Adam Poulsen

Adam Poulsen, Ian B. Hickie, Carla Gorban et al.

Conversational generative artificial intelligence agents (or genAI chatbots) could benefit youth mental health, yet young people's perspectives remain underexplored. We examined the Mental health Intelligence Agent (Mia), a genAI chatbot originally designed for professionals in Australian youth services. Following co-design, 32 young people participated in online workshops exploring their perceptions of genAI chatbots in youth mental health and to develop recommendations for reconceptualising Mia for consumers and integrating it into services. Four themes were developed: (1) Humanising AI without dehumanising care, (2) I need to know what's under the hood, (3) Right tool, right place, right time?, and (4) Making it mine on safe ground. This study offers insights into young people's attitudes, needs, and requirements regarding genAI chatbots in youth mental health, with key implications for service integration. Additionally, by co-designing system requirements, this work informs the ethics, design, development, implementation, and governance of genAI chatbots in youth mental health contexts.

Adam Poulsen, Michael Anderson, Susan L. Anderson et al.

The field of machine ethics is concerned with the question of how to embed ethical behaviors, or a means to determine ethical behaviors, into artificial intelligence (AI) systems. The goal is to produce artificial moral agents (AMAs) that are either implicitly ethical (designed to avoid unethical consequences) or explicitly ethical (designed to behave ethically). Van Wynsberghe and Robbins' (2018) paper Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents critically addresses the reasons offered by machine ethicists for pursuing AMA research; this paper, co-authored by machine ethicists and commentators, aims to contribute to the machine ethics conversation by responding to that critique. The reasons for developing AMAs discussed in van Wynsberghe and Robbins (2018) are: it is inevitable that they will be developed; the prevention of harm; the necessity for public trust; the prevention of immoral use; such machines are better moral reasoners than humans, and building these machines would lead to a better understanding of human morality. In this paper, each co-author addresses those reasons in turn. In so doing, this paper demonstrates that the reasons critiqued are not shared by all co-authors; each machine ethicist has their own reasons for researching AMAs. But while we express a diverse range of views on each of the six reasons in van Wynsberghe and Robbins' critique, we nevertheless share the opinion that the scientific study of AMAs has considerable value.