Praveen Manoharan

CR
4papers
1,239citations
Novelty53%
AI Score27

4 Papers

CRNov 15, 2017
Towards Plausible Graph Anonymization

Yang Zhang, Mathias Humbert, Bartlomiej Surma et al.

Social graphs derived from online social interactions contain a wealth of information that is nowadays extensively used by both industry and academia. However, as social graphs contain sensitive information, they need to be properly anonymized before release. Most of the existing graph anonymization mechanisms rely on the perturbation of the original graph's edge set. In this paper, we identify a fundamental weakness of these mechanisms: They neglect the strong structural proximity between friends in social graphs, thus add implausible fake edges for anonymization. To exploit this weakness, we first propose a metric to quantify an edge's plausibility by relying on graph embedding. Extensive experiments on three real-life social network datasets demonstrate that our plausibility metric can very effectively differentiate fake edges from original edges with AUC (area under the ROC curve) values above 0.95 in most of the cases. We then rely on a Gaussian mixture model to automatically derive the threshold on the edge plausibility values to determine whether an edge is fake, which enables us to recover to a large extent the original graph from the anonymized graph. We further demonstrate that our graph recovery attack jeopardizes the privacy guarantees provided by the considered graph anonymization mechanisms. To mitigate this vulnerability, we propose a method to generate fake yet plausible edges given the graph structure and incorporate it into the existing anonymization mechanisms. Our evaluation demonstrates that the enhanced mechanisms decrease the chances of graph recovery, reduce the success of graph de-anonymization (up to 30%), and provide even better utility than the existing anonymization mechanisms.

CRFeb 21, 2017
On the (Statistical) Detection of Adversarial Examples

Kathrin Grosse, Praveen Manoharan, Nicolas Papernot et al.

Machine Learning (ML) models are applied in a variety of tasks such as network intrusion detection or Malware classification. Yet, these models are vulnerable to a class of malicious inputs known as adversarial examples. These are slightly perturbed inputs that are classified incorrectly by the ML model. The mitigation of these adversarial inputs remains an open problem. As a step towards understanding adversarial examples, we show that they are not drawn from the same distribution than the original data, and can thus be detected using statistical tests. Using thus knowledge, we introduce a complimentary approach to identify specific inputs that are adversarial. Specifically, we augment our ML model with an additional output, in which the model is trained to classify all adversarial inputs. We evaluate our approach on multiple adversarial example crafting methods (including the fast gradient sign and saliency map methods) with several datasets. The statistical test flags sample sets containing adversarial inputs confidently at sample sizes between 10 and 100 data points. Furthermore, our augmented model either detects adversarial examples as outliers with high accuracy (> 80%) or increases the adversary's cost - the perturbation added - by more than 150%. In this way, we show that statistical properties of adversarial examples are essential to their detection.

CRJun 14, 2016
Adversarial Perturbations Against Deep Neural Networks for Malware Classification

Kathrin Grosse, Nicolas Papernot, Praveen Manoharan et al.

Deep neural networks, like many other machine learning models, have recently been shown to lack robustness against adversarially crafted inputs. These inputs are derived from regular inputs by minor yet carefully selected perturbations that deceive machine learning models into desired misclassifications. Existing work in this emerging field was largely specific to the domain of image classification, since the high-entropy of images can be conveniently manipulated without changing the images' overall visual appearance. Yet, it remains unclear how such attacks translate to more security-sensitive applications such as malware detection - which may pose significant challenges in sample generation and arguably grave consequences for failure. In this paper, we show how to construct highly-effective adversarial sample crafting attacks for neural networks used as malware classifiers. The application domain of malware classification introduces additional constraints in the adversarial sample crafting problem when compared to the computer vision domain: (i) continuous, differentiable input domains are replaced by discrete, often binary inputs; and (ii) the loose condition of leaving visual appearance unchanged is replaced by requiring equivalent functional behavior. We demonstrate the feasibility of these attacks on many different instances of malware classifiers that we trained using the DREBIN Android malware data set. We furthermore evaluate to which extent potential defensive mechanisms against adversarial crafting can be leveraged to the setting of malware classification. While feature reduction did not prove to have a positive impact, distillation and re-training on adversarially crafted samples show promising results.

CRFeb 11, 2015
From Closed-world Enforcement to Open-world Assessment of Privacy

Michael Backes, Pascal Berrang, Praveen Manoharan

In this paper, we develop a user-centric privacy framework for quantitatively assessing the exposure of personal information in open settings. Our formalization addresses key-challenges posed by such open settings, such as the unstructured dissemination of heterogeneous information and the necessity of user- and context-dependent privacy requirements. We propose a new definition of information sensitivity derived from our formalization of privacy requirements, and, as a sanity check, show that hard non-disclosure guarantees are impossible to achieve in open settings. After that, we provide an instantiation of our framework to address the identity disclosure problem, leading to the novel notion of d-convergence. d-convergence is based on indistinguishability of entities and it bounds the likelihood with which an adversary successfully links two profiles of the same user across online communities. Finally, we provide a large-scale evaluation of our framework on a collection of 15 million comments collected from the Online Social Network Reddit. Our evaluation validates the notion of d-convergence for assessing the linkability of entities in our data set and provides deeper insights into the data set's structure.