P. C. van Oorschot

2papers

2 Papers

CRApr 20, 2018
SoK: Securing Email -- A Stakeholder-Based Analysis (Extended Version)

Jeremy Clark, P. C. van Oorschot, Scott Ruoti et al.

While email is the most ubiquitous and interoperable form of online communication today, it was not conceived with strong security guarantees, and the ensuing security enhancements are, by contrast, lacking in both ubiquity and interoperability. This situation motivates our research. We begin by identifying a variety of stakeholders who have an interest in the current email system and in efforts to provide secure solutions. We then use the tussle among stakeholders to explain the evolution of fragmented secure email solutions undertaken by industry, academia, and independent developers. We also evaluate the building blocks of secure email -- cryptographic primitives, key management schemes, and system designs -- to identify their support for stakeholder properties. From our analysis, we conclude that a one-size-fits-all solution is unlikely. Furthermore, we highlight that vulnerable users are not well served by current solutions, account for the failure of PGP, and argue that secure messaging, while complementary, is not a fully substitutable technology.

CRAug 13, 2016
Server Location Verification and Server Location Pinning: Augmenting TLS Authentication

AbdelRahman Abdou, P. C. van Oorschot

We introduce the first known mechanism providing realtime server location verification. Its uses include enhancing server authentication (e.g., augmenting TLS) by enabling browsers to automatically interpret server location information. We describe the design of this new measurement-based technique, Server Location Verification (SLV), and evaluate it using PlanetLab. We explain how SLV is compatible with the increasing trends of geographically distributed content dissemination over the Internet, without causing any new interoperability conflicts. Additionally, we introduce the notion of (verifiable) "server location pinning" within TLS (conceptually similar to certificate pinning) to support SLV, and evaluate their combined impact using a server-authentication evaluation framework. The results affirm the addition of new security benefits to the existing SSL/TLS-based authentication mechanisms. We implement SLV through a location verification service, the simplest version of which requires no server-side changes. We also implement a simple browser extension that interacts seamlessly with the verification infrastructure to obtain realtime server location-verification results.