6 Papers

5.3COMar 16
Further Comments on Yablo's Construction

Karl Schlechta

We continue our analysis of Yablo's coding of the liar paradox by infinite acyclic graphs. The present notes are based on and continue the author's previous results on the problem. In particular, our approach is often more systematic than before.

LOOct 6, 2019
A Short Remark on Analogical Reasoning

Karl Schlechta

We discuss the problem of defining a logic for analogical reasoning, and sketch a solution in the style of the semantics for Counterfactual Conditionals, Preferential Structures, etc.

AIDec 27, 2018
KI, Philosophie, Logik

Karl Schlechta

This is a short (and personal) introduction in German to the connections between artificial intelligence, philosophy, and logic, and to the author's work. Dies ist eine kurze (und persoenliche) Einfuehrung in die Zusammenhaenge zwischen Kuenstlicher Intelligenz, Philosophie, und Logik, und in die Arbeiten des Autors.

AIJan 3, 2018
A Reliability Theory of Truth

Karl Schlechta

Our approach is basically a coherence approach, but we avoid the well-known pitfalls of coherence theories of truth. Consistency is replaced by reliability, which expresses support and attack, and, in principle, every theory (or agent, message) counts. At the same time, we do not require a priviledged access to "reality". A centerpiece of our approach is that we attribute reliability also to agents, messages, etc., so an unreliable source of information will be less important in future. Our ideas can also be extended to value systems, and even actions, e.g., of animals.

LODec 17, 2016
A Comment on Argumentation

Karl Schlechta

We use the theory of defaults and their meaning of [GS16] to develop (the outline of a) new theory of argumentation.

AIDec 6, 2016
A pre-semantics for counterfactual conditionals and similar logics

Karl Schlechta

The elegant Stalnaker/Lewis semantics for counterfactual conditonals works with distances between models. But human beings certainly have no tables of models and distances in their head. We begin here an investigation using a more realistic picture, based on findings in neuroscience. We call it a pre-semantics, as its meaning is not a description of the world, but of the brain, whose structure is (partly) determined by the world it reasons about. In the final section, we reconsider the components, and postulate that there are no atomic pictures, we can always look inside.