Andrea E. Martin

Karthikeya Ramesh Kaushik, Andrea E. Martin

Human beings possess the most sophisticated computational machinery in the known universe. We can understand language of rich descriptive power, and communicate in the same environment with astonishing clarity. Two of the many contributors to the interest in natural language - the properties of Compositionality and Structure Dependence, are well documented, and offer a vast space to ask interesting modelling questions. The first step to begin answering these questions is to ground verbal theory in formal terms. Drawing on linguistics and set theory, a formalisation of these ideas is presented in the first half of this thesis. We see how cognitive systems that process language need to have certain functional constraints, viz. time based, incremental operations that rely on a structurally defined domain. The observations that result from analysing this formal setup are examined as part of a modelling exercise. Using the advances of word embedding techniques, a model of relational learning is simulated with a custom dataset to demonstrate how a time based role-filler binding mechanism satisfies some of the constraints described in the first section. The model's ability to map structure, along with its symbolic-connectionist architecture makes for a cognitively plausible implementation. The formalisation and simulation are together an attempt to recognise the constraints imposed by linguistic theory, and explore the opportunities presented by a cognitive model of relation learning to realise these constraints.

Maryam Hashemzadeh, Greta Kaufeld, Martha White et al.

The representations generated by many models of language (word embeddings, recurrent neural networks and transformers) correlate to brain activity recorded while people read. However, these decoding results are usually based on the brain's reaction to syntactically and semantically sound language stimuli. In this study, we asked: how does an LSTM (long short term memory) language model, trained (by and large) on semantically and syntactically intact language, represent a language sample with degraded semantic or syntactic information? Does the LSTM representation still resemble the brain's reaction? We found that, even for some kinds of nonsensical language, there is a statistically significant relationship between the brain's activity and the representations of an LSTM. This indicates that, at least in some instances, LSTMs and the human brain handle nonsensical data similarly.

Leonidas A. A. Doumas, Guillermo Puebla, Andrea E. Martin et al.

People readily generalize knowledge to novel domains and stimuli. We present a theory, instantiated in a computational model, based on the idea that cross-domain generalization in humans is a case of analogical inference over structured (i.e., symbolic) relational representations. The model is an extension of the LISA and DORA models of relational inference and learning. The resulting model learns both the content and format (i.e., structure) of relational representations from non-relational inputs without supervision, when augmented with the capacity for reinforcement learning, leverages these representations to learn individual domains, and then generalizes to new domains on the first exposure (i.e., zero-shot learning) via analogical inference. We demonstrate the capacity of the model to learn structured relational representations from a variety of simple visual stimuli, and to perform cross-domain generalization between video games (Breakout and Pong) and between several psychological tasks. We demonstrate that the model's trajectory closely mirrors the trajectory of children as they learn about relations, accounting for phenomena from the literature on the development of children's reasoning and analogy making. The model's ability to generalize between domains demonstrates the flexibility afforded by representing domains in terms of their underlying relational structure, rather than simply in terms of the statistical relations between their inputs and outputs.

Guillermo Puebla, Andrea E. Martin, Leonidas A. A. Doumas

The ability of neural networks to capture relational knowledge is a matter of long-standing controversy. Recently, some researchers in the PDP side of the debate have argued that (1) classic PDP models can handle relational structure (Rogers & McClelland, 2008, 2014) and (2) the success of deep learning approaches to text processing suggests that structured representations are unnecessary to capture the gist of human language (Rabovsky et al., 2018). In the present study we tested the Story Gestalt model (St. John, 1992), a classic PDP model of text comprehension, and a Sequence-to-Sequence with Attention model (Bahdanau et al., 2015), a contemporary deep learning architecture for text processing. Both models were trained to answer questions about stories based on the thematic roles that several concepts played on the stories. In three critical test we varied the statistical structure of new stories while keeping their relational structure constant with respect to the training data. Each model was susceptible to each statistical structure manipulation to a different degree, with their performance failing below chance at least under one manipulation. We argue that the failures of both models are due to the fact that they cannotperform dynamic binding of independent roles and fillers. Ultimately, these results cast doubts onthe suitability of traditional neural networks models for explaining phenomena based on relational reasoning, including language processing.

Andrea E. Martin, Leonidas A. A. Doumas

Humans learn complex latent structures from their environments (e.g., natural language, mathematics, music, social hierarchies). In cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience, models that infer higher-order structures from sensory or first-order representations have been proposed to account for the complexity and flexibility of human behavior. But how do the structures that these models invoke arise in neural systems in the first place? To answer this question, we explain how a system can learn latent representational structures (i.e., predicates) from experience with wholly unstructured data. During the process of predicate learning, an artificial neural network exploits the naturally occurring dynamic properties of distributed computing across neuronal assemblies in order to learn predicates, but also to combine them compositionally, two computational aspects which appear to be necessary for human behavior as per formal theories in multiple domains. We describe how predicates can be combined generatively using neural oscillations to achieve human-like extrapolation and compositionality in an artificial neural network. The ability to learn predicates from experience, to represent structures compositionally, and to extrapolate to unseen data offers an inroads to understanding and modeling the most complex human behaviors.

Leonidas A. A. Doumas, Guillermo Puebla, Andrea E. Martin

Humans readily generalize, applying prior knowledge to novel situations and stimuli. Advances in machine learning and artificial intelligence have begun to approximate and even surpass human performance, but machine systems reliably struggle to generalize information to untrained situations. We describe a neural network model that is trained to play one video game (Breakout) and demonstrates one-shot generalization to a new game (Pong). The model generalizes by learning representations that are functionally and formally symbolic from training data, without feedback, and without requiring that structured representations be specified a priori. The model uses unsupervised comparison to discover which characteristics of the input are invariant, and to learn relational predicates; it then applies these predicates to arguments in a symbolic fashion, using oscillatory regularities in network firing to dynamically bind predicates to arguments. We argue that models of human cognition must account for far-reaching and flexible generalization, and that in order to do so, models must be able to discover symbolic representations from unstructured data, a process we call predicate learning. Only then can models begin to adequately explain where human-like representations come from, why human cognition is the way it is, and why it continues to differ from machine intelligence in crucial ways.