Yongdae Kim

Taekkyung Oh, Duckwoo Kim, Hansung Bae et al.

Fake Base Station (FBS) detection has been a critical focus of cellular security research for over two decades. However, significant financial and regulatory barriers to accessing commercial FBS (C-FBS) devices have limited direct visibility into real-world operations, forcing detection systems to be designed and evaluated around self-built prototypes. In this paper, we present Devilray, a reconfigurable and reference-grade adversarial baseline designed to systematically explore the realistic adversarial space and identify adversarial blind spots in current detection -- regions of realistic adversarial behavior excluded by prevailing threat models. We establish an empirical ground truth through the first academic analysis of a C-FBS and extend these observations into specification-driven operational variants permitted by 3GPP standards. Devilray enables the systematic exploration of 2,592 feasible and realistic FBS instances, capturing a wide range of operational possibilities. Using Devilray, we evaluate seven representative accessible FBS detectors and uncover coverage gaps across all seven, revealing blind spots rooted in assumption-bound design and evaluation. Our work provides the first robust adversarial model grounded in real-world behavior and specification analysis, enabling the community to develop and evaluate future detection mechanisms in a rigorous manner.

Jusop Choi, Wonseok Choi, William Aiken et al.

Since Bitcoin appeared in 2009, over 6,000 different cryptocurrency projects have followed. The cryptocurrency world may be the only technology where a massive number of competitors offer similar services yet claim unique benefits, including scalability, fast transactions, and security. But are these projects really offering unique features and significant enhancements over their competitors? To answer this question, we conducted a large-scale empirical analysis of code maintenance activities, originality and security across 592 crypto projects. We found that about half of these projects have not been updated for the last six months; over two years, about three-quarters of them disappeared, or were reported as scams or inactive. We also investigated whether 11 security vulnerabilities patched in Bitcoin were also patched in other projects. We found that about 80% of 510 C-language-based cryptocurrency projects have at least one unpatched vulnerability, and the mean time taken to fix the vulnerability is 237.8 days. Among those 510 altcoins, we found that at least 157 altcoins are likely to have been forked from Bitcoin, about a third of them containing only slight changes from the Bitcoin version from which they were forked. As case studies, we did a deep dive into 20 altcoins (e.g., Litecoin, FujiCoin, and Feathercoin) similar to the version of Bitcoin used for the fork. About half of them did not make any technically meaningful change - failing to comply with the promises (e.g., about using Proof of Stake) made in their whitepapers.

Dongkwan Kim, Eunsoo Kim, Sang Kil Cha et al.

Binary code similarity analysis (BCSA) is widely used for diverse security applications, including plagiarism detection, software license violation detection, and vulnerability discovery. Despite the surging research interest in BCSA, it is significantly challenging to perform new research in this field for several reasons. First, most existing approaches focus only on the end results, namely, increasing the success rate of BCSA, by adopting uninterpretable machine learning. Moreover, they utilize their own benchmark, sharing neither the source code nor the entire dataset. Finally, researchers often use different terminologies or even use the same technique without citing the previous literature properly, which makes it difficult to reproduce or extend previous work. To address these problems, we take a step back from the mainstream and contemplate fundamental research questions for BCSA. Why does a certain technique or a certain feature show better results than the others? Specifically, we conduct the first systematic study on the basic features used in BCSA by leveraging interpretable feature engineering on a large-scale benchmark. Our study reveals various useful insights on BCSA. For example, we show that a simple interpretable model with a few basic features can achieve a comparable result to that of recent deep learning-based approaches. Furthermore, we show that the way we compile binaries or the correctness of underlying binary analysis tools can significantly affect the performance of BCSA. Lastly, we make all our source code and benchmark public and suggest future directions in this field to help further research.

Geunwoo Lim, Yujin Kwon, Yongdae Kim

For a decentralized and transparent society, blockchain technology has been developed. Along with this, quite a few consensus algorithms that are one of core technologies in blockchain have been proposed. Among them, we analyze a consensus algorithm called LFT2, which is used by a blockchain system, ICON. We first formulate the LFT2 consensus algorithm and then analyze safety and liveness, which can be considered as the most important properties in distributed consensus system. We prove that LFT2 satisfies safety and liveness, where a certain assumption is required to prove liveness. In addition, we compare LFT2 with two similar consensus algorithms, and from the comparison, we show that a trade-off exist among the three consensus algorithms. Finally, we simulate LFT2 to measure a liveness quality.

Yujin Kwon, Hyoungshick Kim, Yung Yi et al.

Currently, miners typically join mining pools to solve cryptographic puzzles together, and mining pools are in high competition. This has led to the development of several attack strategies such as block withholding (BWH) and fork after withholding (FAW) attacks that can weaken the health of PoW systems and but maximize mining pools' profits. In this paper, we present strategies called Adaptive Retaliation Strategies (ARS) to mitigate not only BWH attacks but also FAW attacks. In ARS, each pool cooperates with other pools in the normal situation, and adaptively executes either FAW or BWH attacks for the purpose of retaliation only when attacked. In addition, in order for rational pools to adopt ARS, ARS should strike to an adaptive balance between retaliation and selfishness because the pools consider their payoff even when they retaliate. We theoretically and numerically show that ARS would not only lead to the induction of a no-attack state among mining pools, but also achieve the adaptive balance between retaliation and selfishness.

Yujin Kwon, Jian Liu, Minjeong Kim et al.

Bitcoin uses blockchain technology and proof-of-work (PoW) mechanism where nodes spend computing resources and earn rewards in return for spending these resources. This incentive system has caused power to be significantly biased towards a few nodes, called mining pools. In fact, poor decentralization appears not only in PoW-based coins but also in coins adopting other mechanisms such as proof-of-stake (PoS) and delegated proof-of-stake (DPoS). In this paper, we target this centralization issue. To this end, we first define (m, \varepsilon, δ)-decentralization as a state that satisfies 1) there are at least m participants running a node and 2) the ratio between the total resource power of nodes run by the richest and δ-th percentile participants is less than or equal to 1+\varepsilon. To see if it is possible to achieve good decentralization, we introduce sufficient conditions for the incentive system of a blockchain to reach (m, \varepsilon, δ)-decentralization. When satisfying the conditions, a blockchain system can reach full decentralization with probability 1. However, to achieve this, the blockchain system should be able to assign a positive Sybil cost, where the Sybil cost is defined as the difference between the cost for one participant running multiple nodes and the total cost for multiple participants each running one node. On the other hand, we prove that when there is no Sybil cost, the probability of reaching (m, \varepsilon, δ)-decentralization is upper bounded by a value close to 0, considering a large rich-poor gap. To determine the conditions that each system cannot satisfy, we also analyze protocols of all PoW, PoS, and DPoS coins in the top 100 coins according to our conditions. Finally, we conduct data analysis of these coins to validate our theory.

Yujin Kwon, Hyoungshick Kim, Jinwoo Shin et al.

In Aug. 2017, Bitcoin was split into the original Bitcoin (BTC) and Bitcoin Cash (BCH). Since then, miners have had a choice between BTC and BCH mining because they have compatible proof-of-work algorithms. Therefore, they can freely choose which coin to mine for higher profit, where the profitability depends on both the coin price and mining difficulty. Some miners can immediately switch the coin to mine only when mining difficulty changes because the difficulty changes are more predictable than that for the coin price, and we call this behavior fickle mining. In this paper, we study the effects of fickle mining by modeling a game between two coins. To do this, we consider both fickle miners and some factions (e.g., BITMAIN for BCH mining) that stick to mining one coin to maintain that chain. In this model, we show that fickle mining leads to a Nash equilibrium in which only a faction sticking to its coin mining remains as a loyal miner to the less valued coin (e.g., BCH), where loyal miners refer to those who conduct mining even after coin mining difficulty increases. This situation would cause severe centralization, weakening the security of the coin system. To determine which equilibrium the competing coin systems (e.g., BTC vs. BCH) are moving toward, we traced the historical changes of mining power for BTC and BCH. In addition, we analyze the recent "hash war" between Bitcoin ABC and SV, which confirms our theoretical analysis. Finally, we note that our results can be applied to any competing cryptocurrency systems in which the same hardware (e.g., ASICs or GPUs) can be used for mining. Therefore, our study brings new and important angles in competitive coin markets: a coin can intentionally weaken the security and decentralization level of the other rival coin when mining hardware is shared between them, allowing for automatic mining.

Yujin Kwon, Dohyun Kim, Yunmok Son et al.

In the Bitcoin system, participants are rewarded for solving cryptographic puzzles. In order to receive more consistent rewards over time, some participants organize mining pools and split the rewards from the pool in proportion to each participant's contribution. However, several attacks threaten the ability to participate in pools. The block withholding (BWH) attack makes the pool reward system unfair by letting malicious participants receive unearned wages while only pretending to contribute work. When two pools launch BWH attacks against each other, they encounter the miner's dilemma: in a Nash equilibrium, the revenue of both pools is diminished. In another attack called selfish mining, an attacker can unfairly earn extra rewards by deliberately generating forks. In this paper, we propose a novel attack called a fork after withholding (FAW) attack. FAW is not just another attack. The reward for an FAW attacker is always equal to or greater than that for a BWH attacker, and it is usable up to four times more often per pool than in BWH attack. When considering multiple pools - the current state of the Bitcoin network - the extra reward for an FAW attack is about 56% more than that for a BWH attack. Furthermore, when two pools execute FAW attacks on each other, the miner's dilemma may not hold: under certain circumstances, the larger pool can consistently win. More importantly, an FAW attack, while using intentional forks, does not suffer from practicality issues, unlike selfish mining. We also discuss partial countermeasures against the FAW attack, but finding a cheap and efficient countermeasure remains an open problem. As a result, we expect to see FAW attacks among mining pools.