Pavel Naumov

Mohammad Divband Soorati, Enrico H. Gerding, Enrico Marchioni et al.

The Agents, Interaction and Complexity research group at the University of Southampton has a long track record of research in multiagent systems (MAS). We have made substantial scientific contributions across learning in MAS, game-theoretic techniques for coordinating agent systems, and formal methods for representation and reasoning. We highlight key results achieved by the group and elaborate on recent work and open research challenges in developing trustworthy autonomous systems and deploying human-centred AI systems that aim to support societal good.

Sophia Knight, Pavel Naumov, Qi Shi et al.

The article proposes a new technique for proving the undefinability of logical connectives through each other and illustrates the technique with several examples. Some of the obtained results are new proofs of the existing theorems, others are original to this work.

Pavel Naumov, Anna Ovchinnikova

Prior proposes the term "egocentric" for logical systems that study properties of agents rather than properties of possible worlds. In such a setting, the paper introduces two different modalities capturing de re and de dicto knowledge and proves that these two modalities are not definable through each other.

Junli Jiang, Pavel Naumov, Wenxuan Zhang

Traditionally, an agent's beliefs would come from what the agent can see, hear, or sense. In the modern world, beliefs are often based on the data available to the agents. In this work, we investigate a dynamic logic of such beliefs that incorporates public announcements of data. The main technical contribution is a sound and complete axiomatisation of the interplay between data-informed beliefs and data announcement modalities. We also describe a non-trivial polynomial model checking algorithm for this logical system.

Qi Shi, Pavel Naumov

A law in a multiagent system is a set of constraints imposed on agents' behaviours to avoid undesirable outcomes. The paper considers two types of laws: useful laws that, if followed, completely eliminate the undesirable outcomes and gap-free laws that guarantee that at least one agent can be held responsible each time an undesirable outcome occurs. In both cases, we study the problem of finding a law that achieves the desired result by imposing the minimum restrictions. We prove that, for both types of laws, the minimisation problem is NP-hard even in the simple case of one-shot concurrent interactions. We also show that the approximation algorithm for the vertex cover problem in hypergraphs could be used to efficiently approximate the minimum laws in both cases.

Pavel Naumov, Jia Tao

The responsibility gap is a set of outcomes of a collective decision-making mechanism in which no single agent is individually responsible. In general, when designing a decision-making process, it is desirable to minimise the gap. The paper proposes a concept of an elected dictatorship. It shows that, in a perfect information setting, the gap is empty if and only if the mechanism is an elected dictatorship. It also proves that in an imperfect information setting, the class of gap-free mechanisms is positioned strictly between two variations of the class of elected dictatorships.

Junli Jiang, Pavel Naumov

In many real-world situations, there is often not enough information to know that a certain strategy will succeed in achieving the goal, but there is a good reason to believe that it will. The paper introduces the term ``doxastic'' for such strategies. The main technical contribution is a sound and complete logical system that describes the interplay between doxastic strategy and belief modalities.

Pavel Naumov, Alexandra Pavlova

The paper proposes to treat agent awareness as a form of knowledge, breaking the tradition in the existing literature on awareness. It distinguishes the de re and de dicto forms of such knowledge. The work introduces two modalities capturing these forms and formally specifies their meaning using a version of 2D-semantics. The main technical result is a sound and complete logical system describing the interplay between the two proposed modalities and the standard "knowledge of the fact" modality.

Junli Jiang, Pavel Naumov

Responsibility has long been a subject of study in law and philosophy. More recently, it became a focus of AI literature. The article investigates the computational complexity of two important properties of responsibility in collective decision-making: diffusion and gap. It shows that the sets of diffusion-free and gap-free decision-making mechanisms are $Π_2$-complete and $Π_3$-complete, respectively. At the same time, the intersection of these classes is $Π_2$-complete.

Pavel Naumov, Jia Tao

The term "diffusion of responsibility'' refers to situations in which multiple agents share responsibility for an outcome, obscuring individual accountability. This paper examines this frequently undesirable phenomenon in the context of collective decision-making mechanisms. The work shows that if a decision is made by two agents, then the only way to avoid diffusion of responsibility is for one agent to act as a "dictator'', making the decision unilaterally. In scenarios with more than two agents, any diffusion-free mechanism is an "elected dictatorship'' where the agents elect a single agent to make a unilateral decision. The technical results are obtained by defining a bisimulation of decision-making mechanisms, proving that bisimulation preserves responsibility-related properties, and establishing the results for a smallest bisimular mechanism.

Junli Jiang, Pavel Naumov

In ethics, individual responsibility is often defined through Frankfurt's principle of alternative possibilities. This definition is not adequate in a group decision-making setting because it often results in the lack of a responsible party or "responsibility gap''. One of the existing approaches to address this problem is to consider group responsibility. Another, recently proposed, approach is "higher-order'' responsibility. The paper considers the problem of deciding if higher-order responsibility up to degree $d$ is enough to close the responsibility gap. The main technical result is that this problem is $Π_{2d+1}$-complete.

Qi Shi, Pavel Naumov

Common knowledge/belief in rationality is the traditional standard assumption in analysing interaction among agents. This paper proposes a graph-based language for capturing significantly more complicated structures of higher-order beliefs that agents might have about the rationality of the other agents. The two main contributions are a solution concept that captures the reasoning process based on a given belief structure and an efficient algorithm for compressing any belief structure into a unique minimal form.

Pavel Naumov, Oliver Orejola

An operation is called covert if it conceals the identity of the actor; it is called clandestine if the very fact that the operation is conducted is concealed. The paper proposes a formal semantics of clandestine operations and introduces a sound and complete logical system that describes the interplay between the distributed knowledge modality and a modality capturing coalition power to conduct clandestine operations.

Lia Bozzone, Pavel Naumov

Discounting future costs and rewards is a common practice in accounting, game theory, and machine learning. In spite of this, existing logics for reasoning about strategies with cost and resource constraints do not account for discounting. The paper proposes a sound and complete logical system for reasoning about budget-constrained strategic abilities that incorporates discounting into its semantics.

Sanaz Azimipour, Pavel Naumov

The article proposes a formal semantics of happiness and sadness modalities in imperfect information setting. It shows that these modalities are not definable through each other and gives a sound and complete axiomatization of their properties.

Sophia Epstein, Pavel Naumov

The paper suggests a definition of "know who" as a modality using Grove-Halpern semantics of names. It also introduces a logical system that describes the interplay between modalities "knows who", "knows", and "for all agents". The main technical result is a completeness theorem for the proposed system.

Pavel Naumov, Kevin Ros

The ability of an agent to comprehend a sentence is tightly connected to the agent's prior experiences and background knowledge. The paper suggests to interpret comprehension as a modality and proposes a complete bimodal logical system that describes an interplay between comprehension and knowledge modalities.

Pavel Naumov, Jia Tao

The paper investigates the second-order blameworthiness or duty to warn modality "one coalition knew how another coalition could have prevented an outcome". The main technical result is a sound and complete logical system that describes the interplay between the distributed knowledge and the duty to warn modalities.

Pavel Naumov, Rui-Jie Yew

An agent, or a coalition of agents, faces an ethical dilemma between several statements if she is forced to make a conscious choice between which of these statements will be true. This paper proposes to capture ethical dilemmas as a modality in strategic game settings with and without limit on sacrifice and for perfect and imperfect information games. The authors show that the dilemma modality cannot be defined through the earlier proposed blameworthiness modality. The main technical result is a sound and complete axiomatization of the properties of this modality with sacrifice in games with perfect information.

Pavel Naumov, Jia Tao

Security games are an example of a successful real-world application of game theory. The paper defines blameworthiness of the defender and the attacker in security games using the principle of alternative possibilities and provides a sound and complete logical system for reasoning about blameworthiness in such games. Two of the axioms of this system capture the asymmetry of information in security games.

Pavel Naumov, Kevin Ros

The article introduces a notion of a stochastic game with failure states and proposes two logical systems with modality "coalition has a strategy to transition to a non-failure state with a given probability while achieving a given goal." The logical properties of this modality depend on whether the modal language allows the empty coalition. The main technical results are a completeness theorem for a logical system with the empty coalition, a strong completeness theorem for the logical system without the empty coalition, and an incompleteness theorem which shows that there is no strongly complete logical system in the language with the empty coalition.

Rui Cao, Pavel Naumov

A coalition is blameable for an outcome if the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. It has been previously suggested that the cost of prevention, or the cost of sacrifice, can be used to measure the degree of blameworthiness. The paper adopts this approach and proposes a modal logical system for reasoning about the degree of blameworthiness. The main technical result is a completeness theorem for the proposed system.

Pavel Naumov, Jia Tao

Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should have had a strategy to prevent it. In this article we argue that in the settings with imperfect information, not only should the coalition have had a strategy, but it also should have known that it had a strategy, and it should have known what the strategy was. The main technical result of the article is a sound and complete bimodal logic that describes the interplay between knowledge and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information.

Pavel Naumov, Jia Tao

There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. The main technical result is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes properties of blameworthiness in one-shot games.

Pavel Naumov, Jia Tao

The existence of a coalition strategy to achieve a goal does not necessarily mean that the coalition has enough information to know how to follow the strategy. Neither does it mean that the coalition knows that such a strategy exists. The paper studies an interplay between the distributed knowledge, coalition strategies, and coalition "know-how" strategies. The main technical result is a sound and complete trimodal logical system that describes the properties of this interplay.

Kaya Deuser, Pavel Naumov

The article studies navigability of an autonomous agent in a maze where some rooms may be indistinguishable. In a previous work the authors have shown that the properties of navigability in such a setting depend on whether an agent has perfect recall. Navigability by an agent with perfect recall is a transitive relation and without is not transitive. This article introduces a notion of restricted navigability and shows that a certain form of transitivity holds for restricted navigability, even for an agent without perfect recall. The main technical result is a sound and complete logical system describing the properties of restricted navigability.

Pavel Naumov, Jia Tao

The paper proposes a bimodal logic that describes an interplay between distributed knowledge modality and coalition know-how modality. Unlike other similar systems, the one proposed here assumes perfect recall by all agents. Perfect recall is captured in the system by a single axiom. The main technical results are the soundness and the completeness theorems for the proposed logical system.

Kaya Deuser, Pavel Naumov

The paper investigates navigability with imperfect information. It shows that the properties of navigability with perfect recall are exactly those captured by Armstrong's axioms from the database theory. If the assumption of perfect recall is omitted, then Armstrong's transitivity axiom is not valid, but it can be replaced by two new weaker principles. The main technical results are soundness and completeness theorems for the logical systems describing properties of navigability with and without perfect recall.

Pavel Naumov, Jia Tao

The existence of a coalition strategy to achieve a goal does not necessarily mean that the coalition has enough information to know how to follow the strategy. Neither does it mean that the coalition knows that such a strategy exists. The article studies an interplay between the distributed knowledge, coalition strategies, and coalition "know-how" strategies. The main technical result is a sound and complete trimodal logical system that describes the properties of this interplay.