IVNov 7, 2025Code
UHDRes: Ultra-High-Definition Image Restoration via Dual-Domain Decoupled Spectral ModulationS. Zhao, W. Lu, B. Wang et al.
Ultra-high-definition (UHD) images often suffer from severe degradations such as blur, haze, rain, or low-light conditions, which pose significant challenges for image restoration due to their high resolution and computational demands. In this paper, we propose UHDRes, a novel lightweight dual-domain decoupled spectral modulation framework for UHD image restoration. It explicitly models the amplitude spectrum via lightweight spectrum-domain modulation, while restoring phase implicitly through spatial-domain refinement. We introduce the spatio-spectral fusion mechanism, which first employs a multi-scale context aggregator to extract local and global spatial features, and then performs spectral modulation in a decoupled manner. It explicitly enhances amplitude features in the frequency domain while implicitly restoring phase information through spatial refinement. Additionally, a shared gated feed-forward network is designed to efficiently promote feature interaction through shared-parameter convolutions and adaptive gating mechanisms. Extensive experimental comparisons on five public UHD benchmarks demonstrate that our UHDRes achieves the state-of-the-art restoration performance with only 400K parameters, while significantly reducing inference latency and memory usage. The codes and models are available at https://github.com/Zhao0100/UHDRes.
CRFeb 22, 2022
Protecting GNSS-based Services using Time Offset ValidationK. Zhang, M. Spanghero, P. Papadimitratos
Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) provide pervasive accurate positioning and timing services for a large gamut of applications, from Time based One-Time Passwords (TOPT), to power grid and cellular systems. However, there can be security concerns for the applications due to the vulnerability of GNSS. It is important to observe that GNSS receivers are components of platforms, in principle having rich connectivity to different network infrastructures. Of particular interest is the access to a variety of timing sources, as those can be used to validate GNSS-provided location and time. Therefore, we consider off-the-shelf platforms and how to detect if the GNSS receiver is attacked or not, by cross-checking the GNSS time and time from other available sources. First, we survey different technologies to analyze their availability, accuracy, and trustworthiness for time synchronization. Then, we propose a validation approach for absolute and relative time. Moreover, we design a framework and experimental setup for the evaluation of the results. Attacks can be detected based on WiFi supplied time when the adversary shifts the GNSS provided time, more than 23.942us; with Network Time Protocol (NTP) supplied time when the adversary-induced shift is more than 2.046ms. Consequently, the proposal significantly limits the capability of an adversary to manipulate the victim GNSS receiver.
CRFeb 22, 2022
Authenticated time for detecting GNSS attacksM. Spanghero, K. Zhang, P. Papadimitratos
Information cross-validation can be a powerful tool to detect manipulated, dubious GNSS data. A promising approach is to leverage time obtained over networks a mobile device can connect to, and detect discrepancies between the GNSS-provided time and the network time. The challenge lies in having reliably both accurate and trustworthy network time as the basis for the GNSS attack detection. Here, we provide a concrete proposal that leverages, together with the network time servers, the nearly ubiquitous IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi) infrastructure. Our framework supports application-layer, secure and robust real time broadcasting by Wi-Fi Access Points (APs), based on hash chains and infrequent digital signatures verification to minimize computational and communication overhead, allowing mobile nodes to efficiently obtain authenticated and rich time information as they roam. We pair this method with Network Time Security (NTS), for enhanced resilience through multiple sources, available, ideally, simultaneously. We analyze the performance of our scheme in a dedicated setup, gauging the overhead for authenticated time data (Wi-Fi timestamped beacons and NTS). The results show that it is possible to provide security for the external to GNSS time sources, with minimal overhead for authentication and integrity, even when the GNSS-equipped nodes are mobile, and thus have short interactions with the Wi-Fi infrastructure and possibly intermittent Internet connectivity, as well as limited resources.