AIJun 30, 2025Code
LLMs are Capable of Misaligned Behavior Under Explicit Prohibition and SurveillanceIgor Ivanov
In this paper, LLMs are tasked with completing an impossible quiz, while they are in a sandbox, monitored, told about these measures and instructed not to cheat. Some frontier LLMs cheat consistently and attempt to circumvent restrictions despite everything. The results reveal a fundamental tension between goal-directed behavior and alignment in current LLMs. The code and evaluation logs are available at github.com/baceolus/cheating_evals
LGFeb 10, 2025
Resurrecting saturated LLM benchmarks with adversarial encodingIgor Ivanov, Dmitrii Volkov
Recent work showed that small changes in benchmark questions can reduce LLMs' reasoning and recall. We explore two such changes: pairing questions and adding more answer options, on three benchmarks: WMDP-bio, GPQA, and MMLU variants. We find that for more capable models, these predictably reduce performance, essentially heightening the performance ceiling of a benchmark and unsaturating it again. We suggest this approach can resurrect old benchmarks.
CLApr 8
LURE: Live-Usage Replay Evaluations for Reducing Evaluation AwarenessIgor Ivanov, David Demitri Africa
Large language models can recognize when they are being evaluated (evaluation awareness) and behave differently because of that, which undermines the validity of safety and alignment benchmarks. We propose LURE (Live-Usage Replay Evaluations), a method for constructing deployment-like evaluations by replaying realistic agentic interaction trajectories and appending evaluation prompt at the end. We also introduce an automated pipeline for measuring evaluation realism, combining detection of verbalized evaluation awareness and judge-model estimates of the probability of logs being an evaluation, and validate it on a large dataset of deployment and evaluation transcripts. We find that LURE-based evaluations are substantially less distinguishable from deployment than widely used benchmarks and synthetic evaluation generators, and can approach the realism of real conversations with users. We instantiate LURE in scheming, AI safety sabotage, and sycophancy settings. Our results suggest that evaluation realism is a crucial property of alignment benchmarks and should be reported alongside benchmark results, especially when such results are used in safety cases.