PLApr 6
Trace-Guided Synthesis of Effectful Test GeneratorsZhe Zhou, Ankush Desai, Benjamin Delaware et al.
Several recently proposed program logics have incorporated notions of underapproximation into their design, enabling them to reason about reachability rather than safety. In this paper, we explore how similar ideas can be integrated into an expressive type and effect system. We use the resulting underapproximate type specifications to guide the synthesis of test generators that probe the behavior of effectful black-box systems. A key novelty of our type language is its ability to capture underapproximate behaviors of effectful operations using symbolic traces that expose latent data and control dependencies, constraints that must be preserved by the test sequences the generator outputs. We implement this approach in a tool called Clouseau, and evaluate it on a diverse range of applications by integrating Clouseau's synthesized generators into property-based testing frameworks like QCheck and model-checking tools like P. In both settings, the generators synthesized by Clouseau are significantly more effective than the default testing strategy, and are competitive with state-of-the-art, handwritten solutions.
ROAug 21, 2020
SOTER on ROS: A Run-Time Assurance Framework on the Robot Operating SystemSumukh Shivakumar, Hazem Torfah, Ankush Desai et al.
We present an implementation of SOTER, a run-time assurance framework for building safe distributed mobile robotic (DMR) systems, on top of the Robot Operating System (ROS). The safety of DMR systems cannot always be guaranteed at design time, especially when complex, off-the-shelf components are used that cannot be verified easily. SOTER addresses this by providing a language-based approach for run-time assurance for DMR systems. SOTER implements the reactive robotic software using the language P, a domain-specific language designed for implementing asynchronous event-driven systems, along with an integrated run-time assurance system that allows programmers to use unfortified components but still provide safety guarantees. We describe an implementation of SOTER for ROS and demonstrate its efficacy using a multi-robot surveillance case study, with multiple run-time assurance modules. Through rigorous simulation, we show that SOTER enabled systems ensure safety, even when using unknown and untrusted components.
ROAug 23, 2018
SOTER: A Runtime Assurance Framework for Programming Safe Robotics SystemsAnkush Desai, Shromona Ghosh, Sanjit A. Seshia et al.
The recent drive towards achieving greater autonomy and intelligence in robotics has led to high levels of complexity. Autonomous robots increasingly depend on third party off-the-shelf components and complex machine-learning techniques. This trend makes it challenging to provide strong design-time certification of correct operation. To address these challenges, we present SOTER, a robotics programming framework with two key components: (1) a programming language for implementing and testing high-level reactive robotics software and (2) an integrated runtime assurance (RTA) system that helps enable the use of uncertified components, while still providing safety guarantees. SOTER provides language primitives to declaratively construct a RTA module consisting of an advanced, high-performance controller (uncertified), a safe, lower-performance controller (certified), and the desired safety specification. The framework provides a formal guarantee that a well-formed RTA module always satisfies the safety specification, without completely sacrificing performance by using higher performance uncertified components whenever safe. SOTER allows the complex robotics software stack to be constructed as a composition of RTA modules, where each uncertified component is protected using a RTA module. To demonstrate the efficacy of our framework, we consider a real-world case-study of building a safe drone surveillance system. Our experiments both in simulation and on actual drones show that the SOTER-enabled RTA ensures the safety of the system, including when untrusted third-party components have bugs or deviate from the desired behavior.