David Abecassis

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2papers

2 Papers

23.3CYMay 8
An International Agreement to Prevent the Premature Creation of Artificial Superintelligence

Aaron Scher, David Abecassis, Peter Barnett et al.

Many experts argue that premature development of artificial superintelligence (ASI) poses catastrophic risks, including the risk of human extinction from misaligned ASI, geopolitical instability, and misuse by malicious actors. This report proposes an international agreement to prevent the premature development of ASI until AI development can proceed without these risks. The agreement halts dangerous AI capabilities advancement while preserving access to current, safe AI applications. The proposed framework centers on a coalition led by the United States and China that would restrict the scale of AI training and dangerous AI research. Due to the lack of trust between parties, verification is a key part of the agreement. Limits on the scale of AI training are operationalized by FLOP thresholds and verified through the tracking of AI chips and verification of chip use. Dangerous AI research--that which advances toward artificial superintelligence or endangers the agreement's verifiability--is stopped via legal prohibitions and multifaceted verification. We believe the proposal would be technically sufficient to forestall the development of ASI if implemented today, but advancements in AI capabilities or development methods could hurt its efficacy. Additionally, there does not yet exist the political will to put such an agreement in place. Despite these challenges, we hope this agreement can provide direction for AI governance research and policy.

AIJul 13, 2025
Technical Requirements for Halting Dangerous AI Activities

Peter Barnett, Aaron Scher, David Abecassis

The rapid development of AI systems poses unprecedented risks, including loss of control, misuse, geopolitical instability, and concentration of power. To navigate these risks and avoid worst-case outcomes, governments may proactively establish the capability for a coordinated halt on dangerous AI development and deployment. In this paper, we outline key technical interventions that could allow for a coordinated halt on dangerous AI activities. We discuss how these interventions may contribute to restricting various dangerous AI activities, and show how these interventions can form the technical foundation for potential AI governance plans.