Emin Gün Sirer

CR
h-index50
10papers
3,393citations
Novelty63%
AI Score31

10 Papers

10.8GNSep 18, 2019
A Classification Framework for Stablecoin Designs

Amani Moin, Emin Gün Sirer, Kevin Sekniqi

Stablecoins promise to bridge fiat currencies with the world of cryptocurrencies. They provide a way for users to take advantage of the benefits of digital currencies, such as ability to transfer assets over the internet, provide assurance on minting schedules and scarcity, and enable new asset classes, while also partially mitigating their volatility risks. In this paper, we systematically discuss general design, decompose existing stablecoins into various component design elements, explore their strengths and drawbacks, and identify future directions.

12.0CRJan 21, 2019
Towards a Functional Fee Market for Cryptocurrencies

Soumya Basu, David Easley, Maureen O'Hara et al.

Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies prioritize transactions based on their fees, creating a unique kind of fee market. Empirically, this market has failed to yield stable equilibria with predictable prices for desired levels of service. We argue that this is due to the absence of a dominant strategy equilibrium in the current fee mechanism. We propose an alternative fee setting mechanism that is inspired by generalized second price auctions. The design of such a mechanism is challenging because miners can use any criteria for including transactions and can manipulate the results of the auction after seeing the proposed fees. Nonetheless, we show that our proposed protocol is free from manipulation as the number of users increases. We further show that, for a large number of users and miners, the gain from manipulation is small for all parties. This results in users proposing fees that represent their true utility and lower variance of revenue for miners. Historical analysis shows that Bitcoin users could have saved $272,528,000 USD in transaction fees while miners could have reduced the variance of fee income by an average factor of 7.4 times.

4.2CRJul 10, 2018
sAVSS: Scalable Asynchronous Verifiable Secret Sharing in BFT Protocols

Soumya Basu, Alin Tomescu, Ittai Abraham et al.

This paper introduces a new way to incorporate verifiable secret sharing (VSS) schemes into Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) protocols. This technique extends the threshold guarantee of classical Byzantine Fault Tolerant algorithms to include privacy as well. This provides applications with a powerful primitive: a threshold trusted third party, which simplifies many difficult problems such as a fair exchange. In order to incorporate VSS into BFT, we introduced sAVSS, a framework that transforms any VSS scheme into an asynchronous VSS scheme with constant overhead. By incorporating Kate et al.'s scheme into our framework, we obtain an asynchronous VSS that has constant overhead on each replica -- the first of its kind. We show that a key-value store built using BFT replication and sAVSS supports writing secret-shared values with about a 30% - 50% throughput overhead with less than 35 millisecond request latencies.

34.6CRJan 11, 2018
Decentralization in Bitcoin and Ethereum Networks

Adem Efe Gencer, Soumya Basu, Ittay Eyal et al.

Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies have demonstrated how to securely implement traditionally centralized systems, such as currencies, in a decentralized fashion. However, there have been few measurement studies on the level of decentralization they achieve in practice. We present a measurement study on various decentralization metrics of two of the leading cryptocurrencies with the largest market capitalization and user base, Bitcoin and Ethereum. We investigate the extent of decentralization by measuring the network resources of nodes and the interconnection among them, the protocol requirements affecting the operation of nodes, and the robustness of the two systems against attacks. In particular, we adapted existing internet measurement techniques and used the Falcon Relay Network as a novel measurement tool to obtain our data. We discovered that neither Bitcoin nor Ethereum has strictly better properties than the other. We also provide concrete suggestions for improving both systems.

1.2DBJan 5, 2018
Enabling Strong Database Integrity using Trusted Execution Environments

Kai Mast, Lequn Chen, Emin Gün Sirer

Many applications require the immutable and consistent sharing of data across organizational boundaries. Because conventional datastores cannot provide this functionality, blockchains have been proposed as one possible solution. Yet public blockchains are energy inefficient, hard to scale and suffer from limited throughput and high latencies, while permissioned blockchains depend on specially designated nodes, potentially leak meta-information, and also suffer from scale and performance bottlenecks. This paper presents CreDB, a datastore that provides blockchain-like guarantees of integrity using trusted execution environments. CreDB employs four novel mechanisms to support a new class of applications. First, it creates a permanent record of every transaction, known as a witness, that clients can then use not only to audit the database but to prove to third parties that desired actions took place. Second, it associates with every object an inseparable and inviolable policy, which not only performs access control but enables the datastore to implement state machines whose behavior is amenable to analysis. Third, timeline inspection allows authorized parties to inspect and reason about the history of changes made to the data. Finally, CreDB provides a protected function evaluation mechanism that allows integrity-protected computation over private data. The paper describes these mechanisms, and the applications they collectively enable, in detail. We have fully implemented a prototype of CreDB on Intel SGX. Evaluation shows that CreDB can serve as a drop-in replacement for other NoSQL stores, such as MongoDB while providing stronger integrity guarantees.

27.0CRJul 18, 2017
Teechain: A Secure Payment Network with Asynchronous Blockchain Access

Joshua Lind, Oded Naor, Ittay Eyal et al.

Blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum execute payment transactions securely, but their performance is limited by the need for global consensus. Payment networks overcome this limitation through off-chain transactions. Instead of writing to the blockchain for each transaction, they only settle the final payment balances with the underlying blockchain. When executing off-chain transactions in current payment networks, parties must access the blockchain within bounded time to detect misbehaving parties that deviate from the protocol. This opens a window for attacks in which a malicious party can steal funds by deliberately delaying other parties' blockchain access and prevents parties from using payment networks when disconnected from the blockchain. We present Teechain, the first layer-two payment network that executes off-chain transactions asynchronously with respect to the underlying blockchain. To prevent parties from misbehaving, Teechain uses treasuries, protected by hardware trusted execution environments (TEEs), to establish off-chain payment channels between parties. Treasuries maintain collateral funds and can exchange transactions efficiently and securely, without interacting with the underlying blockchain. To mitigate against treasury failures and to avoid having to trust all TEEs, Teechain replicates the state of treasuries using committee chains, a new variant of chain replication with threshold secret sharing. Teechain achieves at least a 33x higher transaction throughput than the state-of-the-art Lightning payment network. A 30-machine Teechain deployment can handle over 1 million Bitcoin transactions per second.

23.1CRDec 22, 2016
Teechan: Payment Channels Using Trusted Execution Environments

Joshua Lind, Ittay Eyal, Peter Pietzuch et al.

Blockchain protocols are inherently limited in transaction throughput and latency. Recent efforts to address performance and scale blockchains have focused on off-chain payment channels. While such channels can achieve low latency and high throughput, deploying them securely on top of the Bitcoin blockchain has been difficult, partly because building a secure implementation requires changes to the underlying protocol and the ecosystem. We present Teechan, a full-duplex payment channel framework that exploits trusted execution environments. Teechan can be deployed securely on the existing Bitcoin blockchain without having to modify the protocol. It: (i) achieves a higher transaction throughput and lower transaction latency than prior solutions; (ii) enables unlimited full-duplex payments as long as the balance does not exceed the channel's credit; (iii) requires only a single message to be sent per payment in any direction; and (iv) places at most two transactions on the blockchain under any execution scenario. We have built and deployed the Teechan framework using Intel SGX on the Bitcoin network. Our experiments show that, not counting network latencies, Teechan can achieve 2,480 transactions per second on a single channel, with sub-millisecond latencies.

20.1CRNov 21, 2016
Service-Oriented Sharding with Aspen

Adem Efe Gencer, Robbert van Renesse, Emin Gün Sirer

The rise of blockchain-based cryptocurrencies has led to an explosion of services using distributed ledgers as their underlying infrastructure. However, due to inherently single-service oriented blockchain protocols, such services can bloat the existing ledgers, fail to provide sufficient security, or completely forego the property of trustless auditability. Security concerns, trust restrictions, and scalability limits regarding the resource requirements of users hamper the sustainable development of loosely-coupled services on blockchains. This paper introduces Aspen, a sharded blockchain protocol designed to securely scale with increasing number of services. Aspen shares the same trust model as Bitcoin in a peer-to-peer network that is prone to extreme churn containing Byzantine participants. It enables introduction of new services without compromising the security, leveraging the trust assumptions, or flooding users with irrelevant messages.

41.8CROct 7, 2015
Bitcoin-NG: A Scalable Blockchain Protocol

Ittay Eyal, Adem Efe Gencer, Emin Gun Sirer et al.

Cryptocurrencies, based on and led by Bitcoin, have shown promise as infrastructure for pseudonymous online payments, cheap remittance, trustless digital asset exchange, and smart contracts. However, Bitcoin-derived blockchain protocols have inherent scalability limits that trade-off between throughput and latency and withhold the realization of this potential. This paper presents Bitcoin-NG, a new blockchain protocol designed to scale. Based on Bitcoin's blockchain protocol, Bitcoin-NG is Byzantine fault tolerant, is robust to extreme churn, and shares the same trust model obviating qualitative changes to the ecosystem. In addition to Bitcoin-NG, we introduce several novel metrics of interest in quantifying the security and efficiency of Bitcoin-like blockchain protocols. We implement Bitcoin-NG and perform large-scale experiments at 15% the size of the operational Bitcoin system, using unchanged clients of both protocols. These experiments demonstrate that Bitcoin-NG scales optimally, with bandwidth limited only by the capacity of the individual nodes and latency limited only by the propagation time of the network.

50.5CRNov 1, 2013
Majority is not Enough: Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable

Ittay Eyal, Emin Gun Sirer

The Bitcoin cryptocurrency records its transactions in a public log called the blockchain. Its security rests critically on the distributed protocol that maintains the blockchain, run by participants called miners. Conventional wisdom asserts that the protocol is incentive-compatible and secure against colluding minority groups, i.e., it incentivizes miners to follow the protocol as prescribed. We show that the Bitcoin protocol is not incentive-compatible. We present an attack with which colluding miners obtain a revenue larger than their fair share. This attack can have significant consequences for Bitcoin: Rational miners will prefer to join the selfish miners, and the colluding group will increase in size until it becomes a majority. At this point, the Bitcoin system ceases to be a decentralized currency. Selfish mining is feasible for any group size of colluding miners. We propose a practical modification to the Bitcoin protocol that protects against selfish mining pools that command less than 1/4 of the resources. This threshold is lower than the wrongly assumed 1/2 bound, but better than the current reality where a group of any size can compromise the system.