Ruxandra F. Olimid

CR
4papers
100citations
Novelty31%
AI Score22

4 Papers

CRFeb 15, 2017Code
Easy 4G/LTE IMSI Catchers for Non-Programmers

Stig F. Mjølsnes, Ruxandra F. Olimid

IMSI Catchers are tracking devices that break the privacy of the subscribers of mobile access networks, with disruptive effects to both the communication services and the trust and credibility of mobile network operators. Recently, we verified that IMSI Catcher attacks are really practical for the state-of-the-art 4G/LTE mobile systems too. Our IMSI Catcher device acquires subscription identities (IMSIs) within an area or location within a few seconds of operation and then denies access of subscribers to the commercial network. Moreover, we demonstrate that these attack devices can be easily built and operated using readily available tools and equipment, and without any programming. We describe our experiments and procedures that are based on commercially available hardware and unmodified open source software.

CRNov 8, 2021
Improved security solutions for DDoS mitigation in 5G Multi-access Edge Computing

Marian Gusatu, Ruxandra F. Olimid

Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC) is a 5G-enabling solution that aims to bring cloud-computing capabilities closer to the end-users. This paper focuses on mitigation techniques against Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks in the context of 5G MEC, providing solutions that involve the virtualized environment and the management entities from the MEC architecture. The proposed solutions aim to reduce the risk of affecting legitimate traffic in the context of DDoS attacks. Our work supports the idea of using a network flow collector that sends the data to an anomaly detection system based on artificial intelligence techniques and, as an improvement over the previous work, it contributes to redirecting detected anomalies for isolation to a separate virtual machine. This virtual machine uses deep packet inspection tools to analyze the traffic and provides services until the final verdict. We decrease the risk of compromising the virtual machine that provides services to legitimate users by isolating the suspicious traffic. The management entities of the MEC architecture allow to re-instantiate or reconfigure the virtual machines. Hence, if the machine inspecting the isolated traffic crashes because of an attack, the damaged machine can be restored while the services provided to legitimate users are not affected.

CRApr 27, 2020
Identity Management on Blockchain -- Privacy and Security Aspects

Andreea-Elena Panait, Ruxandra F. Olimid, Alin Stefanescu

In the last years, identity management solutions on blockchain were proposed as a possible solution to the digital identity management problem. However, they are still at an early stage and further research needs to be done to conclude whether identity systems could benefit from the use of blockchain or not. Motivated by this, we investigate identity management solutions on blockchain intending to give the reader an overview of the current status and provide a better understanding of the pros and cons of using such solutions. We conduct an analysis on ten of the most known implementations, with a focus on privacy and security aspects. Finally, we identify existing challenges and give new directions for research.

CRJul 30, 2018
Experimental Analysis of Subscribers' Privacy Exposure by LTE Paging

Christian Sørseth, Xianyu Shelley Zhou, Stig F. Mjølsnes et al.

Over the last years, considerable attention has been given to the privacy of individuals in wireless environments. Although significantly improved over the previous generations of mobile networks, LTE still exposes vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit. This might be the case of paging messages, wake-up notifications that target specific subscribers, and that are broadcasted in clear over the radio interface. If they are not properly implemented, paging messages can expose the identity of subscribers and furthermore provide information about their location. It is therefore important that mobile network operators comply with the recommendations and implement the appropriate mechanisms to mitigate attacks. In this paper, we verify by experiment that paging messages can be captured and decoded by using minimal technical skills and publicly available tools. Moreover, we present a general experimental method to test privacy exposure by LTE paging messages, and we conduct a case study on three different LTE mobile operators.