Simon Mackenzie

Simon Mackenzie, Abdallah Saffidine

In communication complexity the input of a function $f:X\times Y\rightarrow Z$ is distributed between two players Alice and Bob. If Alice knows only $x\in X$ and Bob only $y\in Y$, how much information must Alice and Bob share to be able to elicit the value of $f(x,y)$? Do we need $\ell$ more resources to solve $\ell$ instances of a problem? This question is the direct sum question and has been studied in many computational models. In this paper we focus on the case of 2-party deterministic communication complexity and give a counterexample to the direct sum conjecture in its strongest form. To do so we exhibit a family of functions for which the complexity of solving $\ell$ instances is less than $(1 -ε)\ell$ times the complexity of solving one instance for some small enough $ε>0$. We use a customised method in the analysis of our family of total functions, showing that one can force the alternation of rounds between players. This idea allows us to exploit the integrality of the complexity measure to create an increasing gap between the complexity of solving the instances independently with that of solving them together.

Nika Haghtalab, Simon Mackenzie, Ariel D. Procaccia et al.

The Lazy Shortest Path (LazySP) class consists of motion-planning algorithms that only evaluate edges along shortest paths between the source and target. These algorithms were designed to minimize the number of edge evaluations in settings where edge evaluation dominates the running time of the algorithm; but how close to optimal are LazySP algorithms in terms of this objective? Our main result is an analytical upper bound, in a probabilistic model, on the number of edge evaluations required by LazySP algorithms; a matching lower bound shows that these algorithms are asymptotically optimal in the worst case.

Haris Aziz, Serge Gaspers, Joachim Gudmundsson et al.

We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to elect multiple winners. These rules are satisfaction approval voting, proportional approval voting, and reweighted approval voting. We first show that computing the winner for proportional approval voting is NP-hard, closing a long standing open problem. As none of the rules are strategyproof, even for dichotomous preferences, we study various strategic aspects of the rules. In particular, we examine the computational complexity of computing a best response for both a single agent and a group of agents. In many settings, we show that it is NP-hard for an agent or agents to compute how best to vote given a fixed set of approval ballots from the other agents.

Haris Aziz, Serge Gaspers, Simon Mackenzie et al.

We consider the discrete assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over objects and these objects are allocated to the agents in a fair manner. We use the stochastic dominance relation between fractional or randomized allocations to systematically define varying notions of proportionality and envy-freeness for discrete assignments. The computational complexity of checking whether a fair assignment exists is studied for these fairness notions. We also characterize the conditions under which a fair assignment is guaranteed to exist. For a number of fairness concepts, polynomial-time algorithms are presented to check whether a fair assignment exists. Our algorithmic results also extend to the case of unequal entitlements of agents. Our NP-hardness result, which holds for several variants of envy-freeness, answers an open question posed by Bouveret, Endriss, and Lang (ECAI 2010). We also propose fairness concepts that always suggest a non-empty set of assignments with meaningful fairness properties. Among these concepts, optimal proportionality and optimal weak proportionality appear to be desirable fairness concepts.