Daniel Herr

Patrick Steinmüller, Tobias Schulz, Ferdinand Graf et al.

Parametrized Quantum Circuits (PQCs) enable a novel method for machine learning (ML). However, from a computational point of view they present a challenge to existing eXplainable AI (xAI) methods. On the one hand, measurements on quantum circuits introduce probabilistic errors which impact the convergence of these methods. On the other hand, the phase space of a quantum circuit expands exponentially with the number of qubits, complicating efforts to execute xAI methods in polynomial time. In this paper we will discuss the performance of established xAI methods, such as Baseline SHAP and Integrated Gradients. Using the internal mechanics of PQCs we study ways to speed up their computation.

Pascal Debus, Maximilian Wendlinger, Kilian Tscharke et al.

Quantum Machine Learning (QML) systems inherit vulnerabilities from classical machine learning while introducing new attack surfaces rooted in the physical and algorithmic layers of quantum computing. Despite a growing body of research on individual attack vectors - ranging from adversarial poisoning and evasion to circuit-level backdoors, side-channel leakage, and model extraction - these threats are often analyzed in isolation, with unrealistic assumptions about attacker capabilities and system environments. This fragmentation hampers the development of effective, holistic defense strategies. In this work, we argue that QML security requires more structured modeling of the attack surface, capturing not only individual techniques but also their relationships, prerequisites, and potential impact across the QML pipeline. We propose adapting kill chain models, widely used in classical IT and cybersecurity, to the quantum machine learning context. Such models allow for structured reasoning about attacker objectives, capabilities, and possible multi-stage attack paths - spanning reconnaissance, initial access, manipulation, persistence, and exfiltration. Based on extensive literature analysis, we present a detailed taxonomy of QML attack vectors mapped to corresponding stages in a quantum-aware kill chain framework that is inspired by the MITRE ATLAS for classical machine learning. We highlight interdependencies between physical-level threats (like side-channel leakage and crosstalk faults), data and algorithm manipulation (such as poisoning or circuit backdoors), and privacy attacks (including model extraction and training data inference). This work provides a foundation for more realistic threat modeling and proactive security-in-depth design in the emerging field of quantum machine learning.