Jannik Dreier

CR
5papers
494citations
Novelty43%
AI Score24

5 Papers

CRMay 19, 2020
A Faster Cryptographer's Conspiracy Santa

Xavier Bultel, Jannik Dreier, Jean-Guillaume Dumas et al.

In Conspiracy Santa, a variant of Secret Santa, a group of people offer each other Christmas gifts, where each member of the group receives a gift from the other members of the group. To that end, the members of the group form conspiracies, to decide on appropriate gifts, and usually divide the cost of each gift among all participants of that conspiracy. This requires to settle the shared expenses per conspiracy, so Conspiracy Santa can actually be seen as an aggregation of several shared expenses problems. First, we show that the problem of finding a minimal number of transaction when settling shared expenses is NP-complete. Still, there exist good greedy approximations. Second, we present a greedy distributed secure solution to Conspiracy Santa. This solution allows a group of n people to share the expenses for the gifts in such a way that no participant learns the price of his gift, but at the same time notably reduces the number of transactions to 2 $\times$ n + 1 with respect to a na{ï}ve aggregation of n $\times$ (n -- 2). Furthermore, our solution does not require a trusted third party, and can either be implemented physically (the participants are in the same room and exchange money using envelopes) or, over Internet, using a cryptocurrency.

CRApr 24, 2020
Optimal Threshold Padlock Systems

Jannik Dreier, Jean-Guillaume Dumas, Pascal Lafourcade et al.

In 1968, Liu described the problem of securing documents in a shared secret project. In an example, at least six out of eleven participating scientists need to be present to open the lock securing the secret documents. Shamir proposed a mathematical solution to this physical problem in 1979, by designing an efficient $k$-out-of-$n$ secret sharing scheme based on Lagrange's interpolation. Liu and Shamir also claimed that the minimal solution using physical locks is clearly impractical and exponential in the number of participants. In this paper we relax some implicit assumptions in their claim and propose an optimal physical solution to the problem of Liu that uses physical padlocks, but the number of padlocks is not greater than the number of participants. Then, we show that no device can do better for $k$-out-of-$n$ threshold padlock systems as soon as $k\geq{\sqrt{2n}}$, which holds true in particular for Liu's example. More generally, we derive bounds required to implement any threshold system and prove a lower bound of $\mathcal{O}{\log(n)}$ padlocks for any threshold larger than $2$. For instance we propose an optimal scheme reaching that bound for $2$-out-of-$n$ threshold systems and requiring less than $2\log_2(n)$ padlocks. We also discuss more complex access structures, a wrapping technique, and other sublinear realizations like an algorithm to generate $3$-out-of-$n$ systems with $2.5\sqrt{n}$ padlocks. Finally we give an algorithm building $k$-out-of-$n$ threshold padlock systems with only $\mathcal{O}{\log(n)^{k-1}}$ padlocks. Apart from the physical world, our results also show that it is possible to implement secret sharing over small fields.

CRJun 27, 2018
A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication

David Basin, Jannik Dreier, Lucca Hirschi et al.

Mobile communication networks connect much of the world's population. The security of users' calls, SMSs, and mobile data depends on the guarantees provided by the Authenticated Key Exchange protocols used. For the next-generation network (5G), the 3GPP group has standardized the 5G AKA protocol for this purpose. We provide the first comprehensive formal model of a protocol from the AKA family: 5G AKA. We also extract precise requirements from the 3GPP standards defining 5G and we identify missing security goals. Using the security protocol verification tool Tamarin, we conduct a full, systematic, security evaluation of the model with respect to the 5G security goals. Our automated analysis identifies the minimal security assumptions required for each security goal and we find that some critical security goals are not met, except under additional assumptions missing from the standard. Finally, we make explicit recommendations with provably secure fixes for the attacks and weaknesses we found.

CRJun 3, 2016
Physical Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Akari, Takuzu, Kakuro and KenKen

Xavier Bultel, Jannik Dreier, Jean-Guillaume Dumas et al.

Akari, Takuzu, Kakuro and KenKen are logic games similar to Sudoku. In Akari, a labyrinth on a grid has to be lit by placing lanterns, respecting various constraints. In Takuzu a grid has to be filled with 0's and 1's, while respecting certain constraints. In Kakuro a grid has to be filled with numbers such that the sums per row and column match given values; similarly in KenKen a grid has to be filled with numbers such that in given areas the product, sum, difference or quotient equals a given value. We give physical algorithms to realize zero-knowledge proofs for these games which allow a player to show that he knows a solution without revealing it. These interactive proofs can be realized with simple office material as they only rely on cards and envelopes. Moreover, we formalize our algorithms and prove their security.

CROct 25, 2012
Brandt's Fully Private Auction Protocol Revisited

Jannik Dreier, Jean-Guillaume Dumas, Pascal Lafourcade

Auctions have a long history, having been recorded as early as 500 B.C. Nowadays, electronic auctions have been a great success and are increasingly used. Many cryptographic protocols have been proposed to address the various security requirements of these electronic transactions, in particular to ensure privacy. Brandt developed a protocol that computes the winner using homomorphic operations on a distributed ElGamal encryption of the bids. He claimed that it ensures full privacy of the bidders, i.e. no information apart from the winner and the winning price is leaked. We first show that this protocol -- when using malleable interactive zero-knowledge proofs -- is vulnerable to attacks by dishonest bidders. Such bidders can manipulate the publicly available data in a way that allows the seller to deduce all participants' bids. Additionally we discuss some issues with verifiability as well as attacks on non-repudiation, fairness and the privacy of individual bidders exploiting authentication problems.