Sovon Chakraborty

Md Abdullah Al Nasim, Parag Biswas, Abdur Rashid et al.

Machine learning (ML) is a rapidly developing area of medicine that uses significant resources to apply computer science and statistics to medical issues. ML's proponents laud its capacity to handle vast, complicated, and erratic medical data. It's common knowledge that attackers might cause misclassification by deliberately creating inputs for machine learning classifiers. Research on adversarial examples has been extensively conducted in the field of computer vision applications. Healthcare systems are thought to be highly difficult because of the security and life-or-death considerations they include, and performance accuracy is very important. Recent arguments have suggested that adversarial attacks could be made against medical image analysis (MedIA) technologies because of the accompanying technology infrastructure and powerful financial incentives. Since the diagnosis will be the basis for important decisions, it is essential to assess how strong medical DNN tasks are against adversarial attacks. Simple adversarial attacks have been taken into account in several earlier studies. However, DNNs are susceptible to more risky and realistic attacks. The present paper covers recent proposed adversarial attack strategies against DNNs for medical imaging as well as countermeasures. In this study, we review current techniques for adversarial imaging attacks, detections. It also encompasses various facets of these techniques and offers suggestions for the robustness of neural networks to be improved in the future.

Protiva Das, Sovon Chakraborty, Sidhant Narula et al.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) in biological research has significantly lowered the barrier to accessing complex bioinformatics knowledge, ex perimental design strategies, and analytical workflows. While these capabilities accelerate innovation, they also introduce serious dual-use risks, as Bio-LLMs can be exploited to generate harmful biological insights under the guise of legitimate research queries. Existing safeguards, such as static prompt filtering and policy-based restrictions, are insufficient when LLMs are embedded within dynamic biological workflows and application-layer systems. In this paper, we present BioShield, a context-aware application-level firewall designed to secure Bio LLMs against dual-use attacks. At the core of BioShield is a domain-specific prompt scanner that performs contextual risk analysis of incoming queries. The scanner leverages a harmful scoring mechanism tailored to biological dual-use threat cat egories to identify prompts that attempt to conceal malicious intent within seemingly benign research requests. Queries ex ceeding a predefined risk threshold are blocked before reaching the model, effectively preventing unsafe knowledge generation at the source. In addition to pre-generation protection, BioShield deploys a post-generation output verification module that inspects model responses for actionable or weaponizable biological content. If an unsafe response is detected, the system triggers controlled regeneration under strengthened safety constraints. By combining contextual prompt scanning with response-level validation, BioShield provides a layered defense framework specifically designed for bio-domain LLM deployments. Our framework advances cyberbiosecurity by formalizing dual-use threat detection in Bio-LLMs and proposing a structured mitigation strategy for secure, responsible AI driven biological research.