Milos Cvetkovic

Christian Doh Dinga, Francesco Lombardi, Roald Arkesteijn et al.

District heating networks (DHNs) have significant potential to decarbonize residential heating and accelerate the energy transition. However, designing carbon-neutral DHNs requires balancing several objectives, including economic costs, social acceptance, long-term uncertainties, and grid-integration challenges from electrification. By combining modeling-to-generate-alternatives with power flow simulation techniques, we develop a decision-support method for designing carbon-neutral DHNs that are cost-effective, socially acceptable, robust to future risks, and impose minimal impacts on the electricity grid. Applying our method to a Dutch case, we find substantial diversity in how carbon-neutral DHNs can be designed. The flexibility in technology choice, sizing, and location enables accommodating different real-world needs and achieving high electrification levels without increasing grid loading. For instance, intelligently located heat pumps and thermal storage can limit grid stress even when renewable baseload heat sources and green-fuel boilers are scarce. Using our method, planners can explore diverse carbon-neutral DHN designs and identify the design that best balances stakeholders' preferences.

Kaikai Pan, André Teixeira, Milos Cvetkovic et al.

A class of data integrity attack, known as false data injection (FDI) attack, has been studied with a considerable amount of work. It has shown that with perfect knowledge of the system model and the capability to manipulate a certain number of measurements, the FDI attacks can coordinate measurements corruption to keep stealth against the bad data detection. However, a more realistic attack is essentially an attack with limited adversarial knowledge of the system model and limited attack resources due to various reasons. In this paper, we generalize the data attacks that they can be pure FDI attacks or combined with availability attacks (e.g., DoS attacks) and analyze the attacks with limited adversarial knowledge or limited attack resources. The attack impact is evaluated by the proposed metrics and the detection probability of attacks is calculated using the distribution property of data with or without attacks. The analysis is supported with results from a power system use case. The results show how important the knowledge is to the attacker and which measurements are more vulnerable to attacks with limited resources.

Kaikai Pan, André Teixeira, Milos Cvetkovic et al.

Understanding smart grid cyber attacks is key for developing appropriate protection and recovery measures. Advanced attacks pursue maximized impact at minimized costs and detectability. This paper conducts risk analysis of combined data integrity and availability attacks against the power system state estimation. We compare the combined attacks with pure integrity attacks - false data injection (FDI) attacks. A security index for vulnerability assessment to these two kinds of attacks is proposed and formulated as a mixed integer linear programming problem. We show that such combined attacks can succeed with fewer resources than FDI attacks. The combined attacks with limited knowledge of the system model also expose advantages in keeping stealth against the bad data detection. Finally, the risk of combined attacks to reliable system operation is evaluated using the results from vulnerability assessment and attack impact analysis. The findings in this paper are validated and supported by a detailed case study.