Philippe Balbiani

Philippe Balbiani, Martín Diéguez, David Fernández-Duque et al.

The logics $\mathsf{CS4}$ and $\mathsf{IS4}$ are the two leading intuitionistic variants of the modal logic $\mathsf{S4}$. Whether the finite model property holds for each of these logics have been long-standing open problems. It was recently shown that $\mathsf{IS4}$ has the finite frame property and thus the finite model property. In this paper, we prove that $\mathsf{CS4}$ also enjoys the finite frame property. Additionally, we investigate the following three logics closely related to $\mathsf{IS4}$. The logic $\mathsf{GS4}$ is obtained by adding the Gödel--Dummett axiom to $\mathsf{IS4}$; it is both a superintuitionistic and a fuzzy logic and has previously been given a real-valued semantics. We provide an alternative birelational semantics and prove strong completeness with respect to this semantics. The extension $\mathsf{GS4^c}$ of $\mathsf{GS4}$ corresponds to requiring a crisp accessibility relation on the real-valued semantics. We give $\mathsf{GS4^c}$ a birelational semantics corresponding to an extra confluence condition on the $\mathsf{GS4}$ birelational semantics and prove strong completeness. Neither of these two logics have the finite model property with respect to their real-valued semantics, but we prove that they have the finite frame property for their birelational semantics. Establishing the finite birelational frame property immediately establishes decidability, which was previously open for these two logics. Our proofs yield NEXPTIME upper bounds for $\mathsf{CS4}$, $\mathsf{GS4}$, and $\mathsf{GS4^c}$. The logic $\mathsf{S4I}$ is obtained from $\mathsf{IS4}$ by reversing the roles of the modal and relations intuitionistic in the birelational semantics. We also prove the finite frame property, and thereby decidability, for $\mathsf{S4I}$, although our proof does not yield an elementary complexity bound.

Philippe Balbiani, Hans van Ditmarsch, Clara Lerouvillois

We investigate a logic for asynchronous announcements wherein the sending of the messages by the environment is separated from their reception by the individual agents. Both come with different modalities. In the logical semantics, formulas are interpreted in a world of a Kripke model but given a history of prior announcements and receptions that already happened. An axiomatisation AA for such a logic has been given in prior work, for the formulas that are valid when interpreted in the Kripke model before any such announcements have taken place. This axiomatisation is a reduction system wherein one can show that every formula is equivalent to a purely epistemic formula without dynamic modalities for announcements and receptions. We propose a generalisation AA* of this axiomatisation, for the formulas that are valid when interpreted in the Kripke model given any history of prior announcements and receptions of announcements. It does not extend the axiomatisation AA, for example it is no longer valid that nobody has received any message. Unlike AA, this axiomatisation AA* is infinitary and it is not a reduction system.

Philippe Balbiani, Hans van Ditmarsch, Clara Lerouvillois

There are by now various epistemic modal logics with intersection modalities for distributed knowledge and intersection update modalities for dynamic phenomena like agents sharing (all their) information, agents receiving information from other agents, and full information protocols. One of those is the logic of Resolving Distributed Knowledge, by Agotnes and Wang. It has distributed knowledge modalities for arbitrary subsets of the set of all agents and it also has so-called resolution modalities for arbitrary subsets of agents sharing their knowledge. In that logic, the agents not involved in the knowledge sharing are aware of the agents sharing knowledge, agents are memory-less, and the kind of dynamics represents synchronous updates, where there is common awareness of the global clock. In contrast, in this contribution we present a logic for Resolving Asynchronous Distributed Knowledge. It is an asynchronous generalization of the synchronous logic of resolving distributed knowledge. The logical semantics is history-based: truth is not only with respect to a given world in a model, but also with respect to a given history of prior resolutions, of which each individual agent can only observe a part. In particular, an agent is unaware of resolutions for groups of agents not including her. As is to be expected, this comes with many technical complications, for example concerning the axiomatization. The synchronous axioms relating resolution to distributed knowledge are now invalid. The modelling advantages of such an asynchronous novel logic, for distributed computing and similar areas, are however substantial and a major asset.

Philippe Balbiani, Joseph Boudou, Martín Diéguez et al.

We consider intuitionistic variants of linear temporal logic with `next', `until' and `release' based on expanding posets: partial orders equipped with an order-preserving transition function. This class of structures gives rise to a logic which we denote $\iltl$, and by imposing additional constraints we obtain the logics $\itlb$ of persistent posets and $\itlht$ of here-and-there temporal logic, both of which have been considered in the literature. We prove that $\iltl$ has the effective finite model property and hence is decidable, while $\itlb$ does not have the finite model property. We also introduce notions of bounded bisimulations for these logics and use them to show that the `until' and `release' operators are not definable in terms of each other, even over the class of persistent posets.

Philippe Balbiani, Hans van Ditmarsch, Saúl Fernández González

We propose a multi-agent epistemic logic of asynchronous announcements, where truthful announcements are publicly sent but individually received by agents, and in the order in which they were sent. Additional to epistemic modalities the logic contains dynamic modalities for making announcements and for receiving them. What an agent believes is a function of her initial uncertainty and of the announcements she has received. Beliefs need not be truthful, because announcements already made may not yet have been received. As announcements are true when sent, certain message sequences can be ruled out, just like inconsistent cuts in distributed computing. We provide a complete axiomatization for this \emph{asynchronous announcement logic} (AA). It is a reduction system that also demonstrates that any formula in $AA$ is equivalent to one without dynamic modalities, just as for public announcement logic. A detailed example modelling message exchanging processes in distributed computing in $AA$ closes our investigation.

Philippe Balbiani, David Fernández-Duque, Emiliano Lorini

We present a family of logics for reasoning about agents' positions and motion in the plane which have several potential applications in the area of multi-agent systems (MAS), such as multi-agent planning and robotics. The most general logic includes (i) atomic formulas for representing the truth of a given fact or the presence of a given agent at a certain position of the plane, (ii) atomic programs corresponding to the four basic orientations in the plane (up, down, left, right) as well as the four program constructs of propositional dynamic logic (sequential composition, nondeterministic composition, iteration and test). As this logic is not computably enumerable, we study some interesting decidable and axiomatizable fragments of it. We also present a decidable extension of the iteration-free fragment of the logic by special programs representing motion of agents in the plane.