Peter D. Grunwald

Zakaria Mhammedi, Peter D. Grunwald, Benjamin Guedj

We present a new PAC-Bayesian generalization bound. Standard bounds contain a $\sqrt{L_n \cdot \KL/n}$ complexity term which dominates unless $L_n$, the empirical error of the learning algorithm's randomized predictions, vanishes. We manage to replace $L_n$ by a term which vanishes in many more situations, essentially whenever the employed learning algorithm is sufficiently stable on the dataset at hand. Our new bound consistently beats state-of-the-art bounds both on a toy example and on UCI datasets (with large enough $n$). Theoretically, unlike existing bounds, our new bound can be expected to converge to $0$ faster whenever a Bernstein/Tsybakov condition holds, thus connecting PAC-Bayesian generalization and {\em excess risk\/} bounds---for the latter it has long been known that faster convergence can be obtained under Bernstein conditions. Our main technical tool is a new concentration inequality which is like Bernstein's but with $X^2$ taken outside its expectation.

Peter D. Grunwald, Joseph Y. Halpern

We consider how an agent should update her uncertainty when it is represented by a set P of probability distributions and the agent observes that a random variable X takes on value x, given that the agent makes decisions using the minimax criterion, perhaps the best-studied and most commonly-used criterion in the literature. We adopt a game-theoretic framework, where the agent plays against a bookie, who chooses some distribution from P. We consider two reasonable games that differ in what the bookie knows when he makes his choice. Anomalies that have been observed before, like time inconsistency, can be understood as arising because different games are being played, against bookies with different information. We characterize the important special cases in which the optimal decision rules according to the minimax criterion amount to either conditioning or simply ignoring the information. Finally, we consider the relationship between conditioning and calibration when uncertainty is described by sets of probabilities.

Peter D. Grunwald, Joseph Y. Halpern

It is commonly-accepted wisdom that more information is better, and that information should never be ignored. Here we argue, using both a Bayesian and a non-Bayesian analysis, that in some situations you are better off ignoring information if your uncertainty is represented by a set of probability measures. These include situations in which the information is relevant for the prediction task at hand. In the non-Bayesian analysis, we show how ignoring information avoids dilation, the phenomenon that additional pieces of information sometimes lead to an increase in uncertainty. In the Bayesian analysis, we show that for small sample sizes and certain prediction tasks, the Bayesian posterior based on a noninformative prior yields worse predictions than simply ignoring the given information.

Peter D. Grunwald, Joseph Y. Halpern

As examples such as the Monty Hall puzzle show, applying conditioning to update a probability distribution on a ``naive space', which does not take into account the protocol used, can often lead to counterintuitive results. Here we examine why. A criterion known as CAR (coarsening at random) in the statistical literature characterizes when ``naive' conditioning in a naive space works. We show that the CAR condition holds rather infrequently. We then consider more generalized notions of update such as Jeffrey conditioning and minimizing relative entropy (MRE). We give a generalization of the CAR condition that characterizes when Jeffrey conditioning leads to appropriate answers, but show that there are no such conditions for MRE. This generalizes and interconnects previous results obtained in the literature on CAR and MRE.

Peter D. Grunwald

We give an interpretation of the Maximum Entropy (MaxEnt) Principle in game-theoretic terms. Based on this interpretation, we make a formal distinction between different ways of {em applying/} Maximum Entropy distributions. MaxEnt has frequently been criticized on the grounds that it leads to highly representation dependent results. Our distinction allows us to avoid this problem in many cases.