Miaomiao Tian

Zhili Chen, Wei Ding, Yan Xu et al.

Cloud auctions provide cost-effective strategies for cloud VM allocation. Most existing cloud auctions simply assume that the auctioneer is trustable, and thus the fairness of auctions can be easily achieved. However, in fact, such a trustable auctioneer may not exist, and the fairness is non-trivial to guarantee. In this work, for the first time, we propose a decentralized cloud VM auction and trade framework based on blockchain. We realize both auction fairness and trade fairness among participants (e.g., cloud provider and cloud users) in this system, which guarantees the interest of each party will not suffer any loss as long as it follows the protocol. Furthermore, we implement our system through the local blockchain and Ethereum official test blockchain, carry out experimental simulations, and demonstrate the feasibility of our system.

Zhili Chen, Sheng Chen, Hong Zhong et al.

Auction is widely regarded as an effective way in dynamic spectrum redistribution. Recently, considerable research efforts have been devoted to designing privacy-preserving spectrum auctions in a variety of auction settings. However, none of existing work has addressed the privacy issue in the most generic scenario, double spectrum auctions where each seller sells multiple channels and each buyer buys multiple channels. To fill this gap, in this paper we propose PP-MCSA, a Privacy Preserving mechanism for Multi-Channel double Spectrum Auctions. Technically, by leveraging garbled circuits, we manage to protect the privacy of both sellers' requests and buyers' bids in multi-channel double spectrum auctions. As far as we know, PP-MCSA is the first privacy-preserving solution for multi-channel double spectrum auctions. We further theoretically demonstrate the privacy guarantee of PP-MCSA, and extensively evaluate its performance via experiments. Experimental results show that PP-MCSA incurs only moderate communication and computation overhead.

Zhili Chen, Liusheng Huang, Lu Li et al.

Truthful spectrum auctions have been extensively studied in recent years. Truthfulness makes bidders bid their true valuations, simplifying greatly the analysis of auctions. However, revealing one's true valuation causes severe privacy disclosure to the auctioneer and other bidders. To make things worse, previous work on secure spectrum auctions does not provide adequate security. In this paper, based on TRUST, we propose PS-TRUST, a provably secure solution for truthful double spectrum auctions. Besides maintaining the properties of truthfulness and special spectrum reuse of TRUST, PS-TRUST achieves provable security against semi-honest adversaries in the sense of cryptography. Specifically, PS-TRUST reveals nothing about the bids to anyone in the auction, except the auction result. To the best of our knowledge, PS-TRUST is the first provably secure solution for spectrum auctions. Furthermore, experimental results show that the computation and communication overhead of PS-TRUST is modest, and its practical applications are feasible.

Miaomiao Tian, Liusheng Huang, Wei Yang

Currently, short signature is receiving significant attention since it is particularly useful in low-bandwidth communication environments. However, most of the short signature schemes are only based on one intractable assumption. Recently, Su presented an identity-based short signature scheme based on knapsack and bilinear pairing. He claimed that the signature scheme is secure in the random oracle model. Unfortunately, in this paper, we show that his scheme is insecure. Concretely, an adversary can forge a valid signature on any message with respect to any identity in Su's scheme.