David B. Smith

Wayes Tushar, Chau Yuen, Bo Chai et al.

This paper investigates the feasibility of using a discriminate pricing scheme to offset the inconvenience that is experienced by an energy user (EU) in trading its energy with an energy controller in smart grid. The main objective is to encourage EUs with small distributed energy resources (DERs), or with high sensitivity to their inconvenience, to take part in the energy trading via providing incentive to them with relatively higher payment at the same time as reducing the total cost to the energy controller. The proposed scheme is modeled through a two-stage Stackelberg game that describes the energy trading between a shared facility authority (SFA) and EUs in a smart community. A suitable cost function is proposed for the SFA to leverage the generation of discriminate pricing according to the inconvenience experienced by each EU. It is shown that the game has a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE), under the certain condition at which the SFA's total cost is minimized, and that each EU receives its best utility according to its associated inconvenience for the given price. A backward induction technique is used to derive a closed form expression for the price function at SPE, and thus the dependency of price on an EU's different decision parameters is explained for the studied system. Numerical examples are provided to show the beneficial properties of the proposed scheme.

Chathurika P. Mediwaththe, David B. Smith

In this paper, an electric vehicle (EV) charging competition, among EV aggregators that perform coordinated EV charging, is explored while taking into consideration potential non-ideal actions of the aggregators. In the coordinated EV charging strategy presented in this paper, each aggregator determines EV charging start time and charging energy profiles to minimize overall EV charging energy cost by including consideration of the actions of the neighboring aggregators. The competitive interactions of the aggregators are modeled by developing a two-stage non-cooperative game among the aggregators. The game is then studied under prospect theory to examine the impacts of non-ideal actions of the aggregators in selecting EV charging start times according to subjectively evaluating their opponents' actions. It is shown that the non-cooperative interactions among the aggregators lead to a subgame perfect $ε$-Nash equilibrium when the game is played with either ideal, or non-ideal, actions of the aggregators. A case study presented demonstrates that the benefits of the coordinated EV charging strategy, in terms of energy cost savings and peak-to-average ratio reductions, are significantly resilient to non-ideal actions of the aggregators.

David B. Smith, Kanchana Thilakarathna, Mohamed Ali Kaafar

There is an increasing demand to make data "open" to third parties, as data sharing has great benefits in data-driven decision making. However, with a wide variety of sensitive data collected, protecting privacy of individuals, communities and organizations, is an essential factor in making data "open". The approaches currently adopted by industry in releasing private data are often ad hoc and prone to a number of attacks, including re-identification attacks, as they do not provide adequate privacy guarantees. While differential privacy has attracted significant interest from academia and industry by providing rigorous and reliable privacy guarantees, the reduced utility and inflexibility of current differentially private algorithms for data release is a barrier to their use in real-life. This paper aims to address these two challenges. First, we propose a novel mechanism to augment the conventional utility of differential privacy by fusing two Laplace or geometric distributions together. We derive closed form expressions for entropy, variance of added noise, and absolute expectation of noise for the proposed piecewise mixtures. Then the relevant distributions are utilised to theoretically prove the privacy and accuracy guarantees of the proposed mechanisms. Second, we show that our proposed mechanisms have greater flexibility, with three parameters to adjust, giving better utility in bounding noise, and mitigating larger inaccuracy, in comparison to typical one-parameter differentially private mechanisms. We then empirically evaluate the performance of piecewise mixture distributions with extensive simulations and with a real-world dataset for both linear count queries and histogram queries. The empirical results show an increase in all utility measures considered, while maintaining privacy, for the piecewise mixture mechanisms compared to standard Laplace or geometric mechanisms.