Mingyan Zhu

Hang Guo, Tao Dai, Mingyan Zhu et al.

Recognizing characters from low-resolution (LR) text images poses a significant challenge due to the information deficiency as well as the noise and blur in low-quality images. Current solutions for low-resolution text recognition (LTR) typically rely on a two-stage pipeline that involves super-resolution as the first stage followed by the second-stage recognition. Although this pipeline is straightforward and intuitive, it has to use an additional super-resolution network, which causes inefficiencies during training and testing. Moreover, the recognition accuracy of the second stage heavily depends on the reconstruction quality of the first stage, causing ineffectiveness. In this work, we attempt to address these challenges from a novel perspective: adapting the recognizer to low-resolution inputs by transferring the knowledge from the high-resolution. Guided by this idea, we propose an efficient and effective knowledge distillation framework to achieve multi-level knowledge transfer. Specifically, the visual focus loss is proposed to extract the character position knowledge with resolution gap reduction and character region focus, the semantic contrastive loss is employed to exploit the contextual semantic knowledge with contrastive learning, and the soft logits loss facilitates both local word-level and global sequence-level learning from the soft teacher label. Extensive experiments show that the proposed one-stage pipeline significantly outperforms super-resolution based two-stage frameworks in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, accompanied by favorable robustness. Code is available at https://github.com/csguoh/KD-LTR.

Mingyan Zhu, Yiming Li, Junfeng Guo et al.

Currently, sample-specific backdoor attacks (SSBAs) are the most advanced and malicious methods since they can easily circumvent most of the current backdoor defenses. In this paper, we reveal that SSBAs are not sufficiently stealthy due to their poisoned-label nature, where users can discover anomalies if they check the image-label relationship. In particular, we demonstrate that it is ineffective to directly generalize existing SSBAs to their clean-label variants by poisoning samples solely from the target class. We reveal that it is primarily due to two reasons, including \textbf{(1)} the `antagonistic effects' of ground-truth features and \textbf{(2)} the learning difficulty of sample-specific features. Accordingly, trigger-related features of existing SSBAs cannot be effectively learned under the clean-label setting due to their mild trigger intensity required for ensuring stealthiness. We argue that the intensity constraint of existing SSBAs is mostly because their trigger patterns are `content-irrelevant' and therefore act as `noises' for both humans and DNNs. Motivated by this understanding, we propose to exploit content-relevant features, $a.k.a.$ (human-relied) attributes, as the trigger patterns to design clean-label SSBAs. This new attack paradigm is dubbed backdoor attack with attribute trigger (BAAT). Extensive experiments are conducted on benchmark datasets, which verify the effectiveness of our BAAT and its resistance to existing defenses.