Andrew Conway

Michelle Blom, Andrew Conway, Dan King et al.

The City and County of San Francisco, CA, has used Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) for some elections since 2004. This report describes the first ever process pilot of Risk Limiting Audits for IRV, for the San Francisco District Attorney's race in November, 2019. We found that the vote-by-mail outcome could be efficiently audited to well under the 0.05 risk limit given a sample of only 200 ballots. All the software we developed for the pilot is open source.

Vishal Mohanty, Nicholas Akinyokun, Andrew Conway et al.

Indian Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) will be fitted with printers that produce Voter-Verifiable Paper Audit Trails (VVPATs) in time for the 2019 general election. VVPATs provide evidence that each vote was recorded as the voter intended, without having to trust the perfection or security of the EVMs. However, confidence in election results requires more: VVPATs must be preserved inviolate and then actually used to check the reported election result in a trustworthy way that the public can verify. A full manual tally from the VVPATs could be prohibitively expensive and time-consuming; moreover, it is difficult for the public to determine whether a full hand count was conducted accurately. We show how Risk-Limiting Audits (RLAs) could provide high confidence in Indian election results. Compared to full hand recounts, RLAs typically require manually inspecting far fewer VVPATs when the outcome is correct, and are much easier for the electorate to observe in adequate detail to determine whether the result is trustworthy.

Andrew Conway, Michelle Blom, Lee Naish et al.

We re-examine the 2012 local government elections in New South Wales, Australia. The count was conducted electronically using a randomised form of the Single Transferable Vote (STV). It was already well known that randomness does make a difference to outcomes in some seats. We describe how the process could be amended to include a demonstration that the randomness was chosen fairly. Second, and more significantly, we found an error in the official counting software, which caused a mistake in the count in the council of Griffith, where candidate Rina Mercuri narrowly missed out on a seat. We believe the software error incorrectly decreased Mercuri's winning probability to about 10%---according to our count she should have won with 91% probability. The NSW Electoral Commission (NSWEC) corrected their code when we pointed out the error, and made their own announcement. We have since investigated the 2016 local government election (held after correcting the error above) and found two new errors. We notified the NSWEC about these errors a few days after they posted the results.

Berj Chilingirian, Zara Perumal, Ronald L. Rivest et al.

We explain why the Australian Electoral Commission should perform an audit of the paper Senate ballots against the published preference data files. We suggest four different post-election audit methods appropriate for Australian Senate elections. We have developed prototype code for all of them and tested it on preference data from the 2016 election.