Xinping Zhang

2papers

2 Papers

33.1AIMar 21
Modeling Epistemic Uncertainty in Social Perception via Rashomon Set Agents

Jinming Yang, Xinyu Jiang, Xinshan Jiao et al.

We present an LLM-driven multi-agent probabilistic modeling framework that demonstrates how differences in students' subjective social perceptions arise and evolve in real-world classroom settings, under constraints from an observed social network and limited questionnaire data. When social information is incomplete and the accuracy of perception differs between students, they can form different views of the same group structure from local cues they can access. Repeated peer communication and belief updates can gradually change these views and, over time, lead to stable group-level differences. To avoid assuming a global "god's-eye view," we assign each student an individualized subjective graph that shows which social ties they can perceive and how far information is reachable from their perspective. All judgments and interactions are restricted to this subjective graph: agents use retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) to access only local information and then form evaluations of peers' competence and social standing. We also add structural perturbations related to social-anxiety to represent consistent individual differences in the accuracy of social perception. During peer exchanges, agents share narrative assessments of classmates' academic performance and social position with uncertainty tags, and update beliefs probabilistically using LLM-based trust scores. Using the time series of six real exam scores as an exogenous reference, we run multi-step simulations to examine how epistemic uncertainty spreads through local interactions. Experiments show that, without relying on global information, the framework reproduces several collective dynamics consistent with real-world educational settings. The code is released at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Rashomonomon-0126.

CRNov 7, 2018
Shining Light On Shadow Stacks

Nathan Burow, Xinping Zhang, Mathias Payer

Control-Flow Hijacking attacks are the dominant attack vector against C/C++ programs. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) solutions mitigate these attacks on the forward edge,i.e., indirect calls through function pointers and virtual calls. Protecting the backward edge is left to stack canaries, which are easily bypassed through information leaks. Shadow Stacks are a fully precise mechanism for protecting backwards edges, and should be deployed with CFI mitigations. We present a comprehensive analysis of all possible shadow stack mechanisms along three axes: performance, compatibility, and security. For performance comparisons we use SPEC CPU2006, while security and compatibility are qualitatively analyzed. Based on our study, we renew calls for a shadow stack design that leverages a dedicated register, resulting in low performance overhead, and minimal memory overhead, but sacrifices compatibility. We present case studies of our implementation of such a design, Shadesmar, on Phoronix and Apache to demonstrate the feasibility of dedicating a general purpose register to a security monitor on modern architectures, and the deployability of Shadesmar. Our comprehensive analysis, including detailed case studies for our novel design, allows compiler designers and practitioners to select the correct shadow stack design for different usage scenarios.