Stefan Schiffner

Bettina Berendt, Stefan Schiffner

When technology enters applications and processes with a long tradition of controversial societal debate, multi-faceted new ethical and legal questions arise. This paper focusses on the process of whistleblowing, an activity with large impacts on democracy and business. Computer science can, for the first time in history, provide for truly anonymous communication. We investigate this in relation to the values and rights of accountability, fairness and data protection, focusing on opportunities and limitations of the anonymity that can be provided computationally; possible consequences of outsourcing whistleblowing support; and challenges for the interpretation and use of some relevant laws. We conclude that to address these questions, whistleblowing and anonymous whistleblowing must rest on three pillars, forming a 'triangle of whistleblowing protection and incentivisation' that combines anonymity in a formal and technical sense; whistleblower protection through laws; and other norms and practices including organisational error culture.

Christiane Kuhn, Martin Beck, Stefan Schiffner et al.

Many anonymous communication networks (ACNs) with different privacy goals have been developed. However, there are no accepted formal definitions of privacy and ACNs often define their goals and adversary models ad hoc. However, for the understanding and comparison of different flavors of privacy, a common foundation is needed. In this paper, we introduce an analysis framework for ACNs that captures the notions and assumptions known from different analysis frameworks. Therefore, we formalize privacy goals as notions and identify their building blocks. For any pair of notions we prove whether one is strictly stronger, and, if so, which. Hence, we are able to present a complete hierarchy. Further, we show how to add practical assumptions, e.g. regarding the protocol model or user corruption as options to our notions. This way, we capture the notions and assumptions of, to the best of our knowledge, all existing analytical frameworks for ACNs and are able to revise inconsistencies between them. Thus, our new framework builds a common ground and allows for sharper analysis, since new combinations of assumptions are possible and the relations between the notions are known.

George Danezis, Josep Domingo-Ferrer, Marit Hansen et al.

Privacy and data protection constitute core values of individuals and of democratic societies. There have been decades of debate on how those values -and legal obligations- can be embedded into systems, preferably from the very beginning of the design process. One important element in this endeavour are technical mechanisms, known as privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs). Their effectiveness has been demonstrated by researchers and in pilot implementations. However, apart from a few exceptions, e.g., encryption became widely used, PETs have not become a standard and widely used component in system design. Furthermore, for unfolding their full benefit for privacy and data protection, PETs need to be rooted in a data governance strategy to be applied in practice. This report contributes to bridging the gap between the legal framework and the available technological implementation measures by providing an inventory of existing approaches, privacy design strategies, and technical building blocks of various degrees of maturity from research and development. Starting from the privacy principles of the legislation, important elements are presented as a first step towards a design process for privacy-friendly systems and services. The report sketches a method to map legal obligations to design strategies, which allow the system designer to select appropriate techniques for implementing the identified privacy requirements. Furthermore, the report reflects limitations of the approach. It concludes with recommendations on how to overcome and mitigate these limits.