Rayne Holland

2papers

2 Papers

CRSep 17, 2024
Attacking Slicing Network via Side-channel Reinforcement Learning Attack

Wei Shao, Chandra Thapa, Rayne Holland et al.

Network slicing in 5G and the future 6G networks will enable the creation of multiple virtualized networks on a shared physical infrastructure. This innovative approach enables the provision of tailored networks to accommodate specific business types or industry users, thus delivering more customized and efficient services. However, the shared memory and cache in network slicing introduce security vulnerabilities that have yet to be fully addressed. In this paper, we introduce a reinforcement learning-based side-channel cache attack framework specifically designed for network slicing environments. Unlike traditional cache attack methods, our framework leverages reinforcement learning to dynamically identify and exploit cache locations storing sensitive information, such as authentication keys and user registration data. We assume that one slice network is compromised and demonstrate how the attacker can induce another shared slice to send registration requests, thereby estimating the cache locations of critical data. By formulating the cache timing channel attack as a reinforcement learning-driven guessing game between the attack slice and the victim slice, our model efficiently explores possible actions to pinpoint memory blocks containing sensitive information. Experimental results showcase the superiority of our approach, achieving a success rate of approximately 95\% to 98\% in accurately identifying the storage locations of sensitive data. This high level of accuracy underscores the potential risks in shared network slicing environments and highlights the need for robust security measures to safeguard against such advanced side-channel attacks.

41.7DSMar 10
Fast and Optimal Differentially Private Frequent-Substring Mining

Peaker Guo, Rayne Holland, Hao Wu

Given a dataset of $n$ user-contributed strings, each of length at most $\ell$, a key problem is how to identify all frequent substrings while preserving each user's privacy. Recent work by Bernardini et al. (PODS'25) introduced a $\varepsilon$-differentially private algorithm achieving near-optimal error, but at the prohibitive cost of $O(n^2\ell^4)$ space and processing time. In this work, we present a new $\varepsilon$-differentially private algorithm that retains the same near-optimal error guarantees while reducing space complexity to $O(n \ell+ |Σ| )$ and time complexity to $O(n \ell\log |Σ| + |Σ| )$, for input alphabet $Σ$. Our approach builds on a top-down exploration of candidate substrings but introduces two new innovations: (i) a refined candidate-generation strategy that leverages the structural properties of frequent prefixes and suffixes, and (ii) pruning of the search space guided by frequency relations. These techniques eliminate the quadratic blow-ups inherent in prior work, enabling scalable frequent substring mining under differential privacy.