Matthias Pilz

2papers

2 Papers

SPMay 8, 2019
Selfish Energy Sharing in Prosumer Communities: A Demand-Side Management Concept

Matthias Pilz, Luluwah Al-Fagih

Global warming is endangering the earth's ecosystem. It is imperative for us to limit green house gas emissions in order to combat rising global average temperatures. One way to move forward is the integration of renewable energy resources on all levels of the power system, i.e. from large-scale energy producers to individual households. The future smart grid provides the technology for this. In this paper, a novel demand-side management concept is proposed. It is implemented by a utility company which focuses on renewable energy. Through a specific billing mechanism, prosumers are encouraged to balance load and supply. A game-theoretic approach models households as self-determined rational energy users that want to reduce their individual electricity costs. To achieve this, they selfishly share energy with their neighbours and also schedule their energy storage systems. The scheme is designed such that monetary transactions between households are not necessary. Thus, it provides an alternative approach to energy trading schemes from the literature.

GTOct 17, 2018
Security Attacks on Smart Grid Scheduling and Their Defences: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Matthias Pilz, Fariborz Baghaei Naeini, Ketil Grammont et al.

The introduction of advanced communication infrastructure into the power grid raises a plethora of new opportunities to tackle climate change. This paper is concerned with the security of energy management systems which are expected to be implemented in the future smart grid. The existence of a novel class of false data injection attacks that are based on modifying forecasted demand data is demonstrated, and the impact of the attacks on a typical system's parameters is identified, using a simulated scenario. Monitoring strategies that the utility company may employ in order to detect the attacks are proposed and a game--theoretic approach is used to support the utility company's decision--making process for the allocation of their defence resources. Informed by these findings, a generic security game is devised and solved, revealing the existence of several Nash Equilibrium strategies. The practical outcomes of these results for the utility company are discussed in detail and a proposal is made, suggesting how the generic model may be applied to other scenarios.