Arash Tavakkol

Shai Bergman, Zhe Yang, Julien Eudine et al.

Modern distributed file systems rely on uncoordinated, per node page caches that replicate hot data locally across the cluster. While ensuring fast local access, this architecture underutilizes aggregate cluster DRAM capacity through massive data redundancy and incurs prohibitive coherence overhead via heavyweight, lock-based protocols. In this paper, we focus on the design of a distributed page cache that treats the entire cluster's main memory as a single cache budget while preserving standard file-system interfaces and semantics. We present Distributed Page Cache (DPC), an OS-level, distributed page cache built on top of Compute Express Link (CXL) 3.0 memory semantics. DPC enforces a single-copy invariant at page granularity: each file page has exactly one owner node holding the sole resident DRAM copy, and other nodes access it via CXL-based remote mappings rather than creating replicas of the page. DPC is implemented end-to-end on a CXL-based emulation framework that models multi-host CXL 3.0 memory fabrics, enabling detailed evaluation in the absence of widespread hardware. Across real-world and representative data-sharing workloads, DPC delivers speedups of up to 12.4X, with a geometric-mean speedup of 5.6X.

Lois Orosa, Yaohua Wang, Ivan Puddu et al.

DRAM manufacturers have been prioritizing memory capacity, yield, and bandwidth for years, while trying to keep the design complexity as simple as possible. DRAM chips do not carry out any computation or other important functions, such as security. Processors implement most of the existing security mechanisms that protect the system against security threats, because 1) executing security mechanisms usually require non-trivial computational capabilities (e.g., encryption), and 2) commodity DRAM chips are not designed to perform computations or tasks other than data storage. In this work, we advocate for DRAM as a key component for providing security mechanisms to the system. To this end, we propose Dataplant, a new class of low-cost, high-performance, and reliable security primitives that can be integrated in commodity DRAM chips with minimal changes. The main idea of Dataplant is to slightly modify the internal DRAM timing signals to expose the inherent process variation found in all DRAM chips for generating unpredictable but reproducible values (e.g., keys) within DRAM. We use Dataplant to build two new security mechanisms. First, a new Dataplant-based physical unclonable function (PUF) with non-destructive read-out, low evaluation latency, robust responses, resiliency to temperature changes, and data-independent responses. Second, a new cold boot attack prevention mechanism that automatically destroys all data within DRAM on every power cycle with zero run-time energy and latency overheads. Using a combination of detailed simulations and experiments with 136 real commodity DRAM chips, we show that our Dataplant-based PUF has 1.8x higher throughput than the best state-of-the-art DRAM PUFs. We also demonstrate that our Dataplant-based cold boot attack protection mechanism is 19.5x faster and consumes 2.54x less energy when compared to existing mechanisms.