Gerui Wang

Matthias Fitzi, Xuechao Wang, Sreeram Kannan et al.

Resource-based consensus is the backbone of permissionless distributed ledger systems. The security of such protocols relies fundamentally on the level of resources actively engaged in the system. The variety of different resources (and related proof protocols, some times referred to as PoX in the literature) raises the fundamental question whether it is possible to utilize many of them in tandem and build multi-resource consensus protocols. The challenge in combining different resources is to achieve fungibility between them, in the sense that security would hold as long as the cumulative adversarial power across all resources is bounded. In this work, we put forth Minotaur, a multi-resource blockchain consensus protocol that combines proof-of-work (PoW) and proof-of-stake (PoS), and we prove it optimally fungible. At the core of our design, Minotaur operates in epochs while continuously sampling the active computational power to provide a fair exchange between the two resources, work and stake. Further, we demonstrate the ability of Minotaur to handle a higher degree of work fluctuation as compared to the Bitcoin blockchain; we also generalize Minotaur to any number of resources. We demonstrate the simplicity of Minotaur via implementing a full stack client in Rust (available open source). We use the client to test the robustness of Minotaur to variable mining power and combined work/stake attacks and demonstrate concrete empirical evidence towards the suitability of Minotaur to serve as the consensus layer of a real-world blockchain.

Peiyao Sheng, Gerui Wang, Kartik Nayak et al.

Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) protocols allow a group of replicas to come to a consensus even when some of the replicas are Byzantine faulty. There exist multiple BFT protocols to securely tolerate an optimal number of faults $t$ under different network settings. However, if the number of faults $f$ exceeds $t$ then security could be violated. In this paper we mathematically formalize the study of forensic support of BFT protocols: we aim to identify (with cryptographic integrity) as many of the malicious replicas as possible and in as a distributed manner as possible. Our main result is that forensic support of BFT protocols depends heavily on minor implementation details that do not affect the protocol's security or complexity. Focusing on popular BFT protocols (PBFT, HotStuff, Algorand) we exactly characterize their forensic support, showing that there exist minor variants of each protocol for which the forensic supports vary widely. We show strong forensic support capability of LibraBFT, the consensus protocol of Diem cryptocurrency; our lightweight forensic module implemented on a Diem client is open-sourced and is under active consideration for deployment in Diem. Finally, we show that all secure BFT protocols designed for $2t+1$ replicas communicating over a synchronous network forensic support are inherently nonexistent; this impossibility result holds for all BFT protocols and even if one has access to the states of all replicas (including Byzantine ones).

Rongji Huang, Yifeng Ye, Gerui Wang et al.

Due to regulatory compliance and governance management, modern (permissioned) blockchains require flexible endorsement, which allows the endorsement policy for each contract or state object to be individually defined. To enable flexible endorsement, Hyperledger Fabric employs an execute-order-validate (EOV) paradigm, in which transactions first undergo speculative execution and endorsement, and are only then ordered and validated. Meanwhile, most blockchain systems, including the platform targeted in this work (i.e., ChainMaker), still follow a conflict-free order-execute framework. We argue that the EOV paradigm still faces several limitations, notably high abort rates in high-contention workloads such as those in Decentralized Finance (DeFi). To avoid refactoring our system and better suit DeFi applications, we try to integrate flexible endorsement into the classical order-execute architecture and accordingly propose a new framework. The key challenge is to deterministically remove problematic transactions from an ordered list, while preserving censorship resistance and decentralization for the remaining ones. We instantiate this framework on top of Tendermint, a seminal Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) protocol adopted in our system, and thereby propose FlexTender. By elegantly embedding endorsements into consensus, FlexTender incurs no additional messaging overhead in the normal case. Empirical evaluation using an Ethereum USDT workload demonstrates that FlexTender achieves up to $10.6\times$ speedup in throughput over an EOV simulation on the same platform.

Gerui Wang, Jerome Wang, Liam Lai et al.

This document introduces XinFin DPoS 2.0, the proposed next generation decentralized consensus engine for the XinFin XDC Network. Built upon the most advanced BFT consensus protocol, this upgrade will empower the XDC Network with military-grade security and performance while consuming extremely low resources, and will be fully backwards-compatible in terms of APIs. It will also pave the road to the future evolution of the XDC Network. The core invention is the holistic integration of accountability and forensics in blockchains: the ability to identify malicious actors with cryptographic integrity directly from the blockchain records, incorporating the latest peer-reviewed academic research with state of the art engineering designs and implementation plans.

Lei Yang, Xuechao Wang, Vivek Bagaria et al.

Bitcoin is the first fully-decentralized permissionless blockchain protocol to achieve a high level of security, but at the expense of poor throughput and latency. Scaling the performance of Bitcoin has a been a major recent direction of research. One successful direction of work has involved replacing proof of work (PoW) by proof of stake (PoS). Proposals to scale the performance in the PoW setting itself have focused mostly on parallelizing the mining process, scaling throughput; the few proposals to improve latency have either sacrificed throughput or the latency guarantees involve large constants rendering it practically useless. Our first contribution is to design a new PoW blockchain Prism++ that has provably low latency and high throughput; the design retains the parallel-chain approach espoused in Prism but invents a new confirmation rule to infer the permanency of a block by combining information across the parallel chains. We show security at the level of Bitcoin with very small confirmation latency (a small constant factor of block interarrival time). A key aspect to scaling the performance is to use a large number of parallel chains, which puts significant strain on the system. Our second contribution is the design and evaluation of a practical system to efficiently manage the memory, computation, and I/O imperatives of a large number of parallel chains. Our implementation of Prism++ achieves a throughput of over 80,000 transactions per second and confirmation latency of tens of seconds on networks of up to 900 EC2 Virtual Machines.

Giulia Fanti, Leonid Kogan, Sewoong Oh et al.

Proof-of-stake (PoS) is a promising approach for designing efficient blockchains, where block proposers are randomly chosen with probability proportional to their stake. A primary concern with PoS systems is the "rich getting richer" phenomenon, whereby wealthier nodes are more likely to get elected, and hence reap the block reward, making them even wealthier. In this paper, we introduce the notion of equitability, which quantifies how much a proposer can amplify her stake compared to her initial investment. Even with everyone following protocol (i.e., honest behavior), we show that existing methods of allocating block rewards lead to poor equitability, as does initializing systems with small stake pools and/or large rewards relative to the stake pool. We identify a \emph{geometric} reward function, which we prove is maximally equitable over all choices of reward functions under honest behavior and bound the deviation for strategic actions; the proofs involve the study of optimization problems and stochastic dominances of Polya urn processes, and are of independent mathematical interest. These results allow us to provide a systematic framework to choose the parameters of a practical incentive system for PoS cryptocurrencies.