Matan Danos

Jamba Team, Barak Lenz, Alan Arazi et al.

We present Jamba-1.5, new instruction-tuned large language models based on our Jamba architecture. Jamba is a hybrid Transformer-Mamba mixture of experts architecture, providing high throughput and low memory usage across context lengths, while retaining the same or better quality as Transformer models. We release two model sizes: Jamba-1.5-Large, with 94B active parameters, and Jamba-1.5-Mini, with 12B active parameters. Both models are fine-tuned for a variety of conversational and instruction-following capabilties, and have an effective context length of 256K tokens, the largest amongst open-weight models. To support cost-effective inference, we introduce ExpertsInt8, a novel quantization technique that allows fitting Jamba-1.5-Large on a machine with 8 80GB GPUs when processing 256K-token contexts without loss of quality. When evaluated on a battery of academic and chatbot benchmarks, Jamba-1.5 models achieve excellent results while providing high throughput and outperforming other open-weight models on long-context benchmarks. The model weights for both sizes are publicly available under the Jamba Open Model License and we release ExpertsInt8 as open source.

Emily Tseng, Rosanna Bellini, Nora McDonald et al.

Abusers increasingly use spyware apps, account compromise, and social engineering to surveil their intimate partners, causing substantial harms that can culminate in violence. This form of privacy violation, termed intimate partner surveillance (IPS), is a profoundly challenging problem to address due to the physical access and trust present in the relationship between the target and attacker. While previous research has examined IPS from the perspectives of survivors, we present the first measurement study of online forums in which (potential) attackers discuss IPS strategies and techniques. In domains such as cybercrime, child abuse, and human trafficking, studying the online behaviors of perpetrators has led to better threat intelligence and techniques to combat attacks. We aim to provide similar insights in the context of IPS. We identified five online forums containing discussion of monitoring cellphones and other means of surveilling an intimate partner, including three within the context of investigating relationship infidelity. We perform a mixed-methods analysis of these forums, surfacing the tools and tactics that attackers use to perform surveillance. Via qualitative analysis of forum content, we present a taxonomy of IPS strategies used and recommended by attackers, and synthesize lessons for technologists seeking to curb the spread of IPS.