Bryan Carter

2papers

2 Papers

CRNov 29, 2020
Cyberphysical Security Through Resiliency: A Systems-centric Approach

Cody Fleming, Carl Elks, Georgios Bakirtzis et al.

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are often defended in the same manner as information technology (IT) systems -- by using perimeter security. Multiple factors make such defenses insufficient for CPS. Resiliency shows potential in overcoming these shortfalls. Techniques for achieving resilience exist; however, methods and theory for evaluating resilience in CPS are lacking. We argue that such methods and theory should assist stakeholders in deciding where and how to apply design patterns for resilience. Such a problem potentially involves tradeoffs between different objectives and criteria, and such decisions need to be driven by traceable, defensible, repeatable engineering evidence. Multi-criteria resiliency problems require a system-oriented approach that evaluates systems in the presence of threats as well as potential design solutions once vulnerabilities have been identified. We present a systems-oriented view of cyber-physical security, termed Mission Aware, that is based on a holistic understanding of mission goals, system dynamics, and risk.

CRNov 2, 2017
A Systems Approach for Eliciting Mission-Centric Security Requirements

Bryan Carter, Georgios Bakirtzis, Carl Elks et al.

The security of cyber-physical systems is first and foremost a safety problem, yet it is typically handled as a traditional security problem, which means that solutions are based on defending against threats and are often implemented too late. This approach neglects to take into consideration the context in which the system is intended to operate, thus system safety may be compromised. This paper presents a systems-theoretic analysis approach that combines stakeholder perspectives with a modified version of Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) that allows decision-makers to strategically enhance the safety, resilience, and security of a cyber-physical system against potential threats. This methodology allows the capture of vital mission-specific information in a model, which then allows analysts to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities in the locations most critical to mission success. We present an overview of the general approach followed by a real example using an unmanned aerial vehicle conducting a reconnaissance mission.