GTFeb 11, 2021
A Logic for Conditional Local Strategic ReasoningValentin Goranko, Fengkui Ju
We consider systems of rational agents who act and interact in pursuit of their individual and collective objectives. We study and formalise the reasoning of an agent, or of an external observer, about the expected choices of action of the other agents based on their objectives, in order to assess the reasoner's ability, or expectation, to achieve their own objective. To formalize such reasoning we extend Pauly's Coalition Logic with three new modal operators of conditional strategic reasoning, thus introducing the Logic for Local Conditional Strategic Reasoning ConStR. We provide formal semantics for the new conditional strategic operators in concurrent game models, introduce the matching notion of bisimulation for each of them, prove bisimulation invariance and Hennessy-Milner property for each of them, and discuss and compare briefly their expressiveness. Finally, we also propose systems of axioms for each of the basic operators of ConStR and for the full logic.
MAJun 22, 2017
Rational coordination with no communication or conventionsValentin Goranko, Antti Kuusisto, Raine Rönnholm
We study pure coordination games where in every outcome, all players have identical payoffs, 'win' or 'lose'. We identify and discuss a range of 'purely rational principles' guiding the reasoning of rational players in such games and analyze which classes of coordination games can be solved by such players with no preplay communication or conventions. We observe that it is highly nontrivial to delineate a boundary between purely rational principles and other decision methods, such as conventions, for solving such coordination games.
CRJul 28, 2014
Secure aggregation of distributed information: How a team of agents can safely share secrets in front of a spyDavid Fernández-Duque, Valentin Goranko
We consider the generic problem of Secure Aggregation of Distributed Information (SADI), where several agents acting as a team have information distributed among them, modeled by means of a publicly known deck of cards distributed among the agents, so that each of them knows only her cards. The agents have to exchange and aggregate the information about how the cards are distributed among them by means of public announcements over insecure communication channels, intercepted by an adversary "eavesdropper", in such a way that the adversary does not learn who holds any of the cards. We present a combinatorial construction of protocols that provides a direct solution of a class of SADI problems and develop a technique of iterated reduction of SADI problems to smaller ones which are eventually solvable directly. We show that our methods provide a solution to a large class of SADI problems, including all SADI problems with sufficiently large size and sufficiently balanced card distributions.
LOJan 25, 2012
Tableau-based decision procedure for the multi-agent epistemic logic with all coalitional operators for common and distributed knowledgeMai Ajspur, Valentin Goranko, Dmitry Shkatov
We develop a conceptually clear, intuitive, and feasible decision procedure for testing satisfiability in the full multi-agent epistemic logic CMAEL(CD) with operators for common and distributed knowledge for all coalitions of agents mentioned in the language. To that end, we introduce Hintikka structures for CMAEL(CD) and prove that satisfiability in such structures is equivalent to satisfiability in standard models. Using that result, we design an incremental tableau-building procedure that eventually constructs a satisfying Hintikka structure for every satisfiable input set of formulae of CMAEL(CD) and closes for every unsatisfiable input set of formulae.