Tao Lin

Yongxin Guo, Zhenglin Cheng, Xiaoying Tang et al.

The Sparse Mixture of Experts (SMoE) has been widely employed to enhance the efficiency of training and inference for Transformer-based foundational models, yielding promising results.However, the performance of SMoE heavily depends on the choice of hyper-parameters, such as the number of experts and the number of experts to be activated (referred to as top-k), resulting in significant computational overhead due to the extensive model training by searching over various hyper-parameter configurations. As a remedy, we introduce the Dynamic Mixture of Experts (DynMoE) technique. DynMoE incorporates (1) a novel gating method that enables each token to automatically determine the number of experts to activate. (2) An adaptive process automatically adjusts the number of experts during training. Extensive numerical results across Vision, Language, and Vision-Language tasks demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach to achieve competitive performance compared to GMoE for vision and language tasks, and MoE-LLaVA for vision-language tasks, while maintaining efficiency by activating fewer parameters. Our code is available at https://github.com/LINs-lab/DynMoE.

Hengyu An, Jinghuai Zhang, Tianyu Du et al.

Large language model (LLM) agents are widely deployed in real-world applications, where they leverage tools to retrieve and manipulate external data for complex tasks. However, when interacting with untrusted data sources (e.g., fetching information from public websites), tool responses may contain injected instructions that covertly influence agent behaviors and lead to malicious outcomes, a threat referred to as Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI). Existing defenses typically rely on advanced prompting strategies or auxiliary detection models. While these methods have demonstrated some effectiveness, they fundamentally rely on assumptions about the model's inherent security, which lacks structural constraints on agent behaviors. As a result, agents still retain unrestricted access to tool invocations, leaving them vulnerable to stronger attack vectors that can bypass the security guardrails of the model. To prevent malicious tool invocations at the source, we propose a novel defensive task execution paradigm, called IPIGuard, which models the agents' task execution process as a traversal over a planned Tool Dependency Graph (TDG). By explicitly decoupling action planning from interaction with external data, IPIGuard significantly reduces unintended tool invocations triggered by injected instructions, thereby enhancing robustness against IPI attacks. Experiments on the AgentDojo benchmark show that IPIGuard achieves a superior balance between effectiveness and robustness, paving the way for the development of safer agentic systems in dynamic environments.