Ruimin Sun, Marcus Botacin, Nikolaos Sapountzis et al.
A promising avenue for improving the effectiveness of behavioral-based malware detectors would be to combine fast traditional machine learning detectors with high-accuracy, but time-consuming deep learning models. The main idea would be to place software receiving borderline classifications by traditional machine learning methods in an environment where uncertainty is added, while software is analyzed by more time-consuming deep learning models. The goal of uncertainty would be to rate-limit actions of potential malware during the time consuming deep analysis. In this paper, we present a detailed description of the analysis and implementation of CHAMELEON, a framework for realizing this uncertain environment for Linux. CHAMELEON offers two environments for software: (i) standard - for any software identified as benign by conventional machine learning methods and (ii) uncertain - for software receiving borderline classifications when analyzed by these conventional machine learning methods. The uncertain environment adds obstacles to software execution through random perturbations applied probabilistically on selected system calls. We evaluated CHAMELEON with 113 applications and 100 malware samples for Linux. Our results showed that at threshold 10%, intrusive and non-intrusive strategies caused approximately 65% of malware to fail accomplishing their tasks, while approximately 30% of the analyzed benign software to meet with various levels of disruption. With a dynamic, per-system call threshold, CHAMELEON caused 92% of the malware to fail, and only 10% of the benign software to be disrupted. We also found that I/O-bound software was three times more affected by uncertainty than CPU-bound software. Further, we analyzed the logs of software crashed with non-intrusive strategies, and found that some crashes are due to the software bugs.