an AI agent, SocialBot, on a natural language dialogue task.

Taylor Olson, Roberto Salas-Damian, Kenneth D. Forbus

When deciding how to act, we must consider other agents' norms and values. However, our norms are ever-evolving. We often add exceptions or change our minds, and thus norms can conflict over time. Therefore, to maintain an accurate mental model of other's norms, and thus to avoid social friction, such conflicts must be detected and resolved quickly. Formalizing this process has been the focus of various deontic logics and normative multi-agent systems. We aim to bridge the gap between these two fields here. We contribute a defeasible deontic calculus with inheritance and prove that it resolves norm conflicts. Through this analysis, we also reveal a common resolution strategy as a red herring. This paper thus contributes a theoretically justified axiomatization of norm conflict detection and resolution.

Taylor Olson

The field of machine ethics aims to build Artificial Moral Agents (AMAs) to better understand morality and make AI agents safer. To do so, many approaches encode human moral intuition as a set of axioms on actions e.g., do not harm, you must help others. However, this introduces (at least) two limitations for future AMAs. First, it does not consider the agent's purposes in performing the action. Second, it assumes that we humans can enumerate our moral intuition. This paper explores formalizing a moral procedure that alleviates these two limitations. We specifically consider Kantian ethics and present a multi-sorted quantified modal logic we call the Formula of the Universal Law Logic (FULL). The FULL formalizes Kant's first formulation of the categorical imperative, the Formula of the Universal Law (FUL), and concepts such as causality and agency. We demonstrate on three cases from Kantian ethics that the FULL can reason to evaluate agents' actions for certain purposes without built-in moral intuition, given that it has sufficient (non-normative) background knowledge. Therefore, the FULL is a contribution towards more robust and autonomous AMAs, and a more formal understanding of Kantian ethics.

Taylor Olson, Ken Forbus

To interact with humans, artificial intelligence (AI) systems must understand our social world. Within this world norms play an important role in motivating and guiding agents. However, very few computational theories for learning social norms have been proposed. There also exists a long history of debate on the distinction between what is normal (is) and what is normative (ought). Many have argued that being capable of learning both concepts and recognizing the difference is necessary for all social agents. This paper introduces and demonstrates a computational approach to learning norms from natural language text that accounts for both what is normal and what is normative. It provides a foundation for everyday people to train AI systems about social norms.