Tony F. Wu

Abbas Rahimi, Tony F. Wu, Haitong Li et al.

One viable solution for continuous reduction in energy-per-operation is to rethink functionality to cope with uncertainty by adopting computational approaches that are inherently robust to uncertainty. It requires a novel look at data representations, associated operations, and circuits, and at materials and substrates that enable them. 3D integrated nanotechnologies combined with novel brain-inspired computational paradigms that support fast learning and fault tolerance could lead the way. Recognizing the very size of the brain's circuits, hyperdimensional (HD) computing can model neural activity patterns with points in a HD space, that is, with hypervectors as large randomly generated patterns. At its very core, HD computing is about manipulating and comparing these patterns inside memory. Emerging nanotechnologies such as carbon nanotube field effect transistors (CNFETs) and resistive RAM (RRAM), and their monolithic 3D integration offer opportunities for hardware implementations of HD computing through tight integration of logic and memory, energy-efficient computation, and unique device characteristics. We experimentally demonstrate and characterize an end-to-end HD computing nanosystem built using monolithic 3D integration of CNFETs and RRAM. With our nanosystem, we experimentally demonstrate classification of 21 languages with measured accuracy of up to 98% on >20,000 sentences (6.4 million characters), training using one text sample (~100,000 characters) per language, and resilient operation (98% accuracy) despite 78% hardware errors in HD representation (outputs stuck at 0 or 1). By exploiting the unique properties of the underlying nanotechnologies, we show that HD computing, when implemented with monolithic 3D integration, can be up to 420X more energy-efficient while using 25X less area compared to traditional silicon CMOS implementations.

Tony F. Wu, Karthik Ganesan, Yunqing Alexander Hu et al.

There are increasing concerns about possible malicious modifications of integrated circuits (ICs) used in critical applications. Such attacks are often referred to as hardware Trojans. While many techniques focus on hardware Trojan detection during IC testing, it is still possible for attacks to go undetected. Using a combination of new design techniques and new memory technologies, we present a new approach that detects a wide variety of hardware Trojans during IC testing and also during system operation in the field. Our approach can also prevent a wide variety of attacks during synthesis, place-and-route, and fabrication of ICs. It can be applied to any digital system, and can be tuned for both traditional and split-manufacturing methods. We demonstrate its applicability for both ASICs and FPGAs. Using fabricated test chips with Trojan emulation capabilities and also using simulations, we demonstrate: 1. The area and power costs of our approach can range between 7.4-165% and 0.07-60%, respectively, depending on the design and the attacks targeted; 2. The speed impact can be minimal (close to 0%); 3. Our approach can detect 99.998% of Trojans (emulated using test chips) that do not require detailed knowledge of the design being attacked; 4. Our approach can prevent 99.98% of specific attacks (simulated) that utilize detailed knowledge of the design being attacked (e.g., through reverse-engineering). 5. Our approach never produces any false positives, i.e., it does not report attacks when the IC operates correctly.