Zhijian Duan

Yurong Chen, Qian Wang, Zhijian Duan et al. · pku

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

Zhijian Duan, Yunxuan Ma, Xiaotie Deng

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

Jie Fu, Xue Geng, Zhijian Duan et al.

Knowledge Distillation (KD) is a common method for transferring the ``knowledge'' learned by one machine learning model (the \textit{teacher}) into another model (the \textit{student}), where typically, the teacher has a greater capacity (e.g., more parameters or higher bit-widths). To our knowledge, existing methods overlook the fact that although the student absorbs extra knowledge from the teacher, both models share the same input data -- and this data is the only medium by which the teacher's knowledge can be demonstrated. Due to the difference in model capacities, the student may not benefit fully from the same data points on which the teacher is trained. On the other hand, a human teacher may demonstrate a piece of knowledge with individualized examples adapted to a particular student, for instance, in terms of her cultural background and interests. Inspired by this behavior, we design data augmentation agents with distinct roles to facilitate knowledge distillation. Our data augmentation agents generate distinct training data for the teacher and student, respectively. We find empirically that specially tailored data points enable the teacher's knowledge to be demonstrated more effectively to the student. We compare our approach with existing KD methods on training popular neural architectures and demonstrate that role-wise data augmentation improves the effectiveness of KD over strong prior approaches. The code for reproducing our results can be found at https://github.com/bigaidream-projects/role-kd

Weiping Song, Chence Shi, Zhiping Xiao et al.

Click-through rate (CTR) prediction, which aims to predict the probability of a user clicking on an ad or an item, is critical to many online applications such as online advertising and recommender systems. The problem is very challenging since (1) the input features (e.g., the user id, user age, item id, item category) are usually sparse and high-dimensional, and (2) an effective prediction relies on high-order combinatorial features (\textit{a.k.a.} cross features), which are very time-consuming to hand-craft by domain experts and are impossible to be enumerated. Therefore, there have been efforts in finding low-dimensional representations of the sparse and high-dimensional raw features and their meaningful combinations. In this paper, we propose an effective and efficient method called the \emph{AutoInt} to automatically learn the high-order feature interactions of input features. Our proposed algorithm is very general, which can be applied to both numerical and categorical input features. Specifically, we map both the numerical and categorical features into the same low-dimensional space. Afterwards, a multi-head self-attentive neural network with residual connections is proposed to explicitly model the feature interactions in the low-dimensional space. With different layers of the multi-head self-attentive neural networks, different orders of feature combinations of input features can be modeled. The whole model can be efficiently fit on large-scale raw data in an end-to-end fashion. Experimental results on four real-world datasets show that our proposed approach not only outperforms existing state-of-the-art approaches for prediction but also offers good explainability. Code is available at: \url{https://github.com/DeepGraphLearning/RecommenderSystems}.

Hanyu Li, Wenhan Huang, Zhijian Duan et al.

Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet economics and multi-agent learning. This paper reviews various algorithms computing the Nash equilibrium and its approximation solutions in finite normal-form games from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. For the theoretical part, we classify algorithms in the literature and present basic ideas on algorithm design and analysis. For the empirical part, we present a comprehensive comparison on the algorithms in the literature over different kinds of games. Based on these results, we provide practical suggestions on implementations and uses of these algorithms. Finally, we present a series of open problems from both theoretical and practical considerations.

Zhijian Duan, Yusen Huo, Tianyu Wang et al.

In online advertising, advertisers commonly utilize auto-bidding services to bid for impression opportunities. A typical objective of the auto-bidder is to optimize the advertiser's cumulative value of winning impressions within specified budget constraints. However, such a problem is challenging due to the complex bidding environment faced by diverse advertisers. To address this challenge, we introduce ABPlanner, a few-shot adaptable budget planner designed to improve budget-constrained auto-bidding. ABPlanner is based on a hierarchical bidding framework that decomposes the bidding process into shorter, manageable stages. Within this framework, ABPlanner allocates the budget across all stages, allowing a low-level auto-bidder to bids based on the budget allocation plan. The adaptability of ABPlanner is achieved through a sequential decision-making approach, inspired by in-context reinforcement learning. For each advertiser, ABPlanner adjusts the budget allocation plan episode by episode, using data from previous episodes as prompt for current decisions. This enables ABPlanner to quickly adapt to different advertisers with few-shot data, providing a sample-efficient solution. Extensive simulation experiments and real-world A/B testing validate the effectiveness of ABPlanner, demonstrating its capability to enhance the cumulative value achieved by auto-bidders.

Yunxuan Ma, Siqiang Wang, Zhijian Duan et al.

This paper introduces TEDI (Truthful, Expressive, and Dimension-Insensitive approach), a discretization-free algorithm to learn truthful and utility-maximizing mechanisms. Existing learning-based approaches often rely on discretization of outcome spaces to ensure truthfulness, which leads to inefficiency with increasing problem size. To address this limitation, we formalize the concept of pricing rules, defined as functions that map outcomes to prices. Based on this concept, we propose a novel menu mechanism, which can be equivalent to a truthful direct mechanism under specific conditions. The core idea of TEDI lies in its parameterization of pricing rules using Partial GroupMax Network, a new network architecture designed to universally approximate partial convex functions. To learn optimal pricing rules, we develop novel training techniques, including covariance trick and continuous sampling, to derive unbiased gradient estimators compatible with first-order optimization. Theoretical analysis establishes that TEDI guarantees truthfulness, full expressiveness, and dimension-insensitivity. Experimental evaluation in the studied auction setting demonstrates that TEDI achieves strong performance, competitive with or exceeding state-of-the-art methods. This work presents the first approaches to learn truthful mechanisms without outcome discretization, thereby enhancing algorithmic efficiency. The proposed concepts, network architecture, and learning techniques might offer potential value and provide new insights for automated mechanism design and differentiable economics.

Yunxuan Ma, Yide Bian, Hao Xu et al.

Market equilibrium is one of the most fundamental solution concepts in economics and social optimization analysis. Existing works on market equilibrium computation primarily focus on settings with relatively few buyers. Motivated by this, our paper investigates the computation of market equilibrium in scenarios with a large-scale buyer population, where buyers and goods are represented by their contexts. Building on this realistic and generalized contextual market model, we introduce MarketFCNet, a deep learning-based method for approximating market equilibrium. We start by parameterizing the allocation of each good to each buyer using a neural network, which depends solely on the context of the buyer and the good. Next, we propose an efficient method to unbiasedly estimate the loss function of the training algorithm, enabling us to optimize the network parameters through gradient. To evaluate the approximated solution, we propose a metric called Nash Gap, which quantifies the deviation of the given allocation and price pair from the market equilibrium. Experimental results indicate that MarketFCNet delivers competitive performance and significantly lower running times compared to existing methods as the market scale expands, demonstrating the potential of deep learning-based methods to accelerate the approximation of large-scale contextual market equilibrium.

Zhijian Duan, Haoran Sun, Yichong Xia et al.

Identifying high-revenue mechanisms that are both dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) and individually rational (IR) is a fundamental challenge in auction design. While theoretical approaches have encountered bottlenecks in multi-item auctions, there has been much empirical progress in automated designing such mechanisms using machine learning. However, existing research primarily focuses on randomized auctions, with less attention given to the more practical deterministic auctions. Therefore, this paper investigates the automated design of deterministic auctions and introduces OD-VVCA, an objective decomposition approach for automated designing Virtual Valuations Combinatorial Auctions (VVCAs). Firstly, we restrict our mechanism to deterministic VVCAs, which are inherently DSIC and IR. Afterward, we utilize a parallelizable dynamic programming algorithm to compute the allocation and revenue outcomes of a VVCA efficiently. We then decompose the revenue objective function into continuous and piecewise constant discontinuous components, optimizing each using distinct methods. Extensive experiments show that OD-VVCA achieves high revenue in multi-item auctions, especially in large-scale settings where it outperforms both randomized and deterministic baselines, indicating its efficacy and scalability.

Zhijian Duan, Haoran Sun, Yurong Chen et al.

Automated auction design aims to find empirically high-revenue mechanisms through machine learning. Existing works on multi item auction scenarios can be roughly divided into RegretNet-like and affine maximizer auctions (AMAs) approaches. However, the former cannot strictly ensure dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC), while the latter faces scalability issue due to the large number of allocation candidates. To address these limitations, we propose AMenuNet, a scalable neural network that constructs the AMA parameters (even including the allocation menu) from bidder and item representations. AMenuNet is always DSIC and individually rational (IR) due to the properties of AMAs, and it enhances scalability by generating candidate allocations through a neural network. Additionally, AMenuNet is permutation equivariant, and its number of parameters is independent of auction scale. We conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate that AMenuNet outperforms strong baselines in both contextual and non-contextual multi-item auctions, scales well to larger auctions, generalizes well to different settings, and identifies useful deterministic allocations. Overall, our proposed approach offers an effective solution to automated DSIC auction design, with improved scalability and strong revenue performance in various settings.

Zhijian Duan, Jingwu Tang, Yutong Yin et al.

One of the central problems in auction design is developing an incentive-compatible mechanism that maximizes the auctioneer's expected revenue. While theoretical approaches have encountered bottlenecks in multi-item auctions, recently, there has been much progress on finding the optimal mechanism through deep learning. However, these works either focus on a fixed set of bidders and items, or restrict the auction to be symmetric. In this work, we overcome such limitations by factoring \emph{public} contextual information of bidders and items into the auction learning framework. We propose $\mathtt{CITransNet}$, a context-integrated transformer-based neural network for optimal auction design, which maintains permutation-equivariance over bids and contexts while being able to find asymmetric solutions. We show by extensive experiments that $\mathtt{CITransNet}$ can recover the known optimal solutions in single-item settings, outperform strong baselines in multi-item auctions, and generalize well to cases other than those in training.

Zhijian Duan, Wenhan Huang, Dinghuai Zhang et al.

In this paper, we investigate the learnability of the function approximator that approximates Nash equilibrium (NE) for games generated from a distribution. First, we offer a generalization bound using the Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning model. The bound describes the gap between the expected loss and empirical loss of the NE approximator. Afterward, we prove the agnostic PAC learnability of the Nash approximator. In addition to theoretical analysis, we demonstrate an application of NE approximator in experiments. The trained NE approximator can be used to warm-start and accelerate classical NE solvers. Together, our results show the practicability of approximating NE through function approximation.

Weiping Song, Zhijian Duan, Ziqing Yang et al.

This paper studies recommender systems with knowledge graphs, which can effectively address the problems of data sparsity and cold start. Recently, a variety of methods have been developed for this problem, which generally try to learn effective representations of users and items and then match items to users according to their representations. Though these methods have been shown quite effective, they lack good explanations, which are critical to recommender systems. In this paper, we take a different route and propose generating recommendations by finding meaningful paths from users to items. Specifically, we formulate the problem as a sequential decision process, where the target user is defined as the initial state, and the edges on the graphs are defined as actions. We shape the rewards according to existing state-of-the-art methods and then train a policy function with policy gradient methods. Experimental results on three real-world datasets show that our proposed method not only provides effective recommendations but also offers good explanations.