A H M Nazmus Sakib

Mahsin Bin Akram, A H M Nazmus Sakib, OFM Riaz Rahman Aranya et al.

Standalone virtual reality (VR) headsets process highly sensitive personal, professional, and health-related data, yet their susceptibility to non-contact physical side channels remains largely unexplored. Existing side-channel attacks typically require malicious software execution or physical access to peripherals, making them conspicuous and potentially patchable. This paper introduces ThermalTap, the first passive, non-contact side-channel attack that fingerprints VR applications solely from the long-wave infrared (LWIR) radiation emitted by the headset chassis. By treating a headset's thermal signature as a high-fidelity proxy for internal computational workloads, ThermalTap enables remote application inference at meter-scale distances without any device interaction. To achieve robust performance in real-world settings, the system combines a commodity thermal camera with a multi-modal sensor suite (capturing ambient temperature, humidity, and airflow) to normalize environmental noise. We evaluate ThermalTap using six applications across three commercial standalone headsets. In indoor settings, ThermalTap identifies applications with over 90% accuracy using only 10 seconds of thermal camera data. Under outdoor conditions, with longer session-level observations, several applications remain identifiable despite environmental variability, with the strongest outdoor application reaching 81% accuracy. Our findings establish thermal radiation as a fundamental and unavoidable privacy risk for immersive systems, exposing a critical security gap that bypasses current software-level protections and physical access controls.

Joseph Spracklen, Raveen Wijewickrama, A H M Nazmus Sakib et al.

The reliance of popular programming languages such as Python and JavaScript on centralized package repositories and open-source software, combined with the emergence of code-generating Large Language Models (LLMs), has created a new type of threat to the software supply chain: package hallucinations. These hallucinations, which arise from fact-conflicting errors when generating code using LLMs, represent a novel form of package confusion attack that poses a critical threat to the integrity of the software supply chain. This paper conducts a rigorous and comprehensive evaluation of package hallucinations across different programming languages, settings, and parameters, exploring how a diverse set of models and configurations affect the likelihood of generating erroneous package recommendations and identifying the root causes of this phenomenon. Using 16 popular LLMs for code generation and two unique prompt datasets, we generate 576,000 code samples in two programming languages that we analyze for package hallucinations. Our findings reveal that that the average percentage of hallucinated packages is at least 5.2% for commercial models and 21.7% for open-source models, including a staggering 205,474 unique examples of hallucinated package names, further underscoring the severity and pervasiveness of this threat. To overcome this problem, we implement several hallucination mitigation strategies and show that they are able to significantly reduce the number of package hallucinations while maintaining code quality. Our experiments and findings highlight package hallucinations as a persistent and systemic phenomenon while using state-of-the-art LLMs for code generation, and a significant challenge which deserves the research community's urgent attention.