CRJan 12, 2022
When Machine Learning Meets Spectrum Sharing Security: Methodologies and ChallengesQun Wang, Haijian Sun, Rose Qingyang Hu et al.
The exponential growth of internet connected systems has generated numerous challenges, such as spectrum shortage issues, which require efficient spectrum sharing (SS) solutions. Complicated and dynamic SS systems can be exposed to different potential security and privacy issues, requiring protection mechanisms to be adaptive, reliable, and scalable. Machine learning (ML) based methods have frequently been proposed to address those issues. In this article, we provide a comprehensive survey of the recent development of ML based SS methods, the most critical security issues, and corresponding defense mechanisms. In particular, we elaborate the state-of-the-art methodologies for improving the performance of SS communication systems for various vital aspects, including ML based cognitive radio networks (CRNs), ML based database assisted SS networks, ML based LTE-U networks, ML based ambient backscatter networks, and other ML based SS solutions. We also present security issues from the physical layer and corresponding defending strategies based on ML algorithms, including Primary User Emulation (PUE) attacks, Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification (SSDF) attacks, jamming attacks, eavesdropping attacks, and privacy issues. Finally, extensive discussions on open challenges for ML based SS are also given. This comprehensive review is intended to provide the foundation for and facilitate future studies on exploring the potential of emerging ML for coping with increasingly complex SS and their security problems.
ITOct 17, 2021
A Q-Learning-based Approach for Distributed Beam Scheduling in mmWave NetworksXiang Zhang, Shamik Sarkar, Arupjyoti Bhuyan et al.
We consider the problem of distributed downlink beam scheduling and power allocation for millimeter-Wave (mmWave) cellular networks where multiple base stations (BSs) belonging to different service operators share the same unlicensed spectrum with no central coordination or cooperation among them. Our goal is to design efficient distributed beam scheduling and power allocation algorithms such that the network-level payoff, defined as the weighted sum of the total throughput and a power penalization term, can be maximized. To this end, we propose a distributed scheduling approach to power allocation and adaptation for efficient interference management over the shared spectrum by modeling each BS as an independent Q-learning agent. As a baseline, we compare the proposed approach to the state-of-the-art non-cooperative game-based approach which was previously developed for the same problem. We conduct extensive experiments under various scenarios to verify the effect of multiple factors on the performance of both approaches. Experiment results show that the proposed approach adapts well to different interference situations by learning from experience and can achieve higher payoff than the game-based approach. The proposed approach can also be integrated into our previously developed Lyapunov stochastic optimization framework for the purpose of network utility maximization with optimality guarantee. As a result, the weights in the payoff function can be automatically and optimally determined by the virtual queue values from the sub-problems derived from the Lyapunov optimization framework.
CRNov 22, 2020
Who is in Control? Practical Physical Layer Attack and Defense for mmWave based Sensing in Autonomous VehiclesZhi Sun, Sarankumar Balakrishnan, Lu Su et al.
With the wide bandwidths in millimeter wave (mmWave) frequency band that results in unprecedented accuracy, mmWave sensing has become vital for many applications, especially in autonomous vehicles (AVs). In addition, mmWave sensing has superior reliability compared to other sensing counterparts such as camera and LiDAR, which is essential for safety-critical driving. Therefore, it is critical to understand the security vulnerabilities and improve the security and reliability of mmWave sensing in AVs. To this end, we perform the end-to-end security analysis of a mmWave-based sensing system in AVs, by designing and implementing practical physical layer attack and defense strategies in a state-of-the-art mmWave testbed and an AV testbed in real-world settings. Various strategies are developed to take control of the victim AV by spoofing its mmWave sensing module, including adding fake obstacles at arbitrary locations and faking the locations of existing obstacles. Five real-world attack scenarios are constructed to spoof the victim AV and force it to make dangerous driving decisions leading to a fatal crash. Field experiments are conducted to study the impact of the various attack scenarios using a Lincoln MKZ-based AV testbed, which validate that the attacker can indeed assume control of the victim AV to compromise its security and safety. To defend the attacks, we design and implement a challenge-response authentication scheme and a RF fingerprinting scheme to reliably detect aforementioned spoofing attacks.
CRFeb 10, 2019
Physical Layer Identification based on Spatial-temporal Beam Features for Millimeter Wave Wireless NetworksSarankumar Balakrishnan, Shreya Gupta, Arupjyoti Bhuyan et al.
With millimeter wave (mmWave) wireless communication envisioned to be the key enabler of next generation high data rate wireless networks, security is of paramount importance. While conventional security measures in wireless networks operate at a higher layer of the protocol stack, physical layer security utilizes unique device dependent hardware features to identify and authenticate legitimate devices. In this work, we identify that the manufacturing tolerances in the antenna arrays used in mmWave devices contribute to a beam pattern that is unique to each device, and to that end we propose a novel device fingerprinting scheme based on the unique beam patterns used by the mmWave devices. Specifically, we propose a fingerprinting scheme with multiple access points (APs) to take advantage of the rich spatial-temporal information of the beam pattern. We perform comprehensive experiments with commercial off-the-shelf mmWave devices to validate the reliability performance of our proposed method under various scenarios. We also compare our beam pattern feature with a conventional physical layer feature namely power spectral density feature (PSD). To that end, we implement PSD feature based fingerprinting for mmWave devices. We show that the proposed multiple APs scheme is able to achieve over 99% identification accuracy for stationary LOS and NLOS scenarios and significantly outperform the PSD based method. For mobility scenarios, the overall identification accuracy is 96%. In addition, we perform security analysis of our proposed beam pattern fingerprinting system and PSD fingerprinting system by studying the feasibility of performing impersonation attacks. We design and implement an impersonation attack mechanism for mmWave wireless networks using state-of-the-art 60 GHz software defined radios. We discuss our findings and their implications on the security of the mmWave wireless networks.