Aurore Guillevic

Fabrice Boudot, Pierrick Gaudry, Aurore Guillevic et al.

We report on two new records: the factorization of RSA-240, a 795-bit number, and a discrete logarithm computation over a 795-bit prime field. Previous records were the factorization of RSA-768 in 2009 and a 768-bit discrete logarithm computation in 2016. Our two computations at the 795-bit level were done using the same hardware and software, and show that computing a discrete logarithm is not much harder than a factorization of the same size. Moreover, thanks to algorithmic variants and well-chosen parameters, our computations were significantly less expensive than anticipated based on previous records.The last page of this paper also reports on the factorization of RSA-250.

Aurore Guillevic

Computing discrete logarithms in finite fields is a main concern in cryptography. The best algorithms in large and medium characteristic fields (e.g., {GF}$(p^2)$, {GF}$(p^{12})$) are the Number Field Sieve and its variants (special, high-degree, tower). The best algorithms in small characteristic finite fields (e.g., {GF}$(3^{6 \cdot 509})$) are the Function Field Sieve, Joux's algorithm, and the quasipolynomial-time algorithm. The last step of this family of algorithms is the individual logarithm computation. It computes a smooth decomposition of a given target in two phases: an initial splitting, then a descent tree. While new improvements have been made to reduce the complexity of the dominating relation collection and linear algebra steps, resulting in a smaller factor basis (database of known logarithms of small elements), the last step remains at the same level of difficulty. Indeed, we have to find a smooth decomposition of a typically large element in the finite field. This work improves the initial splitting phase and applies to any nonprime finite field. It is very efficient when the extension degree is composite. It exploits the proper subfields, resulting in a much more smooth decomposition of the target. This leads to a new trade-off between the initial splitting step and the descent step in small characteristic. Moreover it reduces the width and the height of the subsequent descent tree.

Sean Ballentine, Aurore Guillevic, Elisa Lorenzo García et al.

Schoof's classic algorithm allows point-counting for elliptic curves over finite fields in polynomial time. This algorithm was subsequently improved by Atkin, using factorizations of modular polynomials, and by Elkies, using a theory of explicit isogenies. Moving to Jacobians of genus-2 curves, the current state of the art for point counting is a generalization of Schoof's algorithm. While we are currently missing the tools we need to generalize Elkies' methods to genus 2, recently Martindale and Milio have computed analogues of modular polynomials for genus-2 curves whose Jacobians have real multiplication by maximal orders of small discriminant. In this article, we prove Atkin-style results for genus-2 Jacobians with real multiplication by maximal orders, with a view to using these new modular polynomials to improve the practicality of point-counting algorithms for these curves.

Aurore Guillevic, François Morain, Emmanuel Thomé

Pairing based cryptography is in a dangerous position following the breakthroughs on discrete logarithms computations in finite fields of small characteristic. Remaining instances are built over finite fields of large characteristic and their security relies on the fact that the embedding field of the underlying curve is relatively large. How large is debatable. The aim of our work is to sustain the claim that the combination of degree 3 embedding and too small finite fields obviously does not provide enough security. As a computational example, we solve the DLP on a 170-bit MNT curve, by exploiting the pairing embedding to a 508-bit, degree-3 extension of the base field.

Aurore Guillevic

The Number Field Sieve (NFS) algorithm is the best known method to compute discrete logarithms (DL) in finite fields $\mathbb{F}\_{p^n}$, with $p$ medium to large and $n \geq 1$ small. This algorithm comprises four steps: polynomial selection, relation collection, linear algebra and finally, individual logarithm computation. The first step outputs two polynomials defining two number fields, and a map from the polynomial ring over the integers modulo each of these polynomials to $\mathbb{F}\_{p^n}$. After the relation collection and linear algebra phases, the (virtual) logarithm of a subset of elements in each number field is known. Given the target element in $\mathbb{F}\_{p^n}$, the fourth step computes a preimage in one number field. If one can write the target preimage as a product of elements of known (virtual) logarithm, then one can deduce the discrete logarithm of the target. As recently shown by the Logjam attack, this final step can be critical when it can be computed very quickly. But we realized that computing an individual DL is much slower in medium-and large-characteristic non-prime fields $\mathbb{F}\_{p^n}$ with $n \geq 3$, compared to prime fields and quadratic fields $\mathbb{F}\_{p^2}$. We optimize the first part of individual DL: the \emph{booting step}, by reducing dramatically the size of the preimage norm. Its smoothness probability is higher, hence the running-time of the booting step is much improved. Our method is very efficient for small extension fields with $2 \leq n \leq 6$ and applies to any $n \textgreater{} 1$, in medium and large characteristic.

Razvan Barbulescu, Pierrick Gaudry, Aurore Guillevic et al.

We propose various strategies for improving the computation of discrete logarithms in non-prime fields of medium to large characteristic using the Number Field Sieve. This includes new methods for selecting the polynomials; the use of explicit automorphisms; explicit computations in the number fields; and prediction that some units have a zero virtual logarithm. On the theoretical side, we obtain a new complexity bound of $L_{p^n}(1/3,\sqrt[3]{96/9})$ in the medium characteristic case. On the practical side, we computed discrete logarithms in $F_{p^2}$ for a prime number $p$ with $80$ decimal digits.Warning: This unpublished version contains some inexact statements.