Adam Badawy

Samar Haider, Luca Luceri, Ashok Deb et al.

Social media have been deliberately used for malicious purposes, including political manipulation and disinformation. Most research focuses on high-resource languages. However, malicious actors share content across countries and languages, including low-resource ones. Here, we investigate whether and to what extent malicious actors can be detected in low-resource language settings. We discovered that a high number of accounts posting in Tagalog were suspended as part of Twitter's crackdown on interference operations after the 2016 US Presidential election. By combining text embedding and transfer learning, our framework can detect, with promising accuracy, malicious users posting in Tagalog without any prior knowledge or training on malicious content in that language. We first learn an embedding model for each language, namely a high-resource language (English) and a low-resource one (Tagalog), independently. Then, we learn a mapping between the two latent spaces to transfer the detection model. We demonstrate that the proposed approach significantly outperforms state-of-the-art models, including BERT, and yields marked advantages in settings with very limited training data -- the norm when dealing with detecting malicious activity in online platforms.

Adam Badawy, Kristina Lerman, Emilio Ferrara

Social media, once hailed as a vehicle for democratization and the promotion of positive social change across the globe, are under attack for becoming a tool of political manipulation and spread of disinformation. A case in point is the alleged use of trolls by Russia to spread malicious content in Western elections. This paper examines the Russian interference campaign in the 2016 US presidential election on Twitter. Our aim is twofold: first, we test whether predicting users who spread trolls' content is feasible in order to gain insight on how to contain their influence in the future; second, we identify features that are most predictive of users who either intentionally or unintentionally play a vital role in spreading this malicious content. We collected a dataset with over 43 million elections-related posts shared on Twitter between September 16 and November 9, 2016, by about 5.7 million users. This dataset includes accounts associated with the Russian trolls identified by the US Congress. Proposed models are able to very accurately identify users who spread the trolls' content (average AUC score of 96%, using 10-fold validation). We show that political ideology, bot likelihood scores, and some activity-related account meta data are the most predictive features of whether a user spreads trolls' content or not.